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Abstract
Sukuk are financial instruments similar to bonds that are compliant with Shari’ah
(Islamic law). Since their inception in 2002, sukuk markets have experienced dramatic
growth rates, attracting the attention of investors, analysts, and researchers alike.
Despite Islamic bonds (thereafter termed sukuk) successfully holding their place in the
international bond markets, this dissertation’s literature survey reveals that few
empirical studies have undertaken a risk analysis of sukuk markets from the investors’
perspectives. Conventional bonds and sukuk as financial instruments are both exposed
to various types of financial and market risks. This dissertation’s purpose is to engage
in a risk analysis of sukuk markets compared with conventional bonds. Using a value
at risk (VaR) approach, we examine whether sukuk are exposed to higher market risks
than conventional bonds. In addition, we investigate whether the inclusion of sukuk in
investment portfolios provides a diversification benefit to individual investors. We
find that, for a given issuer, a conventional bonds’ VaR is significantly higher than
that of sukuk, indicating that sukuk are less risky. We also find evidence of persistent
sukuk illiquidity. We further show that introducing a sukuk allocation to a bond
portfolio improves the risk–return trade-off. This dissertation’s findings have
important policy implications for investors and Islamic bond issuers. Moreover, they
are of particular importance to policy makers.
Keywords: Islamic finance, conventional bonds, Islamic bonds, sukuk, VaR, hedging
analysis.
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)Title and Abstract (in Arabic

صكُوك اإلسالمية مقارنة بالسندات التقليدية :أدلَّة جديدة؛ باستخدام طريقة القيمة
أداء ال ُّ
المعرضة للخطر
الملخص

ص ُكوك هي أدوات ماليَّة ،مماثلة للسندات ،التي تتوافق و أحكام الشريعة اإلسالمية .فمنذ تأسيسها
ال ُّ
ُ
نمو كبيرة جذبت انتباه المستثمرين ،والمحللين،
في عام  ،2002شهدت
أسواق ال ُّ
ص ُكوك معدَّالت ٍّ
والباحثين على ٍّ
حد سواء .وعلى الرغم من السندات اإلسالمية التي حافظت بنجاح على مكانتها،
ص ُكوك إال َّ
س ِّم َي ْ
أن هناك دراسا ٍّ
ت تجريبية
ت ــ فيما بعد ـ بال ُّ
في أسواق السندات الدوليَّة التي ُ
ص ُكوك ؛ من وجهة نظر المستثمرين .إن السندات
سوق ال ُّ
محدودة ،اقتصرت على تحليل مخاطر ُ
ص ُكوك اإلسالمية ــ كأدوات ماليَّة ــ معرضة ألنواع مختلفة من المخاطر المالية،
التقليدية ،وال ُّ
ص ُكوك اإلسالمية،
سوق ال ُّ
والسوقية .والغرض من هذه الرسالة ،هو استكشاف تحليل مخاطر ُ
مقارنة بالسندات التقليدية .وباستخدام طريقة القيمة المعرضة للخطر ،نقوم بدراسة ما إذا كانت
ص ُكوك تتعرض لمخاطر سوق أعلى من السندات التقليدية .وباإلضافة إلى ذلك ،فإننا نحقق فيما
ال ُّ
ص ُكوك في محفظة االستثمار سوف يوفِّر منافع التنويع للمستثمرين األفراد .ونجد
إذا كان إدراج ال ُّ
أنه بالنسبة لمصدر معين ،فإن القيمة المعرضة للخطر للمخاطر التقليدية أعلى بكثير من القيمة
ص ُكوك أق ُّل ُخ ُ
طورة .كما نجد أدلة
ص ُكوك  ،األمر الذي يشير إلى أن ال ُّ
المعرضة للخطر في ال ُّ
ص ُكوك  .كما نوضح أن إدخال مخصصات صكوك لمحفظة
على استمرار عدم السيولة في ال ُّ
السندات يُحسِّن من العالقة بين المخاطر ،والعائد .والنتائج التي تسعى إليها هذه األُطروحة لها
تأثير مهم في السِّياسة العامة ،بالنسبة للمستثمرين ،ومصدري السندات اإلسالمية .وعالوة على
صة لصانعي السياسات االقتصادية.
ذلك ،فهي ذات أهميَّة خا َّ
مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية :التمويل اإلسالمي ،سندات تقليدية ،سندات إسالمية ،صكوك ،القيمة
المعرضة للخطر.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Orientation of the Thesis
An analysis of markets worldwide shows that the financial markets of Islamic
countries have been growing rapidly, by 15% annually, compared with the global
financial market.1 This growth is believed to represent the fastest growing section of
the global financial market; moreover, nothing indicates that the trend will slow down
in the near future (Chong & Liu, 2009). Such growth may simply be because the region
is an “emerging market” that has been developing slowly for the last five to six decades
and is now able to catch up with more matured countries such as China, India, and
Brazil. Further, over the last decade, investors have seen an unparalleled increase in
financial institutions supporting Islamic markets and the widespread issuing of Islamic
bonds called sukuk (Christophe, Turk-Ariss, & Weill, 2013). Sukuk are Islamic
investment debt. Defining them in this way is vital since sukuk should not be seen
merely as a substitute for conventional securities that are interest-based. Sukuk
investments generally aim to introduce a new brand of monetary products that mimic
fixed-rate debts, floating rate notes, and bonds that are similar to those used by
traditional monetary markets worldwide (Cakir & Raei, 2007; Godlewski & Weill,
2010). However, sukuk are firmly linked with Shari’ah (Islamic law) (Ayman &
Christopher, 2007).
The sukuk market has been growing tremendously since its inception.
However, debate is continuing among scholars regarding the distinction between

1

The Global University of Islamic Finance (INCEIF) reports that the global Islamic finance industry
was worth approximately US$2.1 trillion in 2014. The industry is predicted to reach US$6.5 trillion by
2020 (http://www.inceif.org/industry-growth/).
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sukuk and its conventional counterpart. This thesis aims to assess the difference
between sukuk and conventional bonds by capturing any additional diversification
benefits that can be gained by adding sukuk to conventional fixed income portfolios.
Further, it evaluates the risks associated with sukuk and compares these with the risks
of conventional bonds issued by the same issuer. I employed the value at risk (VaR)
approach to achieve this goal. This study’s findings suggest that sukuk and
conventional bond prices display different behaviors in the secondary market. They
also confirm, in accordance with prior literature, the diversification gains achievable
by adding sukuk to conventional bond portfolios.
Fixed-income Islamic securities are potentially as useful to investors as
conventional bonds. Moreover, for non-Muslim investors and who already own
conventional bonds, the acquisition of sukuk presents an “applauded” new brand asset
that gives them greater economic diversity and conceivably reduces their risks (Hesse,
Jobst, & Sole, 2008). However, it is clear that investing in sukuk conveys numerous
kinds of risks, including the risk of default, which affects interest rates that could
change as reflected in the debit mechanism, and a risk to the investor’s credit rating.
These risks could help investors to assess their future prospects of payments with
regard to specific sukuk issues (Zakaria, Isa, & Abidin, 2012). Nevertheless, there are
additional risks that could arise because of interest rate changes and the debt
instrument being represented in a currency other than the investor’s own. These risks
are collectively called market risk. They may occur with all kinds of commodities,
ranging from oil to precious metals, or to equities and debt tools (Tariq & Dar, 2007).
Recent literature on Islamic finance has focused mainly on the characteristics
of these markets and on the relative performance of the Islamic finance industry
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(banks) compared with the conventional counterpart (e.g., Abdullah, Hassan, &
Mohamad, 2007; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013; Hayat & Kraussl, 2011;
Hussein & Omran, 2005; Jawadi, Jawadi, & Louhichi, 2014; Karim, Lee, Karim, &
Jais, 2012). However, very few studies have empirically focused on analyzing relative
performance in terms of the market risk associated with sukuk compared with the
conventional counterpart. For example, Cakir and Raei (2007) investigate sukuk price
behavior and found a genuine difference. Using the case of sovereign sukuk and
Eurobonds from a similar issuer, they estimated and compared the VaR for a portfolio
that included both instruments with a portfolio that contained only Eurobonds. The
results indicated a lower VaR when sukuk were added to the portfolio, demonstrating
sukuk’s diversification benefits. Similarly, Ramasamy, Yan, and Schmidt (2011) find
that sukuk are less risky than conventional bonds. Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill
(2011), however, suggest no significant market reaction to conventional bond issues
but a significantly negative stock market reaction to sukuk.
This thesis seeks to extend the current literature on market risk in general and
contribute to the literature on Islamic investments in particular. It examines the market
risk associated with sukuk and compares it with the risk of the conventional
counterpart. Specifically, the objectives of this research are to provide a broad,
theoretical description of the risks and their characteristics, and estimate the market
risk of sukuk. The thesis also assesses whether including sukuk in a bond portfolio
investment provides diversification advantages for investors.

1.2 Motivation for the Thesis
This study was undertaken mainly because of the limited availability of
empirical literature on Islamic sukuk. Research in this area has become essential
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because of the recent attention received by this financial instrument. Investors are
looking for safe, reliable, and Shari’ah-compliant investment vehicles, especially in
Asia and the Gulf region. Additionally, sukuk have now become a preferred source of
financing for many countries as opposed to conventional bonds (Ab Majid, Shahimi,
Hafizuddin, & Hafizuddin-Syah, 2010; Al-Ajmi, Al-Saleh, & Hussain, 2011). Given
such attention, sukuk transactions have shown solid growth from US$8 billion to more
than US$251 billion over the last decade (DinarStandard, 2013). Further, various
institutions, advisors, and experts have become interested in providing sukuk
investment services to conventional investors as well as corporations and governments
(Cakir & Raei, 2007). In the following chapters, we first compare sukuk to
conventional bonds, then discuss in detail the risks associated with them.

1.3 Research Significance and Contributions
This research adds to the literature in the area of Islamic finance. It is perhaps
the first comprehensive empirical research on the risks of Islamic sukuk. The research
goes to the core of the controversy regarding the market risk associated with sukuk as
a distinctive financing tool compared with other traditional tools. While there have
been several empirical studies comparing the risk and profitability of Islamic and
conventional bonds, the market risk performance of sukuk has remained largely
unexplored. This study seeks to expand knowledge, clarify misconceptions, and
provide guidance related to sukuk’s potential market risk compared with the risk
associated with conventional bonds. In sum, this research delivers an abstract work
that can be used as a benchmark for further research.
This dissertation includes comprehensive theoretical definitions and aspects of
sukuk-associated risks. Moreover, it uses the VaR approach to evaluate and measure
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the market risk of sukuk. This study’s outcome has important policy implications for
investors and Islamic bond issuers. With regard to investors, it provides evidence about
whether sukuk offer less risk than conventional equivalents, whether adding sukuk to
their portfolios provides diversification benefits, and whether they should invest in
sukuk funds to improve their portfolios’ performance.
Sukuk issuance is encouraged by governments in Muslim countries for at least
two reasons. First, there is widespread evidence that efficient capital markets foster
economic growth. A well-organized and liquid sukuk market can therefore boost
economic growth while being consistent with Shari’ah. Although the link between
capital markets and economic growth can apply to all instruments (sukuk as well as
conventional bonds), sukuk have added features that make them particularly attractive
from a public policy perspective: Shari’ah compliance, economic system stability,
reduced moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and an economic system more
conducive to poverty alleviation. Second, this study shows that sukuk carry less market
risk than conventional bonds.
International investors who do not specifically pursue Shari’ah-compliant
investment objectives can also benefit from allocating part of their resources to sukuk.
This study shows that sukuk are proving to be an excellent diversifier for a bond
portfolio and improve significantly the risk–return tradeoff, as measured by the Sharpe
ratio.
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1.4 Research Objectives
This study’s overall objective is to analyze and compare the market risk of
sukuk and compare it to the risk of conventional bonds. The key objectives are as
follows:
1. To examine whether including Islamic sukuk in a bond portfolio will reduce
market risk.
2. To evaluate whether Value at Risk approach (VaR) is an appropriate method
to measure the market risk of sukuk and conventional bonds.

1.5 Research Questions
This research aims to answer the following questions along with any other
secondary questions that may arise throughout the study.
1. Do sukuk expose investors to higher market risk than conventional bonds?
2. Is the VaR approach a good method to measure and evaluate the market risk of
sukuk and conventional bonds?
3. Does investing in sukuk provide viable diversification benefits for investors?

1.6 Research Hypotheses
This dissertation empirically examines the following null hypotheses.
H1: The market risk of sukuk is less than that of conventional bonds.
H2: VaR is a proper measure for calculating the market risk of sukuk.
H3: Including sukuk in investment portfolios provides additional diversification
benefit to investors.
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Because risk is a core concern in this study, a comparative analysis is carried
out to investigate the risks of conventional bonds compared with sukuk. Thus, because
of the nature of the study, a quadratic (econometric) paradigm will be followed. The
empirical findings are compared with existing theories and the limited empirical
studies available on this topic. Theoretically, we can argue that Islamic sukuk may be
less risky than conventional bonds for the following reasons.
1. Islamic sukuk offer investors cash flow products, often not closely related to
the market’s interest rate, which tend toward a sustainable average; thus, they
are less sensitive to the fluctuations in market’s interest rate.
2. The sukuk market remains relatively isolated from most other financial markets
and, thus, is less risky when compared with bonds.
3. Shari’ah principles require certain ethical business practices, underlying
productive assets, equitable risk sharing, and the avoidance of speculative
trading, all of which may make sukuk subject to less market risk when
compared with stock markets.
4. Foreign exchange principles applicable to sukuk with an underlying asset are
denominated in one currency and sukuk certificates issued in another currency.
As suggested by Tariq & Dar (2007), exchange-rate fluctuations in this case
can lead to losses for the investor or issuer.
5. Sukuk may be exposed to a price risk of their underlying assets in a secondary
market, which may result in decreased risk.

1.7 Data and Research Methodology
The management and evaluation of risks is a major issue for financial
institutions. The total capital requirement for a financial institution in the context of
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market risk is described as the total of the requirement for positions in foreign
exchange, equities, interest rates, commodities, and gold. The most popular and
traditional measure of risk is variance or the standard deviation (volatility) of a
distribution. The main problem with this measure, however, is that it does not consider
the direction of an investment's movement; a financial asset can be volatile because it
suddenly jumps higher. Further, for investors, risk is about the odds of loss rather than
gains. A much better approach is risk’s focus on the tail of distribution of portfolio
returns; namely, Value at Risk approach (VaR). Value at risk approach is the degree
of loss on a portfolio that the investor expects to be maintained at the same level or
beyond, while keeping a margin of small probability. Thus, this risk measure could be
regarded as a forecast of a given percentile, mostly in the lower tail, of the probability
distribution of portfolio returns. The significance of VaR as a measurement of financial
market risk is highlighted by the fact that financial institutions have been obligated by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements
to meet capital requirements in accordance with this risk measure (Dowd, 1999). This
method is used to analyze data and measure risks to achieve the study’s objectives.
The analyzed sample of sukuk and conventional bonds came from Datastream. Despite
the increasing interest in sukuk issuance globally, there is a lack of authentic data on
various markets. The sample size was determined by the information available on all
requested variables. The goal was to select data that had similar characteristics, such
as the same issuer, duration, price, structure, coupon, and yields of Islamic Sukuk, with
the conventional bonds focusing on corporate bonds and trade bonds that were already
issued. We selected only the bonds (Islamic and conventional) on which we have
complete data. With the selected data, we applied the methodology described earlier.
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Moreover, Datastream was used to extract daily data from the Dow Jones Corporate
Bond Index and the Dow Jones Sukuk Index.

1.8 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the background of
Islamic finance. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on conventional and Islamic bonds.
Chapter 4 describes the methodology. Chapter 5 focuses on descriptive statistics.
Chapters 6 and 7 present the results and findings. A summary of the results,
implications, contributions, recommendations for further research, limitations, and
suggestions are presented in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2: Islamic Finance/ Background
2.1 Introduction
Islamic finance has been growing rapidly in recent years. Motivated by a
heightened interest in financial instruments emphasizing risk sharing, it is attracting
greater attention in the wake of the recent global financial crisis. This class of
instrument appears to have avoided many of the most severe consequences of the
crisis. Several features underpin the expansion and performance of Islamic finance.
For instance, Islamic finance is rapidly evolving and expanding, with banking assets
estimated to exceed US$920 billion in 2015 (EYGM, 2015). Since the first experiment
of the Mit Ghamr Bank (MGB) in Egypt in 1963, Islamic financial services have
become increasingly attractive to over 1.6 billion Muslims across the world. Such
dramatic growth has stretched well beyond Muslim countries in a way that suggests
Islamic finance is becoming a global financial force that cannot be ignored(Jung,YongCheo,&Stulz,1996). The importance of Islamic finance stems from its ultimate
objective of achieving socioeconomic development and social justice among different
groups in society. However, the rise of Islamic finance has posed a dilemma for
Muslim governments to either accept or restrain this new phenomenon. Despite the
awareness that Islamic finance “could potentially contribute to capital formation and
economic development” (Wilson, 2008), the dilemma has led to the slowdown of such
finance in some Muslim countries. This slowdown has been accompanied by the
emergence of arguments that perceive the state as the sole responsible agent of such a
drawback because of retrogressive policies.
Islamic finance is based on Shari’ah, which in essence requires that gains be
derived from ethical and socially responsible investments and discourages interest-
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based banking and investments. Islamic finance is fundamentally different from
conventional banking models because it is based on profit and loss sharing (PLS) and
the prohibition of riba (interest). This structure requires that a financial institution
invests with a client to finance the client’s transaction rather than lend money to the
client. Because of the inherent risk involved in any investment, the financial institution
is entitled to profit from the financial transaction. This is in stark contrast to modern
finance in which interest is one of the key methods by which banks make money
through their products, such as mortgages and personal loans. Another fundamental
distinction of Islamic banking is the absence of insurance that protects clients’
deposits, which is found in conventional banks.
While PLS permits the receipt of money by depositors when invested deposits
have earned a profit, depositors must incur losses when deposit investments incur
losses in order to comply with Shari’ah mandates. Deposit insurance, such as the
protection provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, defeats the very
purpose of the PLS model, because the depositor does not incur any risk. Deposit
insurance is an integral part of Western banking regulations but is in direct conflict
with the basic concepts of Islamic banking. The issue of deposit insurance has proven
to be a major hurdle for Western, primarily European, banks that wanted and have
chosen to provide Shari’ah-compliant products. European banks have overcome this
hurdle of deposit insurance by informing clients that the insurance is not Shari’ahcompliant.
Because of a lack of uniformity in the application of Islamic principles, specific
banking procedures may be accepted by some Muslims and rejected by others. Modern
Islamic finance products generally address two major issues: riba and gharar. Riba is
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the payment of charges for the use of money, including interest and usury, and is
forbidden in the Qur’an in a number of places. An uncertain rate of return (a profit) is
permissible, but a fixed rate of return (interest) is prohibited. Purely financial
agreements that are Shari’ah-compliant do not exist because there must always be an
asset underlying a contract.
Gharar is the idea of risk or uncertainty, but can also imply deceit. Gharar in a
form of “normal” risk or hazard is not forbidden; however, any deceit, fraud, or undue
advantage that results in injustice to either party is prohibited. In addition to the
Shari’ah principles pertaining to riba and gharar, any financial relationship following
Islamic principles must also consider activities that may be impermissible (haram)
under the Qur’an. For example, it is unacceptable for a bank to fund a business that is
involved in the production of alcoholic beverages or a restaurant that serves alcohol,
or for a mutual fund to invest in a casino or in a business that makes or sells either pork
or pornography.
Among the Islamic concepts commonly used in Islamic banking are profit
sharing (mudharabah), safekeeping (wadiah), joint venture (musharakah), cost-plus
(murabahah), and leasing (ijarah). There is a consensus among Muslim scholars that
the Qur’an prohibits usury, which is the payment and/or collection of any type of
interest. The payment and collection of interest is referred to as riba. In addition,
Islamic law prohibits investing in businesses that are haram. In addition to prohibiting
riba and investing in haram industries, the Qur’an clearly admonishes gharar, which
can be interpreted to mean “contractual uncertainty and/or ambiguity,” and maisir,
which is gambling. Despite differences from its Western counterparts, Islamic finance
has the same purpose as conventional banking except that it operates in accordance
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with the rules of Shari’ah, known as fiqh al-muamalat (Islamic rules on transactions).
Unlike ordinary commercial banks whose operations are based on interest, Islamic
banks operate an interest-free system and are guided by the common principle that
depositors, instead of receiving a fixed return in the form of interest, share the risk of
investment and take part of the resulting profits or bear part of the losses.
Such an investment is a contractual agreement between a bank, financial
institution, or capital investor and an entrepreneur. This agreement can be viewed as
venture capital funding. Essentially, it is a contract that provides for profit sharing
between a bank and an entrepreneur. In such a contract, the entrepreneur can mobilize
the funds of the former for a business activity. While the bank provides the funding
for the business venture, the entrepreneur provides expertise, labor, and management.
Profits are shared between the bank and the entrepreneur in accordance with a
predetermined ratio. In the event of a loss, the bank loses the capital, while the
entrepreneur loses the provision of labor. It is this financial risk, according to Shari’ah,
that justifies the bank’s claim to part of the profit. The profit sharing continues until
the loan is repaid. Such participatory arrangements between capital and labor reflect
the Islamic view that the borrower must not take on all the risk/cost of a failure,
resulting in a balanced distribution of income and not allowing the lender to
monopolize the economy.
In this arrangement, the depositor and the bank enter into an agreement
whereby the bank acts essentially as the keeper and trustee of the funds deposited.
However, while serving as a trustee, the bank is entitled to use the funds on deposit for
its business endeavors. The bank, however, guarantees a refund of the entire deposit
or whatever balance remains when the depositor demands it. The bank at its discretion
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may periodically reward the depositor with hibah (a gift) in appreciation for allowing
it to use the depositor’s funds. Hibah, in most instances, is a cash payment equivalent
to an interest payment. However, it is not considered riba because there is no guarantee
of such payments and the amount is generally not fixed. The amount, frequency, and
duration of hibah are entirely at the bank’s discretion.
Musharakah can be likened to what is commonly known as joint ventures. In
this scheme, two or more persons or entities combine either their capital or labor to
share the profits, while enjoying similar rights and liabilities. This method of financing
is often used in investment projects, letters of credit, and the purchase of real estate or
property. While the investment by each partner may be unequal, each partner retains
an equal right to manage and participate in the business. In essence, every partner is
an agent for the other because all the partners benefit from the musharakah business.
When a contract of musharakah is made, the condition of agency is automatically
presumed to be in existence in the contract. Although each partner enjoys equal rights
in all respects, any condition regarding participation in the administration of the
musharakah and any variation in the share of profits is considered valid. Further,
although every partner has the right to participate actively in the affairs of musharakah
should they desire, they can choose to relinquish and waive that right without any
repercussions. For example, when a bank enters a fast-food venture with an individual,
it will most likely waive any and all rights regarding the day-to-day management of
the enterprise.
The basis for entitlement to the profits of musharakah is capital, active
participation, the nature of the business, and responsibility. Profits are to be distributed
among the partners in the business based on the proportions settled by them in advance.
The share of every party in the profits must be determined as a proportion or
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percentage. No fixed amount can be settled for any party. However, Muslim scholars
are in unanimous agreement that, with this method of financing, losses shall be
allocated to each partner in proportion to the capital invested.
The foregoing concept refers to the sale of goods at a price that includes a profit
margin agreed by both parties. The purchase and selling price, other costs, and the
profit margin must be clearly stated at the time of the sales agreement. The bank is
compensated for the time value of its money in the form of the profit margin. This is
equivalent to a fixed-income loan for the purchase of a real asset (such as real estate
or a vehicle), with a fixed rate of interest determined by the profit margin. The bank is
not compensated for the time value of money outside the contracted term. Such a
concept is widely used in Islamic mortgage transactions. In these transactions, instead
of loaning the buyer money to purchase a property, the bank may buy the item itself
from the seller and resell it to the buyer at a profit, while allowing the buyer to pay the
bank in installments. However, because profit cannot be made explicit, there are no
additional penalties for late payment. In order to protect itself against default, the bank
requires strict collateral. However, the goods or land are registered in the name of the
buyer from the start of the transaction; as such, the buyer is in fact able to benefit and
receive tax credits, et cetera.
Ijarah simply refers to leasing, renting, or wages. However, under the purview
of Islamic finance, ijarah means selling the benefit or use of a service for a fixed price
or wage. Under this concept, a bank makes available to the customer the use of a
service of assets or equipment, such as plant, office automation, or a motor vehicle,
for a fixed period and price. The benefits derived and the reasons behind this form of
financing are very similar to those that drive major corporations to lease rather than
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purchase equipment, tools, offices, and automobiles. Islamic banks provide a variation
to the leasing model that is used by corporations. This method of financing is known
as ijarah-wal-iqtina and involves a contract under which a bank provides equipment, a
building, or other assets to the client against an agreed rental with a unilateral
undertaking by the bank or the client that at the end of the lease period, ownership of
the asset is transferred to the lessee. The undertaking or the promise does not become
an integral part of the lease contract to make it conditional. The lease and the purchase
price are fixed in such a manner that the bank receives back its principal sum together
with a profit over the period of the lease.

2.2 Islamic Banking and Economic Development
The epistemology of Islamic finance and economics goes back to Shari’ah
principles, which are deduced from the guidance of the Qur’an, Sunna, Ijma, and Qiyas
(Maghrebi, Mirakhor, & Iqbal, 2016). In the particular context of Islamic finance, the
primary sources of Shari’ah permit transactional exchange and prohibit dealings with
interest, ambiguity, and gambling, among others. Thus, all forms of transactions are
bound with inherent risk; however, deferred contracts involve a time interval that is
liable to other risks and requires the parties involved to record the transaction (Aliyu,
Hassan, Mohd Yusuf, & Naiimi, 2017). The risk element of financial transactions
emerges because of the probability of outcomes in the contractual relations, which
necessitate risk and profit sharing under the Islamic concept of financial transactions.
Although Islamic finance is asset-backed, sharing risk and profit is one of the major
tools used to achieve the targeted enhancement in social well-being. Thus, the
empirical literature of Islamic financial activities has encompassed the practical
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direction of Islamic financial transactions regarding convergence to or divergence
from the risk and profit sharing principles (Hassan & Sirajo, 2017).
An Islamic bank is an institution where the main activity, similar to a
conventional bank, is the mobilization of funds from the savers to the agents with a
deficit (companies and business owners). Moreover, all banking activities are
conducted without invoking an interest rate. Thus, the role and the functions of Islamic
banks, like all other banks, are extremely useful and socially desirable. Unfortunately,
the role of conventional banks is tarnished by the practice of charging interest that
limits their activities to operations of money trading. Conventional banks often finance
these operations in terms of short-term and personal loans. This approach does not
answer the need for venture capital; consequently, their effect on economic
development is less than their real potential suggests.
Islamic banks represent an improvement in two ways. Firstly, Islamic banks
frequently offer capital lending to the process of production and, through the
instruments of the process, aim to contribute to companies’ capital. The disbursement
of financial resources in accordance with the requirements of production is more
efficient than allocation in accordance with pure lending principles. It is suggested that
in this regard, Islamic banks’ impact on economic development is more important.
Secondly, Islamic banks guarantee to Muslim people that their contracts will not
include elements of interest, which are forbidden in Islam. Financial development is
an important component of any overall development strategy. Seeing the success of
Islamic banks, which is characterized by an annual growth rate of 16% as participation
banking continues despite political and economic volatility in major regions, several
international banking institutions have started to establish their own Islamic units,
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windows, or branches to capture the opportunity. Some economists believe that this
modern generation of banking will lead to better financial development and growth
than conventional banking.
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has
remained one of the most debated issues in terms of whether the financial sector
actually contributes to the process of economic development. Some authors consider
finance an important element of growth (Goldsmith, 1969; King and Levine, 1993;
McKinnon, 1973; Schumpeter, 1934; Shaw, 1973), while for others it is only a minor
growth factor (Lucas, 1988; Robinson, 1952). Schumpeter (1934) sees the banking
sector as an engine of economic growth through its funding of productive investment.
In contrast, Lucas (1988) argues that the role of finance has been overstressed. Patrick
(1966) also contributes to this literature by identifying two possible patterns in the
causal relationship between financial development and economic growth.
The first pattern is called “demand-following,” which means that the creation
of modern financial institutions, with their financial assets and liabilities, and related
financial services, is in response to the demand for these services by investors and
savers in the real economy. This implies that the financial system can support and
sustain leading sectors in the process of growth. Here, an expansion of the financial
system is considered to be a consequence of real economic growth.
The second pattern is “supply-leading,” which means that the creation of
financial institutions and the supply of their financial assets, liabilities, and related
financial services are in demand, especially from entrepreneurs in modern, growthinducing sectors. Supply-leading has two functions: to transfer resources from
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traditional (non-growth) sectors to modern sectors and to promote and stimulate an
entrepreneurial response in modern sectors.
In addition, Goldsmith (1969) and Gurley and Shaw (1955) argue that more
developed financial markets promote economic growth by mobilizing savings and
facilitating investment. Explicitly or implicitly, it is notable from all studies that an
efficient financial system accelerates economic development. The main contribution
of a financial system to the materialization of growth is that it ensures the functioning
of an efficient and evolutionary payment system, mobilizes saving, and improves
growth’s impact on investment. Thus, the existence of a reliable and sound financial
exchange system is a prerequisite for growth. The financial sector plays a growthpromoting role if it demonstrates the capacity to direct financial resources toward
sectors that demand these the most. When a financial sector is more developed, greater
financial resources can be allocated to productive use; hence, more physical capital is
formed, which in turn leads to economic growth.
However, Odedokun (1992) favors bidirectional causality between finance and
growth. Both financial and economic developments are causally related: financial
development causes an economy to grow; economic growth triggers the financial
sector to develop the economy further. Masih and Masih (1996) support the demandfollowing hypothesis whereby economic growth causes financial sectors to develop.
The more rapid the growth of real national income, the greater will be the demand by
enterprises for external funds (the savings of others). Thus, financial intermediation,
as in most situations, will be less able to finance expansion from internally generated
depreciation allowance and retained profits. Consequently, the financial system can
support and sustain the leading sectors in the process of growth. In this case, an
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expansion of the financial system is induced as a result of real economic growth or
demand-following.
Levine and Zervos (1998) study the empirical relationship between stock
market development, banking development, and long-term economic growth. They
show that stock market liquidity and banking development are both positively and
robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, capital
accumulation, and productivity growth. Fase and Abma (2003) argue that an expansion
of the financial system could have a positive repercussion on economic growth. The
financial sectors in this case act as supply-leading institutions to transfer resources
from traditional, low-growth sectors to modern high-growth sectors and to promote
and stimulate an entrepreneurial response in these modern sectors.
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2005) examine the causal relationship between
financial development and economic growth in Egypt from 1960 to 2001. They use
Granger causality tests and conclude that financial development promotes economic
growth either through increased investment efficiency or capital accumulation. Romeo
(2007) also confirms the positive impact of finance on growth. He investigates the
relationship between finance and growth with an emphasis on the effect of financial
deregulation and banking law harmonization on economic growth in the European
Union. The study establishes that financial intermediation positively impacts
economic growth through three different channels. Kenourgios and Samitas (2007)
examine the long-term relationship between finance and economic growth in Poland
and conclude that credit to the private sector has been one of the main driving forces
of such growth. Huang and Lin (2009) reexamine the dynamic relationship between
financial development and economic growth using the data set employed in Levine,
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Loayza, and Beck (2000). Using a novel threshold regression with the instrumental
variables approach, they support a positive link between financial development and
economic growth. They also find that financial development has an important effect
on growth in low-income countries.
Despite the availability of many studies investigating the relationship between
financial development and economic growth, studies that examine the role of Islamic
financial development in economic growth are scarce. Some limited articles have been
written by scholars from countries in Southeast Asia. Furqani and Mulyany (2009)
examine the dynamic interactions between Islamic banking and the economic growth
of Malaysia by employing the co-integration test and vector error correction model
(VECM) to assess whether the financial system influences growth and whether growth
transforms the financial system’s operation in the long term. They find that, in the
short term, only fixed investment caused Islamic banks to develop in the period 1997–
2005. In the long term, there is evidence of a bidirectional relationship between Islamic
banking and fixed investment; further, there is evidence to support the demandfollowing hypothesis of gross domestic product (GDP) and Islamic banks, whereby an
increase in GDP causes Islamic banking to develop and not vice versa. Abduh and
Chowdhury (2012) investigate the long-term and dynamic relationship between the
development of Islamic banking and economic growth in Bangladesh. The quarterly
time-series data of economic growth, total financing, and total deposits of Islamic
banking from Q1 2004 to Q2 2011 are used in their study. Through co-integration and
Granger’s causality method, Islamic banks’ financing is found to have a positive and
significant relationship with economic growth both in the long and short term. This
finding implies that the development of Islamic banking is one of the policies that
should be considered by governments to improve their nations’ incomes.
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The studies cited above have demonstrated that the development of the Islamic
financial system has played a viable role in the economic growth of each country that
is considered. However, the direction of the relationship between the flow of Islamic
finance and economic growth has differed from one country to another, particularly in
relation to the monetary policies of each country. Moreover, there have been some
drawbacks in the studies showing the relationship between Islamic financial
development and economic growth; for example, most studies have used short time
periods and an analysis of just one Islamic bank in each country. Further, all the studies
were conducted in Southeast Asian countries.
Goaied and Sassi (2011) investigate total Islamic banks’ financing at all fully
fledged Islamic banks in selected countries from the Middle East over a reasonable
time so that adequate data can be collected. The study selects the most important
countries from the Middle East in which Islamic finance has a footprint. Tabash and
Dhankar (2014) examine the relationship between the development of the Islamic
financial system and economic growth in the long term in selected countries of the
Middle East. They empirically analyze the relationship between Islamic banks’
financing and economic growth using econometric analysis. Because the variables in
their analysis are stationary, Johansen’s co-integration technique is applied. The cointegration results provide evidence of a unique co-integrating vector. In other words,
a long-term stable relationship between Islamic banks’ financing and economic growth
is found in the three countries that are studied. This finding suggests that in the long
term, Islamic banks’ financing and economic growth move forward together, at least
for selected countries of the Middle East.

23
It has been shown that the Middle East has benefited from a strong banking
system. Goaied and Sassi (2011) find a causal, bidirectional relationship between
Islamic banks’ financing and economic growth for Bahrain and Qatar. They also
discover that in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a causal relationship exists, from the
development of the financial system to economic growth, but not in the opposite
direction. Their results indicate that improvement of the Islamic financial institutions
in the Middle East has contributed to economic development and has been critical in
the long term for economic welfare and poverty reduction. The study’s results are quite
significant; indeed, the study is one of the pioneering works on Islamic finance.

2.3 Advantages of Islamic Banking
Islamic banks provide the same contributions to the financial system and the
economy as conventional banks. However, they present some relative advantages that
can be summarized as follows: efficiency, economic system stability, the reduction of
moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and greater conduciveness to poverty
alleviation.
Islamic banks are more efficient since they are not based on the volatile
principle of interest rates. Friedman (1969) demonstrates that a zero nominal interest
rate is a necessary condition for the optimal allowance of resources. With a zero
interest rate, traders will have no reason to substitute real resources for money; thus,
more resources will be channeled into investments. Consequently, when fixing a
positive price for money, traders will economize money for a fixed return and reduce
their transaction costs. It has been demonstrated empirically that a zero interest rate is
both necessary and sufficient for efficient allocation in general equilibrium models
(Cole & Kocherlakota, 1998; Wilson, 1979).
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By excluding the principle of interest from its mechanism, Islamic banks
exclude all speculative activities related to interest rate expectations. Changes in
money flow directly reflect the real sphere by changes in the demand and supply of
goods and services. Islamic banks adapt to the real economic sphere by using other
rates where the time-money value is maintained: the rate of profit sharing in
mousharaka, the markup rate in moudaraba, and the rental rate in leasing. Thus,
Islamic banks operate more efficiently. In their 2008 report, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) considered that the Islamic financial system is steadier and less
inflationary than the conventional system based on interest rates. Further, applying the
“z-scores” analysis, Cihák and Hesse (2008) prove that the Islamic financial system is
financially stronger and less risky than conventional banking. In the conventional
system, a depreciation of assets due to an exogenous shock downgrades the banks’
equity capital. Since depositors have fixed value securities (the deposits), there are no
risks provoking bankruptcy. In an Islamic system, the possessors of investment
accounts do not have fixed value securities; thus, in macroeconomic or bank-specific
crises, investment depositors automatically share the risk, which allows an adjustment
of the liability in the case of asset reduction.
In the same way, when borrowers cannot repay their debts on time, they are
obliged to pay penalty rates of interest, which are higher than regular rates. In Islamic
banks, the debt value and the profit rate, or the markup, are fixed in advance. As such,
Islamic banks are more reliable than the conventional system, which is another
argument supporting the stability of inflation. Thus, Islamic banking is relatively more
stable. Since banks operate in an environment characterized by asymmetry of
information, Islamic banks benefit from the risk reduction of moral hazard and adverse
selection by simultaneously providing equity and debt finance.
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In addition, by sitting on companies’ boards of directors, banks can influence
corporate governance and are able to control the companies’ performance, financing
them at a cost that is less than usually possible with conventional banking. Thus,
Islamic banks are likely to be more efficient in terms of monitoring and surveillance
by reducing the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard. Further, since the most
important criteria for financing projects in the conventional system is the ability to
repay loans, collateral, and guarantees, only the rich have the broadest access to the
financial market. In contrast, Islamic finance provides funds based on the sharing profit
and loss principle, which accords importance only to profitability and the rate of return.
Thus, those who are not rich but have essential skills to succeed in projects, such as
scientists, engineers, and craftsmen, have a better chance to acquire finance.

2.4 The Main Developmental Characteristics of Islamic Modes of Financing
The essential characteristic of Islamic modes of financing is their direct and
undetachable links with the real economy or physical transactions. Mousharaka and
moudharaba are possible only for productive companies, which contribute to real-life
businesses that increase production and improve quality. A company must generate a
profit and distribute it between the entrepreneur and the bank. Mourabaha and other
sale-based modes must involve a physical transaction of commodities or provision of
services. The same also applies to leasing, where the leased assets are the pivotal issues
around which financing is built. As such, all Islamic financing must relate to
production and/or the exchange of real goods and services. In contrast with
conventional banks that focus only on the ability of the entrepreneur to repay loans,
Islamic banks concentrate on the profitability of the project, which is the essential
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condition. Consequently, Islamic banks lead to economic growth by promoting
productive projects and supporting the trading of commodities and services.
Another advantage for this foremost characteristic of Islamic modes of
financing is that such financing is incompatible and unsuitable for debt rescheduling,
debt swaps, speculative transfers, and other purely monetary-oriented activities that
constitute a substantial part of the contemporary activities of conventional banks.
The second developmental characteristic of Islamic banking is the
incorporation of ethical and moral values in their modes of financing; for example, one
cannot ignore ethical/moral considerations in the project selection process. Regardless
of legality in a given country, Islamic banks do not finance harmful goods, such as
alcoholic beverages and tobacco, or morally unacceptable services, such as casinos
and pornography. Such products and activities are indeed profitable but they have high
social and economic costs and harmful long-term effects on productivity in the
economy. The ethical and moral loyalty of Islamic banks is also manifested in another
form: Islamic banks grant zero-interest credits from social funds in cases of dire need
or unexpected circumstances for the poor and needy. These funds are principally
financed by yearly zakah, a form of alms-giving paid by Muslim people, and also by
interest accumulated from deposits in conventional banks and money from other
transactions judged to be suspicious by Shari’ah boards from the Islamic point of view.
Donations from the public or countries are also an important source for the
charitable funds of Islamic banks. An example is the Islamic Development Bank in
Jeddah, which has US$100 million in its waqf account. The bank spends this money
on research, training, developmental studies, research scholarships, technical
assistance programs, and disaster relief services for Muslim countries. In other words,
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although profit maximization is as essential to Islamic banks as to other businesses,
the underlying philosophy of these institutions is conducive to promoting social
commitment and activities that usually cannot be assured by the profit motive.
The third developmental characteristic of Islamic banks is found in the nature
of their relationship with depositors and employees. Since Islamic banks deal with
their depositors on investment grounds, competition is higher among Islamic banks
than among conventional banks, which receive current and timed deposits against
fixed interest. Such competition among Islamic banks drives profitability to its
maximum in both the short term, which concerns depositors, and the long term, which
concerns shareholders. This situation makes all the banks more aware of, and attached
to, the real market. Nevertheless, a bank’s financial performance is not the only criteria
of competition; the ability of Islamic banks to keep, and to raise, deposits depends
upon a good reputation.

2.5 Financial Performance of Islamic Banks
In addition to the theoretical arguments, there is empirical evidence that
confirms the benefits of the Islamic system compared with the conventional system.
Hassan and Bachir (2003) highlight the individual performance of the Islamic banking
sector and show that Islamic banks, as a group, are much better than conventional
banks. Iqbal, Ausaf, and Tariqullah (1998) test the performance of Islamic banks using
a panel consisting of the 10 foremost banks in the world, the 10 foremost banks in
Asia, the 10 foremost banks in the Middle East, and the 10 foremost Islamic banks.
They prove that the performance of Islamic banks in a capitalistic environment, where
the conventional system dominates, is higher.
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Kader, Asaporta, and Al-Maghaireh (2007) examine the performance of
Islamic banks in terms of profitability, liquidity, risk, solvency, and efficiency from
2000 to 2004 in the UAE, where Islamic funds are highly concentrated. The study
finds that UAE Islamic banks are relatively more profitable, less liquid, less risky, and
more efficient compared with the UAE’s conventional banks. The authors associate
this performance to the PLS paradigm. The success of Islamic banks, as shown by a
high growth rate, may be attributed to the productive characteristic of Islamic products
more than borrowing based on the PLS principle.
Jordan’s statistics, however, show that the emergence of Islamic banks in the
country did not decrease the deposits that were already in conventional banks. Thus,
the Islamic banks attracted reserve funds that led to growth. Indeed, economists have
favored the emergence of Islamic banking such banks help to vary the financial
product range and improve the institutional quality of the financial sector. A result is
that this new banking alternative offers better fund distribution.

2.6 Conventional Financing Compared with Islamic Financing
The concept of Islamic or Shari’ah-compliant finance is based on the core
tenets of Islam concerning property rights, social and economic justice, wealth
distribution, and governance. One of the key features of the system is the prohibition
of riba and gharar (El-Gamal, 2009; Kabir & Mahlkrecht, 2011). There is consensus
among scholars that the prohibition of interest is not limited to usury but refers to
interest on debt in any form (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011). The prohibition of gharar1 is to
discourage excessive uncertainty in contracts, enhance disclosure, and proscribe all
forms of deception. In addition to the prohibition of riba and gharar, Islamic finance
has seven key precepts. Thus, implemented fully, Islamic finance does the following.
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1. Eliminates pure debt securities from the financial system, replacing interest by
the rate of return earned ex post on contracts of exchange or risk sharing.
2. Calls for bank deposits to be collected on a profit and loss basis rather than
fixed predetermined liabilities. All profits and/or losses on the asset side are to
be passed through to the investors (depositors) on the liability side (Ayub,
2007; Dar & Presley, 2000).
3. Promotes the financing of trade and the exchange of goods and services to
ensure a close link between the real economy and the financial sector, because
all financial contracts should be backed by assets or transactions/activities in
the real economic sector.
4. Upholds the property rights of the individual and society, and clarifies the
sources of individual ownership.2
5. Mandates the fulfillment and sanctity of contracts that deal with trade in goods
and services, and the transfer of ownership and honoring of debt obligations
(Ayub, 2007, Chapter 5).
6. Emphasizes principles of morality and ethics in business conduct, proscribing
illicit activities according to Shari’ah (El-Ghazali, 2002) and mandating that
all economic activities be governed by rules of fair dealing and justice.
7. Advocates the sharing of risk and reward between the rich and the poor through
specific instruments of re-distribution.
The difference between the two banking systems also lies in the governance
structures. Islamic banks must comply with the rules of the Holy Qur’an and meet the
expectations of the Muslim community by providing acceptable financing modes to
Islam. Islamic finance is a financial system that operates according to Shari’ah
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principles. Shari’ah, which is an Arabic term, means, “The way to the source of life.”
Islamic finance has all the features of a conventional financial system such as capital
markets, fund managers, investment companies, and insurance companies; however,
these systems are governed by Islamic laws. A core concept of Islam is that Allah is
the owner of all wealth in the world, and humans are only the trustees of the wealth.
Thus, humans need to manage wealth according to Allah’s commands, which promote
justice and prohibit certain activities. The law does not forbid Muslims from enjoying
wealth: They have the right to enjoy whatever wealth they acquire and spend it in
Shari’ah-compliant ways. They need not feel apologetic about being wealthy as long
as their behavior aligns with Islam.
Conventional banking, however, is based on the debtor–creditor relationship
between a bank and a customer’s interest. This relationship is just a consideration
between the borrower and the banker, reflecting the opportunity cost of money.
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Table 2.1: Differences between Islamic banking and conventional banking
Business
Framework

Islamic Banking System

Conventional Banking
System

Banking Practice

Based on Shari’ah; Shari’ah
scholars ensure adherence to
Islamic laws and provide
guidance.

Based on secular banking
laws and the financial
practices of respective
countries.

Equity Financing

Islamic banks provide equity
capital to a project or venture.
Losses are shared in
accordance with equity
participation while profits are
shared in accordance with a
pre-agreed ratio. Management
of the enterprise depends upon
the type of financing provided.
Examples: mudarabah and
musharkah.

Although venture capital
companies and
investment banks take
equity stakes and
management control of
an enterprise in return for
providing start-up
finance, commercial
banks, which are the
primary lenders, do not
have this facility.

Prohibition of
Gharar

Transactions deemed gharar
are prohibited; they denote
varying degrees of deception
regarding the price and quality
of goods, for example
derivatives, which are
prohibited in Islamic Finance.

Trading in all financial
instruments, including
derivatives, is allowed in
conventional banking.

Profit and Loss
Sharing

All transactions are based on
this principle: Returns are
variable depending upon bank
performance, and consumers
can participate in profit upsides
in a more equitable way than
receiving a predetermined
return.

Returns to customers are
irrespective of bank
performance and
profitability. Customers
are treated only as
depositors and do not
receive any other
compensation other than
interest.

with Capital Risk
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Islamic finance does not restrict economic activity; instead, it directs it toward
responsible activities that benefit other people and honor Allah. It allows a free market
economy where supply and demand are decided in the market and not in accordance
with governmental rules and regulations.

2.7 Challenges to Islamic Banking
While Islamic banking may provide a more conservative and stable approach
to conventional banking models, it is not immune to the current economic crisis.
Experts predict that, because of its heavy reliance on property investments and private
equity, the booming US$1 trillion global industry could be hit if the turmoil worsens
and real assets start to crumble. The key challenges that have been partly considered
by some researchers are described in the following paragraphs.
Recent regulatory changes concerning the structure of sukuk warrant careful
consideration and may dampen some of the recent enthusiasm for Islamic capital
market products. In February 2008, the Shari’ah committee of the Accounting and
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) issued new
recommendations regarding the role of asset ownership, investment guarantees, and
the Shari’ah advisory and approval process for sukuk origination and trading. The
proposed rules attracted significant attention prior to their release, following a
statement by the chairman of the Shari’ah committee in November 2007 indicating
that 85% of sukuk issues in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do not concur with
Shari’ah principles. Most sukuk issued in the GCC have explicit repurchase
agreements that guarantee the repayment of the principal but violate the PLS features
of Shari’ah.
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Currently, there are discussions underway between the various stakeholders
and some market participants to gauge the potential of these recommendations to cause
permanent damage to the sukuk market. The sukuk market is also still plagued by
illiquidity due to limited depth and breadth, mainly because Middle Eastern banks,
which are the most likely securitizers/sellers of risk, are flush with liquidity and
capital; thus, there is no strong funding or balance sheet rationale for sukuk. Although
the commoditization of illiquid asset exposures through securitization facilitates the
disciplining effect of capital markets, there is a lack of information from private
sources about securitized assets in many sukuk and the prevalence of “buy-and-hold”
investments that inhibit efficient price discovery and information dissemination.
Moreover, sukuk are available at maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years but not for short-term
maturities, which significantly limits their application in money markets.
Although Islamic banks are currently one of the largest buyers of Shari’ahcompliant products (at long maturities), they would benefit most from issues with
shorter tenors. There is some hope that the launch of different sukuk funds in the near
future may potentially unlock liquidity constraints; however, this may only create new
demand without sufficiently alleviating supply constraints. It is also difficult to
establish sukuk funds with sufficient diversification. Notwithstanding the compelling
value proposition of sukuk, without efficient and transparent capital markets and
appropriate legal frameworks to operate within, Islamic capital markets will not
continue to grow meaningfully in the near future.
The liquidity risk management of Islamic banking is an important challenge
and is constrained because of the limited availability of tradable Islamic money market
instruments and a weak systemic liquidity infrastructure. At the moment, there is no
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Shari’ah-compliant short-term Islamic money market (with less than one week’s
maturity) in local currency or in US dollars, and Islamic repo markets have not yet
developed. Islamic money markets with longer maturities, which are based on
commodity murabaha transactions (markup financing), sometimes suffer from
unreliable brokers with low creditworthiness. Islamic banks also have a competitive
disadvantage over conventional banks because they deposit their overnight money
with their domestic interest-free central bank. The lack of liquidity and viable
alternatives, combined with competitive disadvantage, hamper local Islamic banks and
can even create a liquidity crisis. Many investment banks are currently designing new
complex products, compliant with Shari’ah, that attempt to overcome the
shortcomings of the Islamic money market. It remains to be seen whether these new
solutions will demonstrate widespread Shari’ah compliance in the Islamic finance
community and generate enough demand for a functional Islamic money market to
develop.
Business models and products of Islamic banks are still rather homogenous,
while Shari’ah compliance amplifies risks stemming from product configuration and
process implementation. The success of Islamic banking in recent years has produced
too many Islamic banks with the same business models. There is a lack of “bread-andbutter” lending, and the current excess liquidity has led to too much complacency
among the Islamic banks. In addition, there is a large and diverse set of accounting
standard differences across the different jurisdictions. The development and setting of
simple standard legal contracts is necessary in order to overcome the complexity and
heterogeneity of current contracts.
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Further, the deployment of IT systems that help monitor the fulfillment and
visibility of processes on an end-to-end basis are crucial in facilitating the continuous
monitoring of activities by Shari’ah scholars while eliminating the possibilities of noncompliance, which in some cases may render transactions invalid. Financial innovation
in Islamic finance is still hampered by the need for harmonized financial regulation.
Governance issues, especially regarding the Shari’ah compliance of products
and activities, constitute a major challenge for the Islamic finance industry. Although
Shari’ah rulings (fatwas) by legal scholars are disclosed, there are currently no unified
principles by which Shari’ah scholars decide on the Shari’ah compliance of new
products. Fatwas are not consolidated, which inhibits the dissemination, adoption, and
cross-fertilization of jurisprudence across different countries and schools of thought.
Moreover, there is still considerable heterogeneity of scholarly opinion about Shari’ah
compliance, which undermines the creation of a consistent regulatory framework and
corporate governance principles. The fragmented opinions of Shari’ah boards, which
act as quasi-regulatory bodies, remain a source of continued divergence of legal
opinion.
Since Islamic law itself is divided between different juristic schools of thought
(madhahib), which provide guidance on the analytical reasoning (ijtihaad) or
interpretative analogy (Qiyas) of the general principles of Shari’ah, there is no
consensus (Ijma) on the religious compliance of certain products and transactional
structures. Given the rising global integration of the Islamic financial services industry,
greater supervisory harmonization across national boundaries is essential. There is also
regulatory disparity among national supervisors, with each regulator working
independently and refusing to recognize the validity of judgments made by foreign
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counterparts. A greater role for the AAOIFI, the General Council for Islamic Banking
and Finance Institutions (GCIBFI), and the Islamic International Rating Agency
(IIRA) in this regard has added consistency to Shari’ah rulings, while the retention of
conventional financial market practice and the supremacy of a governing law as a
matter of form remain essential to maintain investor confidence in the rapidly growing
Islamic banking system and capital markets. Moreover, national solutions are gaining
traction. Various Islamic countries have teamed up in a bid to create more liquidity
and enhance market transparency with a view to becoming a center of Islamic finance,
while more specific regional initiatives have provided a valuable platform for drawing
further attention to structured finance as an important element of local capital market
development.
Additionally, institutions wanting to provide Shari’ah-compliant products face
the challenge of increased and added costs that stem from the research,
implementation, and development of such products. The costs associated with the
implementation and development of such products is passed on by the institutions to
clients seeking such products. This results in increased costs to the customers, often
making the products unattractive. Regardless of the increased costs, institutions will
probably have to examine and consider Shari’ah-compliant banking as a viable
alternative in the current economic situation worldwide. Consumers who have suffered
tremendous losses are now looking for a more conservative and stable banking system.
Shari’ah-compliant products may provide them with such stability.

2.8 Development of Islamic Finance and Islamic Capital Markets
As modern Islamic finance moves through the second decade of the period of
“transformation and innovation,” we are witnessing the first stages of the realization
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of the long-articulated admonition to develop capital markets, including secondary
markets, for securities and investments that comply with the principles and precepts of
Shari’ah. Before considering these factors, and by way of background, this section first
considers the nature of Islamic finance. In other words: What is Islamic finance? The
answer requires more than definitional recitation; it needs an examination (at least in
summary) of the nature, composition, and role of Shari’ah supervisory boards that
oversee the explication of Shari’ah as it applies to the field of Islamic finance,
including the issuance of fatwas or authoritative opinions as to the permissibility,
under Shari’ah, of structures and products. The final background discussion is a survey
of a few rudimentary principles of Shari’ah that are of particular importance when
considering Islamic capital markets.
A fundamental function of a capital market is to provide medium- to long-term
funds to finance capital-intensive projects. In order to attract funds into the market to carry
out this important function, innovative financial products that meet the specific needs of
investors and fund-seekers are introduced (Alam, Hassan, & Haque, 2013; EtudaiyeMuhtar, Bashir, & Abdulkadir, 2012). The Islamic capital market serves as an alternative
to the conventional capital market, where corporate and sovereign entities seek access to
long-term funds (Kusuma & Silva, 2014). One such product in the Islamic capital market
that enables the market to fulfill this function is the sukuk financial debt instrument.

This section now turns to the consideration of the primary factors influencing
the development and growth of Islamic capital markets. Historical trends in the
development of modern Islamic finance provide context, in terms of constraints and
opportunities, based upon existing knowledge, available resources, and methodology.
Next, this section summarizes some of the major multilateral organizations that have
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focused on the development of the Islamic capital markets, including their initiatives
and capabilities. Then, it provides an overview of the expectations of transactional
participants in order to increase sensitivity to issues that will need to be addressed to
effectuate capital market products in the Islamic finance field.
Turning to more specific factors, this section examines a range of factors that
affect risk assessment by transactional participants, particularly those pertaining to the
certainty, predictability, and transparency of risk factors. The first such factors
considered are systemic legal matters: the role of legal opinions and governing law
choices. Special attention is paid to the variations in the nature and composition of
legal systems in which necessary legal opinions must be rendered. Some jurisdictions,
particularly those within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),
incorporate Shari’ah to a greater or lesser extent in the secular law of their jurisdictions
(these are referred to as “incorporated jurisdictions,” which are jurisdictions that desire
to use Shari’ah-compliant financing techniques as their primary economic form and
are referred to as the “Islamic economic sphere”; jurisdictions that use primarily
interest-based financing techniques are referred to as the “Western economic sphere”).
Other jurisdictions do not incorporate Shari’ah to any extent in their secular law (these
are referred to as “secular jurisdictions”).
Financial transactions conducted in Islamic capital markets worldwide have
grown from relatively small-sized to large-sized transactions. The driving force behind
this growth may be traced to the issuance of sukuk financial debt instruments by both
sovereign and corporate entities (Alam et al., 2013). For instance, the financial report
of the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) for 2014 reports that global sukuk
issuance grew from US$1,172 billion in January 2001 to US$68,197 billion as of July
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2014. The total value of sukuk issued over the same period was reported as
US$668,058 billion. Similarly, Kusuma and Silva (2014) report the size of worldwide
Shari’ah financial assets as $1.8 trillion as of 2014. These assets consist of banking
assets, sukuk and other funds, with sukuk representing 15% of the total value.
Capital market transactions involve both types of jurisdictions. Further, the
legal opinions and choice of governing law for transactional documentation in each
type of jurisdiction are critical factors in effectuating these transactions and the growth
of the markets.
These factors, in turn, are dependent upon whether contractual arrangements,
which embody risk allocations as agreed by the transactional participants, will be
enforced in secular and incorporated jurisdictions. Case law and contractual drafting
in secular jurisdictions will be summarized first. Systemic issues and transactional
practices in incorporated jurisdictions will then be examined. Sukuk issuance
transactions, and related enforceability issues, will be considered as a capital markets
case study.
As previously explained, Islamic finance is the conduct of commercial and
financial activities in accordance with Shari’ah. For present purposes, Shari’ah is
Islamic religious law as applied to commercial and financial activities.2 It is a
combination of theology, religion, and law. Shari’ah is a guide to how a Muslim leads
life (it means, literally, “the way” or “the right path”). Thus, it is considered the perfect,
immutable, divine law as revealed in the Qur’an and the Sunna.
Fiqh, literally “understanding,” is the sum of human comprehension of divine
law and forms the practical rules of Shari’ah as determined by Shari’ah scholars. The
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primary methodology used in this determinative and interpretive endeavor is ijtihad
(literally, “effort’”), or legal reasoning, using the “roots of the law” (usul al-fiqh). The
roots (usul) upon which Islamic jurisprudence is based are: (i) the Qur’an, being the
holy book of Islam and the revealed word of Allah (notably, less than 3 percent of the
Qur’an is legal in nature); (ii) the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed, which are the
binding authority of his dicta and decisions; (iii) the Ijma or “consensus” of the
community of scholars; and (iv) the Qiyas or analogical deductions and reasoning.
Shari’ah is comprised of principles and precepts. In its explication and
application, it is largely oral (there is a limited number of written compilations, such
as the 1839 compilation for the Ottoman empire, the Majelle or Majalat al-Ahkam alAdliyah).4 Further, there exist several schools of Islamic jurisprudence (the four main
Sunni schools, which have the greatest impact on modern Islamic finance: Hanafi,
Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi). Historically, the different schools are frequently in
conflict regarding the application of Shari’ah to different factual or structural
situations. Even within a school, there are varying interpretations with respect to any
given matter. There is also considerable divergence between Southeast Asia
(particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei) and the Middle East and Western Asia
(particularly Pakistan).
As explicated by Shari’ah scholars over the last 1400 years, and as applied to
Islamic finance, Shari’ah is a fulsome body of law. It covers virtually most aspects of
commerce and finance that are addressed by a mature body of secular law. Thus, for
example, it addresses contracts, concepts of consideration, legal capacity, mutuality,
sales, leasing, construction activities, partnerships and joint ventures of various types,
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guarantees, estates, equity and trust, litigation, and many other activities and legal
structures.
2.8.1 Forces influencing the development of Islamic capital markets
The development of Shari’ah-compliant capital market instruments, in their
modern incarnation, began in approximately 2002 and has continuously accelerated
since. This process is the result of a confluence of factors, some of which are as
follows:
1. The evolution of modern Islamic finance, particularly since the mid-1990s;
2. The efforts of multilateral institutions, such as the AAOIFI, the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB), and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB);
and
3. Transactional developments since the mid-1990s.

2.9 Conclusion
Among the common Islamic concepts used in Islamic banking are profit
sharing, safekeeping, joint venture, cost-plus, and leasing. The epistemology of
Islamic finance and economics goes back to Shari’ah principles, which are deduced
from the guidance of the Qur’an, Sunna, Ijma, and Qiyas.
Empirical literature on Islamic financial activities encompasses the practical
direction of Islamic financial transactions regarding convergence to or divergence
from the risk and profit-sharing principle.
The main activity of an Islamic bank, as with a conventional bank, is the
mobilization of funds from savers and the offer of these funds to agents that have a
deficit; moreover all banking activities must be undertaken without the use of interest
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rates. Over the long term, there is evidence of a bidirectional relationship between
Islamic banks and fixed investments; further, there is evidence supporting the demandfollowing hypothesis of GDP and Islamic banks, whereby an increase in GDP causes
Islamic banking to develop and not vice versa.
Islamic banks provide the same contributions to the financial system and the
economy as conventional banks and also present some relative advantages: efficiency,
economic system stability, the reduction of moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, and greater conduciveness to poverty alleviation. Another argument
favoring the stability of the Islamic system is that Islamic banking does create money;
thus, it is not inflationary.
In addition to the theoretical arguments, there is empirical evidence confirming
the good done by the Islamic system relative to the conventional system.
Islamic banking may provide a more conservative and stable approach to conventional
banking models, even though Islamic banking is not immune from the current
economic crisis.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical and Literature Review of Sukuk and Bonds
3.1 Introduction
Sukuk have a unique structure and features that differ from one type to another.
However, the structure of sukuk as a security is based on the main fundamentals of
Islamic finance. In order to accurately interpret a risk–return analysis of sukuk, it is
necessary to understand the concept of Islamic finance and its contracts and the
different types and structures of sukuk.
Sukuk has emerged as an alternative financial instrument over the last decade
to fill the need for secure and bond-like investments (Alam et al., 2013). Both
conventional bonds and sukuk carry fixed maturity terms, can bear losses or benefits,
and are tradable in qualified markets with a standard yield rate. However, Al-Bashir
and Al-Amine (2008) state that, unlike traditional bonds, sukuk represent undivided
full or partial ownership of other tangible assets such as properties, ventures, or even
services. They are, as such, secured against real assets (SARA) and support entitlement
to actual ownership of the underlying assets. Thus, SARA bonds are more secure than
conventional bonds. In contrast, Islamic joint venture (IJV) bonds have more
similarities with equity than debt (Vishwanath & Azmi, 2009). Sukuk also have legal
partnership contracts binding the issuers to the investors. In contrast, traditional bonds
are essentially forms of debt contracts that may be secured with specific assets or can
even remain unsecured through the obligation of payment promises.
Investors residing in Islamic countries or those who want to invest in Islamic
financial markets prompted the need for the creation of bond-like instruments; hence,
the introduction of sukuk. As such, investing in sukuk gives investors the opportunity
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to balance their portfolios with investments in asset-based securities, not debt
instruments, since sukuk equate to tangible assets, usufruct of assets, services, projects,
businesses, or joint ventures (Vishwanath & Azmi, 2009).
Notwithstanding the growth in sukuk financial transactions, several authors
have questioned whether sukuk is another variation of the conventional bond (Afshar,
2013; Alam et al., 2013; Ariff, Safari, & Mohamed, 2013; Godlewski et al., 2011;
Hassan, 2012). This question arises because of the similarities observed in the two debt
instruments,

although

different

approaches

are

used

in

examining

the

similarities/differences between them.

3.2 Global Sukuk Issuances
Total international sukuk issuances stood at US$31.56 billion in 2016, which
translates into an increase of US$10.68 billion from the 2015 level of US$20.88
billion. This increase is the highest value of issuance recorded since the inception of
the sukuk market. Total sukuk market size has now reached US$856M globally (IIFM,
2016).

3.3 Securitization of Sukuk
The processes and procedures applied for sukuk issuance are similar to those
for securitization with conventional bonds, except for dissuading attempts to avoid the
basic prohibitions of Islamic finance. Various factors are involved in sukuk
transactions. The most important are listed below.
1. The originator or issuer of sukuk sells assets to special purpose vehicles (SPVs)
and uses the realized funds. Although the originators are mostly governments
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or large corporations, they could also be banking or nonbanking Islamic
institutions. The user may delegate the process of arranging the issue for a
consideration or a commission.
2. An SPV is an entity established specifically for the securitization process and
for managing the issue. It purchases assets from the originator and funds the
purchase price with the sukuk. Sometimes the SPV also refers to the issuer.
3. Investment banks act like issuing agents in term of underwriting, lead
managing, and book-making services for sukuk. These services are provided
by syndicates of Islamic banks or conventional banks that are operating Islamic
finance windows.
4. Sukuk subscribers are mostly central banks, Islamic banks, and individuals
who subscribe to securities issued by SPVs.
5. The obligator can be a contractual debtor to the originator who pays cash flows
that are securitized.
6. The lead manager oversees the design and execution of the transaction and acts
as an arranger for the securities. A company/trust/mutual fund could provide
services for managing the sukuk issues.
7. The cash administrator, or receiving and paying agent, is the banker for the
deal who manages inflows and outflows and invests interim funds and accesses
cash collateral.
8. The credit enhancement provider provides credit enhancements by either
guarantees or takaful ( Islamic Insurance).
9. The credit rating agency provides a rating for the deal based on the structure
and rates of the parties involved, and legal and tax aspects.
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3.4 Main Types of Sukuk
3.4.1 Pure Ijarah Sukuk
The authorities issue pure ijarah certificates on stand-alone assets that can be
seen from the balance sheet. Examples of such assets include real estate fixed assets,
aircraft, and ships that a company intends to lease. The rental charges and rates of
return vary depending upon the originator and could be either floating or fixed.
3.4.2 Variable Rate Redeemable Sukuk
Musharakah finance certificates (MTFCs) are viewed as an alternative to sukuk
because of the MTFCs’ seniority in terms of their redeemable nature, issuers’ equity,
and relative stability compared with their dividend payouts. The certificates are
superior and advantageous because the jurists prefer employing musharakah returns
on the basis that such a move strengthens the principles of PLS, which are considered
core ideals and embodied in the paradigm of Islamic banking. Besides, the floating
rates are contingent on a company's balance actualities, a situation that is contrary to
others that depend upon benchmarking references; for instance, the London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR).
3.4.3 Fixed-rate Zero-coupon Sukuk
Organizations use fixed-rate zero coupon sukuk only when assets that need to
be mobilized are not yet available. As a result, fund mobilization attains the objective
of increasing a company's assets through istisna'a contracts. Nonetheless, the
certificates are not immediately ready for trading because of the restrictions of
Shari’ah. Thus, by nature, istina'a contracts and installment sales and purchases that
fulfill debt obligations warrant the primary pools that the certificates generate.
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3.4.4 Hybrid/Pooled Sukuk
These sukuk enable greater mobilization of funds because they work in a way
that, in their structure, combines multiple Islamic finance contracts such as Mudarabah
and Ijarah.

3.5 Main Structures of Sukuk
3.5.1 Pure Sukuk al-Ijarah
These sukuk are ideal when mobilizing funds for funding long-term projects,
especially infrastructure projects. Thus, the sukuk are extended to a large number of
individual and institutional investors to ensure that the objective is satisfied. In order
to achieve this, the sukuk securitize physical and tangible assets such as airports,
buildings, roads, and land. Importantly, these sukuk involve three parties, who are (i)
the issuer, who doubles up as issuer and as trustee; (ii) the originator, who also acts as
seller, obligator, and lessee (both in a sales undertaking and a purchase commitment);
and (iii) the servicing agent, who is the investors in the sukuk.
3.5.2 Sukuk al-Mudarabah
These sukuk are certificates that represent all the activities and projects whose
management is by the principles of a mudarabah contract. Such an approach is
achieved by choosing any of the partners in the deal to take responsibility to act as the
mudarib in managing the business. Thus, the mudarabah has three factors involved,
which are (i) the mudarib, who is also the issuer; (ii) investors of the Sukuk, who are
subscribers; and (iii) mudarabah capital, which is the amount of money mobilized.
Importantly, the mudarabah sukuk holders are the owners of mudarab assets; further,
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the owners of the capital share profits and suffer losses that occur in accordance with
the agreed terms and agreement.
3.5.3 Sukuk al-Musharakah
These are certificated sukuk issued to each of the members of a partnership.
They represent the equal value that the individuals issued as they mobilized funds for
the partnership. Notably, the partners or the owners become owners of the project or
the asset in equal shares to the value of the amount indicated in the certificate. The
sukuk may be redeemable, meaning that the holder can give them to individuals and
corporations, for general purchasing, obtaining commercial vehicles, starting factories
and hospitals, and rehabilitating the owner whenever necessary. Organizations can also
use musharakah sukuk to secure assets for large projects that require significant
finance as capital. Notably, several parties take part in a sukuk al-musharakah. The
first party is the issuer, who is the initiator of the project or activity and who invites
others to fund the project. The second party is the subscribers, who are the investors
who contribute their funds to the musharakah contract and are known as sukuk
partners. Finally, the total amount mobilized consists of a summation of each member's
contribution or share, whereby a certificate is issued to represent the proportion that
each member contributed when they became subscribers. Subscribers or the owners of
such certificates own the project or the asset. Each subscriber is entitled to a share of
the profit that the project or asset realizes.
3.5.4 Sukuk al-Salam
This sukuk works on the basis that goods paid for will be delivered at a later
date. As such, the sukuk work on a salam principle whereby the purchaser makes an
advance payment to a property that will be given later. Thus, the purchaser will receive
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a certificate representing the amount issued for the sale of the capital mobilized.
Notably, the salam can afterward enter into another contractual relationship and
forward the sale to someone else, using a contract that is parallel to the initial contract.
Importantly, the sukuk al-salam has several factors: the issuer, who is the seller of the
asset under salam; the subscriber, or certificate holder, who is the person buying the
asset; and the funds collected, or salam capital, which represent the asset purchase
price. The salam holder and the salam capital can also claim the salam asset because
they are entitled to do so. The final factor is the salam price, or the price the salam is
sold as part of a parallel agreement, if any occurs.

3.6 Differences between Sukuk and Bonds
Differences between sukuk and conventional bonds in Islamic finance
empirical literature are usually examined in terms of issuance structure,
regulatory/legal requirements, diversification/alternative investment opportunities,
and the effect on returns. For example, while some studies such as Cakir and Raei
(2007) and Godlewski et al. (2011) show that sukuk are alternative investment outlets,
Ariff et al. (2013) and Fathurahman and Fitriati (2013) demonstrate that sukuk have
significantly higher risks than conventional bonds and hence higher returns.
Nonetheless, Alam et al. (2013) report a negative relationship between sukuk issuance
and returns.
Arguing for the similarity between the two debt instruments, Nagano (2017)
contends that sukuk issuance follows conventional corporate finance theory. This was
observed in the reduction of information gathering costs between issuers and investors
following an increase in the number of sukuk issuers due to sukuk market
development. Likewise, Mohamed, Masih, and Bacha (2015) utilize a partial
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adjustment model of debt and conclude that sukuk issuance follows conventional
corporate finance theory. Specifically, the authors argue that sukuk issuance follows
trade-off theory through optimization of company behavior. They also observe support
for the pecking order theory of capital structure in some partnership-based sukuk when
companies are faced with higher costs arising from information asymmetry. Further
evidence supporting the assertion that sukuk follow corporate finance theory is
observed in Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill (2013) and Klein and Weill (2016),
where information asymmetries via moral hazard and adverse selection are found to
enhance companies’ choice to issue sukuk.
Other empirical research highlighting similarities between sukuk and
conventional bonds includes examinations of the execution of contracts under sukuk
that are structured in a similar way to conventional bonds (Cakir & Raei, 2007) and
sukuk returns that mirror conventional bond returns (Miller, Challoner, & Atta, 2007).
In terms of issuance and regulatory structure, Zulkhibri (2015) argues that in
order to integrate Islamic finance into the global financial market and harness the
advantages of sukuk issuance, there is a need for Shari’ah-compliant transactions in
secular Western economies. This integration may be achieved by incorporating
Shari’ah into the laws of the country concerned, such that Shari’ah governs Islamic
financial transactions. This clearly marks another major difference, as observed in
Table 2.1, since the laws applicable in a secular country already cover bondholders.
Zulkhibri (2015) further notes that the existence of sound accounting and reporting
standards ensures a well-regulated Islamic financial system. This is of particular
importance since the main essence of Islamic finance is to ensure equity and fairness
in financial transactions (maqasid al-shari’ah). Nonetheless, the problem of sukuk
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default has been traced to sukuk structures that mirror conventional bond structures,
especially in terms of mismatching relevant jurisdictions, ill-defined property rights,
and the choice of legal rights (Majid, Shahimi, & Abdullah, 2010; Wijnbergen &
Zaheer, 2013; Zulkhibri, 2015).
Empirical literature also suggests that macroeconomic factors influence Sukuk
market development, as occurs in the conventional bond market. For example, GDP
per capita, population, and trade-openness in Said and Grassa (2013) are observed to
have a significant and positive economic impact on sukuk market development in a
similar way to the effect on the conventional bond market. Nonetheless, the bond
market in the same study is also noted to have a positive effect on sukuk market
development, suggesting that the two financial debt instruments (conventional bonds
and sukuk) complement each other and are not substitutes. In a similar study, Ahmad,
Daud, and Kefelia (2012) employ a series of econometric techniques and find that a
country’s business cycle, inflation rate, and GDP are all important determinants of
sukuk market development. Specifically, sukuk is found to Granger cause GDP, while
GDP Granger causes both the business cycle and inflation; moreover, in the short term,
the sukuk market is driven by its own dynamics. Sukuk, like most other assets, carry
face values that are typically proportional or based on the assets’ market values and
can be bought at a discount or premium by investors (Usmani, 2008). However,
conventional bonds are long-term debt instruments issued by companies or the
government. Sukuk and traditional bonds generate two streams of cash flows for their
holders as follows.
1. Face Value: The fixed amount of funds the bond issuer pays to bondholders at
maturity.
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2. Coupon/Interest: The fixed amount of funds the bond issuer pays bondholders
periodically until maturity. Such a period can be semi-yearly or yearly,
depending upon the contract.
Sukuk entitle the holder to the ownership of existing resources or a pool of
diversified tangible assets (Jobst, Kunzel, Mills, & Sy, 2008). The risk and return
associated with the related cash flow is proportional to that of the underlying assets. In
the following, we highlight the key differences and similarities between sukuk and
conventional bonds.
1. Sukuk owners claim the ownership of assets and their cash flows.
2. Sukuk returns can be estimated from the associated underlying resource as
opposed to the traditional/debt regime that is often associated with
predetermined returns.
3. By holding sukuk, it is possible that the value of an associated asset may
appreciate or depreciate and hence influence Sukuk returns, unlike fixed
conventional bond returns. This also means that the returns are not guaranteed
at maturity.
4. A sukuk contract represents a seller–buyer relationship as opposed to bonds’
customer–lender relationship.
5. The assets associated with sukuk can be tangible or intangible, existing or with
deferred delivery, usufruct, etc., while bonds are only associated with nonexistent resources.
6. Sukuk returns can be fixed or variable.
7. LIBOR is utilized in pricing and valuation, like many other conventional bonds
and Eurobonds.
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Even with the above-demonstrated similarities between sukuk and
conventional bonds, some studies provide different views. For instance, Cakir and Raei
(2007) assert that sukuk can be fundamentally different from conventional bonds. They
suggest that sukuk are essentially less risky compared with conventional sovereign
bonds. Examining a portfolio of various sukuk and Eurobond contracts from the same
issuer, the authors compare the VaR for a hybrid portfolio to a portfolio that holds only
Eurobonds. According to the authors’ estimation, sukuk reduce the overall portfolio
risks when added and can create diversity for investors. Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4
summarize the structural and other differences between conventional bonds and sukuk.
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Table 3.1: Structural differences between conventional bond and sukuk
Asset ownership

Investment criteria

Issue unit

Issue price

Investment rewards
and risks

Effects of costs

Conventional Bonds
Bonds do not give the
investor a share of ownership
in the asset, project,
business, or joint venture
they support. They are a debt
obligation from the issuer to
the bond holder.
Generally, bonds can be used
to finance any asset, project,
business, or joint venture
that complies with local
legislation.
Each bond represents a share
of debt.
The face value of a bond
price is based on the issuer’s
credit worthiness (including
its rating).
Bond holders receive
regularly scheduled (and
often fixed rate) interest
payments for the life of the
bond, and their principal is
guaranteed to be returned at
the bond’s maturity date.
Bond holders generally
aren’t affected by costs
related to the asset, project,
business, or joint venture
they support. The
performance of the
underlying asset doesn’t
affect investor rewards.

Sukuk
Sukuk give the investor
partial ownership in the
asset on which the Sukuk
are based.

The asset on which Sukuk
are based must be shariacompliant.

Each Sukuk represents a
share of the underlying
asset.
The face value of Sukuk
is based on the market
value of the underlying
asset.
Sukuk holders receive a
share of profits from the
underlying asset (and
accept a share of any loss
incurred).

Sukuk holders are
affected by costs related
to the underlying asset.
Higher costs may
translate to lower investor
profits and vice versa.
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Table 3.2: Sukuk versus conventional bonds in terms of return, issuers, and risk
Sukuk

8. Major risk lays with underlying assets

Conventional
Bonds
1. Income is derived from
debt instrument
2. Return is interest and
pre-determined
3. Negotiable financial
paper
4. Bond issuer is a
borrower
5. Bond holder is a lender
6. Lender-borrower
relationship
7. Issuer guarantees the
payment of face value and
periodic interest
8. Major risk is with issuer
– credit risk

9. Return is expected from the underlying assets

9. Interest payment is an
obligation

1. Income is generated from assets
2. Return is expected
3. Negotiability is restricted to specific types of
Sukuk
4. Sukuk issue is a seller of assets
5. Sukuk holder is an owner of assets
6. Seller-Buyer relationship
7. Business risk-return relationship

10. Return of investor’s capital cannot be
guaranteed

10. Issuer is obligated to
return investor’s capital
(face value)
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Table 3.3: Structural differences between conventional bonds and sukuk

Asset ownership

Investment criteria

Issue unit

Conventional Bonds
Bonds do not give the
investor a share of
ownership in the asset,
project, business, or joint
venture they support. They
are a debt obligation from
the issuer to the bondholder.
Generally, bonds can be
used to finance any asset,
project, business, or joint
venture that complies with
local legislation.
Each bond represents a share
of debt.

The face value of a bond’s
price is based on the issuer’s
credit worthiness (including
its rating).
Investment rewards Bondholders receive
regularly scheduled (and
and risks
often fixed rate) interest
payments for the life of the
bond, and their principal is
guaranteed to be returned at
the bond’s maturity date.
Bondholders generally are
Effects of costs
not affected by costs related
to the asset, project,
business, or joint venture
they support. The
performance of the
underlying asset does not
affect investor rewards.
Issue price

Sukuk
Sukuk give the investor
partial ownership in the
asset on which the sukuk
are based.

The asset on which sukuk
are based must be
Shari’ah-compliant.

Each sukuk represents a
share of the underlying
asset.
The face value of sukuk
is based on the market
value of the underlying
asset.
Sukuk holders receive a
share of profits from the
underlying asset (and
accept a share of any loss
incurred).

Sukuk holders are
affected by costs related
to the underlying asset.
Higher costs may
translate to lower investor
profits and vice versa.
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Table 3.4: Sukuk compared with conventional bonds in terms of returns, issuers, and
risk
Sukuk
1. Income is generated from assets
2. Return is expected
3. Negotiability is restricted to
specific types of sukuk
4. Sukuk issuer is a seller of assets
5. Sukuk holder is an owner of assets
6. Seller–buyer relationship
7. Business risk–return relationship
8. Major risk lies with underlying
assets
9. Return is expected from the
underlying assets
10. Return of investor’s capital cannot
be guaranteed

Conventional Bonds
1. Income is derived from the debt
instrument
2. The return is interest and is
predetermined
3. Negotiable financial paper
4. Bond issuer is a borrower
5. Bondholder is a lender
6. Lender–borrower relationship
7. Issuer guarantees the payment of face
value and periodic interest
8. Major risk is with issuer: credit risk
9. Interest payment is an obligation
10. Issuer is obligated to return
investor’s capital (face value)

3.7 Risk Exposure
Assessing risk exposure is perhaps the most important element in any study
aiming to investigate and contrast sukuk with other assets (Abdel-Khaleq &
Richardson, 2006; Al-Zoubi & Maghyereh, 2007; Viceira, 2012). Although sukuk and
conventional bonds have different structures, they may have similar risks; moreover,
each also has its own risks. The following are the various risks associated with the
holding of both assets.
1) Financial Risk. This is the risk when the issuer defaults on interest
or face value or both. Although Sukuk and bonds both carry this risk, their
remedial methods differ. Conventional bondholders have no choice but to
chase the issuer for unpaid amounts through a lawsuit. Thus, there is
uncertainty about how much can be retrieved from the original amount that is
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due. However, in the case of a default, sukuk holders have recourse to the assets
of the bankrupted individual.
2) Call Risk. This is the risk that a bondholder is obligated to sell the
bonds back to the issuer. When market interest rates rise, conventional bonds
are exposed to this risk. This situation may create significant cash flow
problems to bondholders because they will not be receiving the higher market
interest rates. In contrast, sukuk are not exposed to interest rate fluctuations
(Bask, 2010; Tariq & Dar, 2007)
3) Liquidity Risk. This occurs when a bond cannot be sold in
secondary markets because of a lack of interest. Such a situation can be equally
applicable to corporate and municipal bonds in the US market, for instance,
and to some sukuk. Sukuk can be entirely tradable, which means they also bear
this risk (Hayat & Kraeussl, 2011).
4) Interest Rate Risk. When interest rates change, there is an inverse
relationship between interest rates and bond prices. Thus, the overall return for
bonds will change with the interest rate; however, such a risk is typically
mitigated through holdings over long periods (Ahmad et al., 2012; Tariq &
Dar, 2007).
5) Purchasing Power Risk. Rising inflation rates can reduce
conventional bond yields while strengthening sukuk returns because the latter’s
underlying asset values increase with inflation (Usmani, 2008).
6) Foreign Exchange Risk. Fluctuations in market currency influence
both sukuk and conventional bonds. However, sukuk, which are liquid, namely
short term, have less exposure to this risk (El Shazly & Tripathy, 2013).
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7) Price Risk or Collateral Risk. Sukuk are exposed to the risk of
depreciation in the value of their corresponding assets upon maturity (Tariq,
2004; Usmani, 2008).
8) Shari’ah and Legal Risk. Risks resulting from the violation of
Shari’ah fundamentals or changes in policies apply only to sukuk. Suck risks
are more pronounced in countries that do not comply with Shari’ah (Hesse et
al., 2008).
9) Operational Risk. The risk of delay in accruing the benefits of the
underlying asset or cash flow for operational reasons (Tariq & Dar, 2007).
Of the foregoing, systemic market risks include interest rates, foreign
exchange, price risks, and commodity risks. These are addressed in detail by a
considerable amount of literature. The risks also include idiosyncratic risks such as
credit, Shari’ah, and operational risks (Hayat & Kraeussl 2011). Interest rate risks are
similar for sukuk with fixed rates and conventional bonds with fixed rates. When
market rates rise above the coupon’s value, the value of fixed rate sukuk falls. Foreign
exchange and currency risks vary with time and influence both assets. There are also
some specific risks associated with the operation and issuance of sukuk, in accordance
with their structure. Additionally, coupon risks associated with the obligor failing to
pay on time may also occur. Moreover, the associated asset may not be fully redeemed,
thereby exposing the sukuk holder to redemption risks (Alhabshi, 1994).
Further, sukuk structures expose sukuk to liquidity risks because there is no
up-to-date and well-structured secondary market for trading, and most of the
certificates tend to be held until maturity. Assets associated with sukuk may also be
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subject to the risk of asset loss or depreciation. Such risks are usually mitigated by the
Islamic form of insurance (Tariq & Dar, 2007).
As is the case for all assets and securities, institutions and governments must
evaluate and manage bonds’ risks. The 1988 Basel Accord suggested regulations and
guidelines for credit and market risks. The novel formation and structure of sukuk
inherently mean that sukuk have greater exposure to certain markets, assets, and,
hence, risks. Overall, the Islamic financial regime has its own structure and risks, as
do sukuk (Tariq, 2004). However, because of Shari’ah fundamentals, Islamic banks do
not allow the issuance of, or trading in, derivative instruments and other high riskbearing instruments, unlike conventional financial institutions (Tariq, 2004).
Sukuk markets mainly operate in emerging nations where less sophisticated
risk management expertise and mechanisms exist compared with the developed
traditional bond markets. The marked-up pricing of debt at a higher rate is not
permissible because of the Shari’ah prohibition of interest. Consequently,
counterparties in the market are, accordingly, inclined to default on their commitments
to other parties. In addition, institutional fees are higher in accordance with PLS
arrangements. Recently, diversified sukuk issuances have mainly involved assets
based on ijarah, istisna’a, salam, and murabaha contracts, which have credit risk
considerations at various levels (Azmat, Skully, & Brown, 2013; Bask, 2010; Dusuki,
2010). Additionally, sukuk-issuing institutions may have a difficult time developing
and executing effective risk management strategies congruent with Shari’ah
fundamentals (Khan, 2010).
More importantly, market risk in well-defined markets includes systematic
risks that occur because of monetary policy and idiosyncratic risks because of
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instruments that may differ from predominant market instruments (Hakim &
Rashidian, 2002). Market risk includes interest rate and foreign exchange risks. With
regard to sukuk, interest rate risks can be considered rate of return risks. Maturity terms
also affect risk considerations. The longer a term, the higher the risk. Sukuk contracts
with fixed rates may be exposed to risks in almost the same way as fixed-rate
conventional bonds have market interest rate risks. Essentially, sukuk are indirectly
exposed to fluctuations in interest rates through widespread benchmarking with
LIBOR (i.e., in their financing operations). Opposing fluctuations of market rates also
affect the creditworthiness of issuers unfavorably; hence, such fluctuations result in a
higher credit risk (Tariq, 2004; Tariq & Dar, 2007).
3.7.1 Market Risks/Rate of Return Risk
Any rise in market interest rates may result in a noticeable decline in the value
of fixed-rate sukuk. This is because the exposure of fixed-rate sukuk to rates of return
is similar to that of fixed-rate bonds to interest-rate risk (Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson,
2006). Additionally, when a traded asset is not liquid, a reinvestment risk occurs in
addition to the opportunity cost of investing at the new rate, as is the case with zerocoupon non-tradable sukuk. Essentially, sukuk are indirectly exposed to fluctuations
in interest rates through widespread benchmarking with LIBOR. For instance, markup,
which is a defining characteristic of a murabahah contract, is the most popular Islamic
financial instrument on the asset side of the balance sheet (Wilson, 2008). Every
contract benchmarked with LIBOR inherits the risk that future LIBOR rates will rise
and that the issuer, on the asset side, may not have earned as much.
The liability side of the issuer’s balance sheet is also of interest. This has
provisions dependent upon varying market conditions. Sukuk issuers have to counter
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fluctuations in LIBOR because any increase in earnings will have to be shared with
the investors in accordance with the sukuk structure. On the asset side, meanwhile,
repricing of murabahah contracts is not permissible because debts are non-tradable
according to the Islamic financial regime (Jin & Ziobrowski, 2011). Thus, a conflicting
situation occurs whereby a murabahah contract exposes the issuer and buyer to a
considerable interest rate risk, albeit indirectly. Some sukuk issuances, such as IDB
trust certificates, have assets that include murabahah receivables; hence, they are
exposed to an interest rate risk.
3.7.2 Foreign Exchange-Rate Risks
Currency risks arise from unfavorable fluctuations that influence holdings in
foreign currencies. Sukuk investors can also be exposed to such risks when held in
foreign currencies. For instance, according to the IDB, an Islamic dinar (ID) is
equivalent to one special drawing right (SDR) of the IMF, composed of 45% US
dollars, 29% euros, 15% Japanese yen, and 11% British pounds. However, sukuk are
denominated by US dollars and are consequently exposed to currency risk.
Over the last few years, this currency mismatch has been favorable for the IDB
because of the weakness in the US dollar relative to the ID. Thus, such IDB strength
has served as a guarantor and bench market protection for investors in sukuk with
foreign currencies. This, however, may not completely mitigate the exchange risk for
sukuk originators. Generally speaking, with fast-growing and globalized market-based
economics, currency exchange rates become more volatile and hence pose greater risk
exposure to financial instruments. As such, issuing institutions and governments
should implement effective exchange-risk management strategies that are compliant
with Shari’ah principles (Grewal, 2007; Khan, 2010).
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3.7.3 Credit and Counterparty Risk
This risk occurs when an asset or loan becomes irrecoverable because of
default or a delay in settlement. Chapra and Khan (2000), Khan and Ahmed (2001),
and El-Hawary, Grais, & Iqbal (2004) identify various credit risks that are unique to
Islamic finance. Sukuk trade in emerging markets, where counterparties enjoy less
sophisticated risk management mechanisms and the rescheduling of debt at higher
rates is not permissible because of the prohibition of interest; thus, counterparties are
more inclined to default on their commitments to other parties.
3.7.4 Default and Coupon Payment Risks
These risks can result in contract termination in the case of obligor default.
When a sukuk obligor fails to pay the rental due on the ijarah, namely the coupon
payment, the holder may exercise the right to nullify the contract and force the
defaulting obligor to purchase the assets back, against the obligor’s will and at a nonfavorable value. Further, legal action can be taken against the obligor if they fail to
return the principal amount. Delayed funds, due to obligor failure to pay on time, are
subject to a specified penalty payment amount, typically accumulated with the SPV
(Tariq, 2004; Viceira, 2012). Shari’ah boards recommend that such funds are donated
to charity.
3.7.5 Asset Redemption Risk
Redemption risk is more likely to occur when the originator has to purchase
an asset back because the originator may not be able to afford the purchase at that time
(Tariq, 2004).
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3.7.6 Liquidity Risk
Because of the lack of a well-structured and adequate secondary liquid market,
sukuk are exposed to liquidity risk. Usually, sukuk are listed on several local markets
that may be unable to provide the desired liquidity. Sukuk certificates are usually
medium to long term in maturity; further, their long-term success largely depends upon
their ability to provide higher liquidity with adequate risk management mechanisms.
Moreover, fixed-rate sukuk bear this risk in a very similar way to fixed interest rate
bonds. However, sukuk certificates are directly exposed to interest rate fluctuations
because of benchmarking with LIBOR (Tariq, 2004). Opposing alterations in market
rates may even unfavorably alter the credit history of issues. Further, sukuk are
exposed to foreign currency-rate risks just like any negative exchange-rate
fluctuations. With such, there is a school of thought that suggests sukuk as an ideal
tool for liquidity management and the mobilization of fresh funds. The collateral assets
eventually make them a safe form of asset. Indeed, existing asset-backed securities can
be bundled together and transformed into new sukuk that can, in turn, generate fee
income (Bask, 2010; Giot & Laurent, 2003).
Investors can choose between fixed or variable returns depending upon future
market expectations and have the opportunity to finance infrastructure projects. In this
regard, sukuk have become a vehicle for the equitable distribution of wealth because
they allow investors to benefit from true economic profits in equal shares (Vishwanath
& Azmi, 2009). Additionally, because sukuk are asset-backed, they provide asset
security or corporate guarantees (referred to as special vehicles in sukuk contracts) to
investors even in the case of default. Sukuk also undergo credit rating and auditing
procedures similar to conventional bonds. Ab Majid et al. (2010) suggest that sukuk
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default occurs primarily because of a breach of binding obligations in the agreement
between the issuer and holder.
Cakir and Raei (2007) examine the considerable risk-reduction advantages of
holding sovereign sukuk. Using the case of sovereign Sukuk and euro bonds from
similar issuers, they estimate and compare the VaR for a portfolio that includes both
instruments with one that only has Eurobonds. The results indicate lower VaR when
sukuk are added to the portfolio, demonstrating the diversification benefits of sukuk.
However, Godlewski et al. (2011) suggest no significant market reaction to
conventional bond issues but a significant negative stock market reaction to sukuk.
The researchers attribute the different markets’ reactions to two factors. First, investors
expect an adverse selection mechanism to encourage the less healthy entities to prefer
sukuk over conventional bonds. Second, investors may think that if companies issuing
sukuk are prevented from entering the conventional bond market, they can still take
advantage of excess demand for sukuk from Islamic banks.
Tariq and Dar (2007) study how expanding sukuk markets have highlighted
Islamic property-based securities in emerging economies. In this context, the authors
consider the securities’ fluidity, credit ability, and market risk. The ultimate goal is to
evaluate sukuk structures and gauge the numerous risks associated with Islamic private
and commercial structures. Such worthwhile examinations have been undertaken by
investigators such as Elgari (1997), Kahf (1997), and Zarqa (1997) with regards to
funding in Islamic economies.
Further, Al-Suwailem (1999) and El-Gamal (2001) inspect the consequences
of doubt and uncertainty in Islamic economies that may develop into pivotal points
regarding Islamic risk management instruments. Nevertheless, Godlewski et al. (2011)

66
suggest that there is no noteworthy reaction in the market to traditional bond issues
and that there may be considerable negative reaction to the sukuk by the market. The
literature contrasts the different stock market reactions to such assets; for example, the
study by Hayat and Kraeussl (2011) indicates that Islamic equity funds (IEFs) can be
typical investment vehicles that receive neutral reaction. However, IEFs must comply
with numerous ethical and financial criteria before acceptance in accordance with
Islamic law. Over the last decade, the IEF industry has exhibited solid growth; minimal
academic literature has analyzed the funds, though.
In a prior investigation (Hayat & Kraeussl, 2013), the performance of IEFs is
examined. The researchers utilize well-known techniques to develop estimated
coefficients for systematic risk (beta), risk-adjusted return (alpha), market timing
(gamma and theta), and downside risk (relative beta) using the excess returns of 145
open-ended IEFs over the decade following the year 2000. On average, IEFs have
underperformed both Islamic and conventional benchmarks considerably prior to
including management fees. The authors also find that globally invested IEFs,
surprisingly, have the worst performance, while locally invested IEFs perform slightly
better. Throughout the recent financial crisis of 2008–09, this underperformance has
further increased.
Such a finding is surprising because it widely contrasts with the prior literature,
which asserts that IEFs perform better during bear than bull markets (Hayat &
Kraeussl, 2011). However, to thoroughly examine market timing, the investigators
also employ parametric and non-parametric approaches, only to find that, based on
numerous robustness tests, IEFs are poor market timers. The authors also explicitly
analyze the downside risk as a potential explanation for inferior performance, but find
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that IEFs do not possess any significant downside risk. Moreover, one should note that
next to being relative underperformers, IEFs possess some unique and specific risks
that cannot simply be modeled with existing conventional investments because they
are dissimilar. Such risks include the changing Shari’ah rules, the evident lack of
sufficient historical data, high exposure to companies that may be suboptimally
leveraged, and considerable exposure to companies with low working capital. Indeed,
such risks should be taken into account when assessing IEFs as an investment
alternative in order to yield accurate judgment. Meanwhile, it seems that IEF managers
still need further time and experience before offering Muslims an investment
instrument that is attractive in terms of risk and return, although prior research
indicates the competitiveness of Islamic indices compared with conventional indices
(Albaity and Ahmad, 2008).
Additionally, Hakim and Rashidian (2002) conduct a study on the risk and
return of Islamic stock market indices. Introduced in 1999, the Dow Jones Islamic
Market Index (DJIMI) has rapidly gained traction from Muslim investors worldwide.
The index caters to the needs of investors seeking Shari'ah-compliant assets and
equities. Further, it gives investors a viable benchmark to gauge the performance of
Islamic funds/portfolios, whereby better-performing fund managers are rewarded
while underperforming managers are penalized. As such, this index is an indication of
the maturity process of Islamic financial markets, which is estimated today as having
a value of US$251 billion (DinarStandard, 2013). However, even with such
attractiveness, the stochastic properties of the DJIMI remain unexplored, primarily
because of the absence of academic research.
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Rusgianto and Ahmad (2013) conduct a study about the volatility behavior of
the sukuk market. The aim of the study is to examine such behavior in terms of
structural breaks. The Dow Jones Citigroup Sukuk Index (DJCSI) for 2007–2011 is
used as a proxy of the global sukuk market. In their results, the authors indicate that
structural breaks significantly alter the volatility behavior of sukuk. In other words,
volatility during the pre-crisis period and the contemporaneous period is more
sensitive to market events compared with the post-crisis period. The findings imply
that in order to realize a more rational and efficient sukuk market, a need exists for
policies that are more transparent, impose information disclosure, and offer better
incentives to attract investors. Such policies could, in turn, lead to higher trading
activities in the secondary market. Future research may develop a risk-return
forecasting model incorporating the volatility behavior of the sukuk market.
However, Ramasamy et al. (2011) urge that sukuk are less risky than
conventional bonds. Sukuk differ from governmental and conventional bonds as far as
rates and the calculations of delayed payments are concerned (Bacha, 1996). Thus,
with conventional finance, interest rates accrue and add to the principal because
borrowers fail to repay their dues on time. As such, interest earns interest based on the
length of the time the funds are utilized by the borrowers (Lydon, 2009). Such charges
are not permitted by Shari’ah and are considered as mere markup (profit) because of
delays in payment (Al-Omar & Abdel Haq, 1996). That said, in an Islamic-compliant
regime, this exposure by the lender to risk also yields a higher return while offering
investors a steady income stream, which, although low, is less risky when compared
with shares. As such, sukuk are unique in character and pricing mechanism. Indeed, as
a financial instrument, they eventually cannot deviate much from conventional bonds
because arbitrage opportunities will emerge between the two markets. However,
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overpricing of one asset and not the other will deter investors from parking their funds
in sukuk while underpricing will attract everyone in a chaotic pattern. This necessitates
the development of an efficient fair pricing mechanism to avoid arbitrage between
Islamic and conventional bonds (Al-Zoubi & Maghyereh, 2007)
We can also say, generally, that government bonds should always be
considered as safe and highly liquid, while offering lower yield. Sukuk are growing
fast, along with governmental and conventional bonds. Sukuk funds invest, as per
Shari’ah principles, in halal (permissible) businesses; as such, they are safer when
compared with conventional bonds. When empirically analyzed for riskiness,
however, the results reveal that sukuk are moderately more risky than governmental
bonds and less risky than conventional bonds, indicating a possible lower return.
Nonetheless, such an asset can offer a great opportunity to investors to diversify, even
for those who do not follow Islamic laws. Ultimately, investors who resort to parking
their money in the bond market are usually risk averse (Ramasamy et al., 2011).
3.7.7 Shari’ah Compliance
When issuers breach their responsibility to comply with Shari’ah, this can
possibly result in the loss of asset value. Dissolution clauses of Sukuk prospectuses
outline events that make contracts void because of Shari’ah noncompliance. If sukuk,
for instance, are based on a hybrid of ijarah and istisna assets, ijarah must always have
greater precedence than istisna otherwise the contract will dissolve (Usmani, 2008).
As such, there is a risk of the ability of such sukuk to compete and survive in the market
as distinct Shari’ah-compliant assets. There are numerous conflicts concerning the
applicability of Islamic financial instruments in accordance with different schools of
thought; hence, sukuk issuance and structure are affected, thereby posing a further risk.
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For example, the applicability of the murabahah varies among diverse schools of
thought. For instance, bodies such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC)
Fiqh Academy asserts that murabahah contracts are binding only on the seller and not
the buyer, while other schools of thought say that such contracts are binding on both
(Vogel & Hayes III, 1998).
With regard to liquidity facility, sukuk prospectuses stipulate that a facility
must limit lags between payments to investors and returns on underlying asset pools.
Some facilities are formed to permit a trustee to improve the facility for any liquidity
deficit ensuing from default in sukuk asset pools. The imbursement of liquidity
services has been provisional upon surplus funds after the distribution of coupon
payments to sukuk holders. The sole purpose of such a facility is to reduce lags
between investor payments and returns on the underlying asset pools. The importance
of such a liquidity facility can most effectively be appreciated when the arrangement
has floating-rate payments because fixed-rate returns would imply the nonexistence of
interest-rate differentials (Zakaria et al., 2012).
It is important to note that sukuk prospectuses are subject to the same fiduciary
risks as Islamic banks (El-Hawary et al., 2004). As such, if compliance is not proved,
originator reputation can suffer because investors would lose their confidence in the
issuer, who would hence lose potential investments. Thus, overall, the association of
Shari’ah auditors with sukuk issuances ensures investor confidence and market flow.
However, devising mechanisms that assure compliance with competitive market
conditions remains a challenge for sukuk issuances.
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3.8 Risk and Return
The novelty of sukuk inherently entails a higher exposure to certain market and
financial risks. The credit and counterparty risks inherent in Islamic finance are unique
owing to the nature of Islamic financial instruments that have become the foundation
of the sukuk assets pool. Unlike conventional financial institutions, Islamic banks do
not have access to derivative instruments and other credit risk management
mechanisms because of Shari’ah considerations.
Sukuk issuers operate, for the large part, in emerging markets where
counterparties possess less sophisticated risk management mechanisms. The
rescheduling of debt at a higher markup rate does not occur because of the prohibition
of interest. Consequently, counterparties are more inclined to default on their
commitments to other parties. Agency costs are also higher with regard to PLS
arrangements.
Recent major sukuk issuances have mainly involved assets based on ijarah,
istisna’a, salam, and murabaha contracts. There are numerous credit risk
considerations associated with these modes of finance. In addition, sukuk are exposed
to a variety of systemic risks such as interest rate and exchange rate risks, and
operational risks such as redemption and SPV-specific risks.

3.9 Literature Review of Sukuk Performance
OIC Fiqh legitimized sukuk in 1988; since then, sukuk have gained significant
acceptance in the world’s leading financial markets. This is because tangible assets
back most Islamic financial transactions and a sukuk signifies asset ownership. In
contrast, a bond is a real debt agreement between two parties, the investor and the
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issuer (Omar, Abduh, & Sukmana 2013). Moreover, a sukuk is known as a method of
mobilizing funds for supporting an investment but with an expectation of earning a
future yield for settling obligations, thus enabling it to access financial markets
(Nagano, 2017). However, Islamic bonds are designed in such a way that they adhere
to the guidelines and regulations of Shari’ah, although they have the characteristics of
both stocks and bonds (Klein & Weill, 2016). Sukuk are known for their low volatility,
which makes them an even more stable option for investment (Alaoui, Diwandaru,
Azhar, & Masih, 2014; Boumediene, 2015). Further, Nagano (2017) finds that large
corporations with high demands for funding opt to use the sukuk market instead of the
conventional debt market, especially when there is a significant need for financing in
situations where information relating to the conventional debt market is not matched,
meaning that accessing funds from banks may become difficult. Specifically, sukuk
are a readily available option for large-scale funding that may be beyond the limits of
the conventional debt market, especially from the banks.
Moreover, Azmat et al., (2014), upon further analysis, note essential
characteristics that distinguish conventional bonds from Islamic bonds. For example,
it is apparent that when choosing Islamic bonds, issuers do not have a similar approach
as they would for a debt-deriving common bond. This is because they do not regard a
debt-equity investment venture bond as an equity instrument. Besides, it is clear that
the distance to the issuer, the type of sukuk, and the Shari’ah advisor’s popularity
determine the stock price (Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, & Weill, 2016). This means that the
issuers must find ways to suit their preferential needs. They can achieve their aim by
upholding Shari’ah principles consistently without considering fatwas.
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Nevertheless, it is noted that Malaysian investors fail to react to the
announcement of conventional bonds; however, they have an adverse reaction to sukuk
in the stock market (Godlewski et al., 2013; Klein & Weill, 2016). This situation
applies despite conventional bonds and sukuk being different before, during, and after
the financial crisis that affected the whole world. In fact, when the two are compared
in an empirical investigation, the announcement of conventional bonds and sukuk has
caused a negative market reaction, although this reaction differed at specific times of
the financial crisis period. For example, conventional bonds had negative effects only
during and after the crisis, while sukuk had negative effects before and during the crisis
(Alam et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, in the case of a single product, for instance sukuk only, there is
a possibility of obtaining varying results during the crisis period from different
international markets. For example, it is apparent that analyzing the sukuk market
using wavelet technique during the crisis period shows that sukuk proved to be of high
quality, while at the same time having less risk, with the Dubai Financial Market being
the top index in the GCC region (El Alaoui et al., 2015). Moreover, when the analysis
is conducted using the Markov switching technique, the results are impressive. For
example, Aloui, Hammoudeh, and Hamida (2015) analyze the GCC sukuk market and
Shari’ah-compliant stock. They find that when using two different regimes, the first
shows that the bonds have higher means and a smaller variance, while in the second,
the results are inverse. Moreover, the authors demonstrate that the regime determines
the link between Shari’ah-compliant stock and sukuk. They also show that Shari’ahcompliant stock responds to the sukuk market’s activities in an asymmetrical way. In
addition, using dynamic conditional correlations for 1241 observations on a daily basis
together with the multivariate integrated asymmetric power of an autoregressive
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conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model, Aloui, Hammoudeh, and Hamida
(2015a) investigate the spillover of Shari’ah-compliant stock with sukuk in the GCC
region. The researchers find that for corporate and financial services, sukuk and
Shari’ah-compliant stock have a high correlation and an inverse interaction. In the
second phase of their analysis, the researchers discover that in the GCC, there is
behavior that exhibits itself as a dynamic conditional correlation, which is a spillover
from the crisis period from the US. However, during the crisis, the Islamic indices
showed detachment from conventional products, despite evidence of an adverse effect
spreading from the crisis to conventional portfolios and Islamic bonds (Hkiri et al.,
2017). In other words, Islamic finance is a safe option for investors who would like to
diversify so that they can spread and minimize risks, especially during a financial
crisis. In addition, when Aloui, Hammoudeh, and Hamida (2015b) use a wavelet
squared coherency approach to determine the co-movement power between
conventional bonds and sukuk in the GCC capital market, they realize that Shari’ah
stock and sukuk have a dependent relationship that involves a kind of co-movement.
This co-movement mostly depends upon time-frequency and the long-term effect.
Nonetheless, Arundina, Omar, and Kartiwi (2015) give neural networks
priority over multinomial logit techniques when they conduct research to determine
sukuk rating accuracy. They prove that sukuk ratings depend upon sukuk structure and
share price. There is also a dissimilar transmission between the two, as revealed by a
dynamic spillover index (Maghyereh & Awartani. 2016). Further, Maghyereh and
Awartani (2016) discover that sukuk have high transmission mechanisms brought
about by the availability of information relating to market equity, regardless of the
slow integration of sukuk into other markets. Nevertheless, Kenourgios, Naifar, and
Dimitriou (2016) note an advantage with Islamic portfolios, claiming that such
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portfolios have the potential to protect investors against risks and economic instability,
a benefit that was exhibited during financial crises. This is especially the case when
sukuk are diversified and used in both developed and developing economies.
Consequently, it is possible for investors to gain higher profits, provided that they can
distinguish a domestic market from regional markets and have a strategy that enables
proper resource allocation. Balcilar, Cerci, and Demirer (2016) unearth unmatched
diversification options for sukuk that are unique in a way that conventional bonds are
not. The authors base their argument on an examination of performance analysis.
However, they discover that during financial crises, sukuk have a negative correlation
with global stock markets. However, Nagano (2017) describes the importance of
timing the market efficiently, especially when issuing sukuk. Notably, Nagano (2017)
says that ordering should be in a sequence flow, starting from sukuk market
accessibility, financial constraint, and undervaluation of the organization just before
sukuk are issued. Similarly, Mohamed, Masih, and Bacha (2015) highlight two events.
The first promotes trade-off theory for products in the process of achieving optimal
behavior. The second indicates that the two product issuers mimic pecking order
theory, whereas those who issue exchange-based sukuk and straight bonds use
underlying growth opportunity theory. Consequently, each event is unique, although
the uniqueness depends upon the preferred products and their target matches.
Regarding returns, Naifar (2016) discovers that sukuk returns depend upon the
volatility of the stock market in Saudi Arabia. Further, with regard to the UAE,
Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, Islamic bond indices show that sukuk have a sensitive
effect on the world’s conventional stock markets compared with Islamic products in
global, regional, and local markets (Naifar, Hammoudeh, & Al Dohaiman, 2016).
Naifar and Hammoudeh (2016) decide to investigate the effect of economic policy, oil
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uncertainties, and the global financial crisis on sukuk returns using quantile regression.
Particularly in GCC countries, they discover that policy, uncertainty, and a crisis affect
the lower quantile negatively; however, only a crisis affects the higher quantile
negatively. The authors also note that gold uncertainty combined with bonds has no
impact on sukuk returns in the GCC. Notably, according to Halim, How, and
Verhoeven (2016), corporations suffering agency costs and still experiencing
problems of underinvestment choose sukuk in most instances instead of deciding to
issue bonds. This action suggests that sukuk can lessen the effects that
underinvestment and agency costs cause to a corporation. Nonetheless, future studies
should focus on cost and benefit analysis.

3.10 Conclusion
With such attention, sukuk transactions have shown solid growth over the last
decade from US$8 billion to more than US$856 M globally (IIFM, 2016). By holding
sukuk, it is possible that the value of associated assets may appreciate or depreciate
and thereby influence sukuk returns, unlike fixed conventional bond returns. Sukuk
are exposed to many types of risk such as liquidity and Shari’ah-compliance risks.
More importantly, sukuk are exposed to market risk. In well-defined markets, the risks
include systemic risks that occur because of monetary policy and idiosyncratic risks
that occur because instruments may differ from predominant market instruments
(Hakim & Rashidian, 2002). Sukuk are an ideal tool for liquidity management and the
mobilization of fresh funds. They are a relatively safe form of investment because they
are asset-backed. Existing asset-backed transitions can be bundled together and
transformed into new sukuk. These instruments generate a significant amount of fees
as income for Islamic financial institutions. However, investors may select fixed and
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variable returns depending upon future market expectations. Investors also have the
potential to finance infrastructure projects. Sukuk are a means to achieve the equitable
distribution of wealth and enable investors to benefit from the true profits that result
from enterprises in equal shares.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
4.1 Introduction
The literature has identified some appropriate techniques for use in this thesis,
namely the VaR approach and hedging analysis. The objective behind selecting these
is as follows.
1. To measure and quantify the level of financial risk within a company over a
specific time.
2. To determine the extent and occurrence ratio of potential losses in institutional
portfolios.
3. To empirically explore the diversification benefits of sukuk in fixed income
portfolios.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 describes the VaR
approach used and section 4.3 describes hedging analysis.

4.2 Value at Risk Approach
The concept of value at risk was originally initiated as a substitute risk measure
of variance by Bawa (1978). However, it was not until the early 1990s that the term
“VaR” came into common use. According to Linsmeier and Pearson (1996), VaR
provides a general and consistent measure of risk, taking into account a range of
positions and risk factors. Through VaR, the risk linked with a fixed income asset can
be measured in a way that is consistent with and comparable to the measure of risk
linked with the equity position. Another feature of VaR is that it considers correlations
among various risk factors. The methods by which VaR information could be utilized
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for the provision of strategic risk assessments for managers, traders, and other
employees have been discussed by Kuruc and Lee (1998). They suggest ways for
dissuading the excess risk taking that takes place when traders are rewarded solely on
the basis of profits. Such risk assessment could even be used in a portfolio context.
The use of VaR for reporting and disclosing has been discussed by Jorion (1996), who
observes that companies are progressively ensuring the reporting of VaR information
in their annual reports. It has been suggested by Dowd (1999) that portfolio hedging
approaches against the amount measured by VaR could be applied through VaR
information.
The VaR model can perhaps be commonly regarded as a quantitative tool for
the purpose of calculating the possible loss that could occur in a financial institution
for a number of assets within a specific time period (Jin & Ziobrowski, 2011). The
banking industry presently uses conditional VaR for the measurement of market risk
since it is related to commodity, equity, interest rate, and currency risk. In financial
institutions, VaR is acknowledged and regularly used because of its easy-tocomprehend definition: It sums up the possible inadequacy of a portfolio of assets into
numbers stated as percentages or possibly nominal amounts in a selected currency (Jin
& Ziobrowski, 2011). With regard to poor market risk, the market cost exposure from
the financial instrument is measured through VaR, lest the next day could be
statistically described as bad. Moreover, the risk–return profile of active market
participants, for example resource managers or traders, could be measured through
VaR (Jin & Ziobrowski, 2011). With regard to market risk, the market value exposure
of a financial instrument can be measured through VaR if, for instance, the next day is
a statistically defined bad day (Linsmeier & Pearson, 2000).
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Even though there could be a single, strong, and distinct definition of VaR, the
exact process of VaR application has not yet been confirmed. In accordance with its
nature, the measurement of VaR relies strongly on good forecasts of catastrophic risk
or unusual happenings. Thus, modeling the returns precisely is essential. It is because
of its easily comprehensible definition that VaR is well-known and extensively used
by financial institutions (Cakir & Raei, 2007). Such use is also because VaR totals the
potential loss of a portfolio of assets into a nominal amount in a selected currency or
in a number stated as a percentage. In addition, the risk–return profile of active market
members such as asset managers or traders can be qualified through VaR (Jorion 1996;
Pérignon & Smith, 2010).
With regard to modeling the returns distribution, the following traditional
techniques are used: (1) stress testing (scenario analysis), (2) parametric techniques
(analysis based), (3) Monte Carlo simulation, and (4) historical simulation (Al-Zoubi
& Maghyereh, 2007).
However, there are certain Islamic finance indices such as the DJCSI in capital
markets that could be utilized for calculating and measuring sukuk risks. The DJCSI
was formulated to evaluate the performance of global Islamic fixed-earnings
investments. The overall approach from the set of Citigroup fixed earnings indices and
even the DJIMI approach for inspecting investments for Shari’ah compliance are
followed by the DJCSI. This latter index could be benchmarked by sukuk traders in
US dollar-denominated investment-grade sukuk issued within the international
market. Those that have been verified for Shari’ah compliance in accordance with the
index approach, are also included in the index. In the Islamic indices (from the
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beginning), the usual return is an expected 83.94%. However, there is a more sensible
8.45% in the five-year return in the Islamic indices (Al-Zoubi & Maghyereh, 2007).
The worst possible loss of a portfolio within a particular holding period at a set
confidence level under normal market conditions is measured through VaR (Jorion,
1996). The analysis of whether the initiation of sukuk bond portfolios leads to any
diversification advantage is undertaken through a VaR approach. This projection of
the distribution of future portfolio values and the measurement of potential losses by
utilizing past data could be undertaken through different techniques such as simulation
methods (Pérignon & Smith, 2010). Basically, VaR is a representation of a portfolio’s
market risk, signifying the maximum amount that could be lost during the holding
period, in every case, except possibly 1%. For instance, through the VaR approach, it
can be known with a confidence level between 0.99% and 1% that a given number of
US dollars will be lost in a particular year, month, or day. Thus,
σp = w Σ w

(4.1)

where Σ = the variance-covariance matrix of returns on securities in a portfolio, w =
the vector of weights for the different securities in the portfolio, and w' = the
transposed vector of weights in the portfolio.
A portfolio’s VaR can be formed through a grouping of the risks of the main
securities. It basically includes cover for the correlation and volatility within the
different risk variables over time. With regard to the measurement of VaR, different
approaches could be used. A commonly utilized approach is the variance-covariance
method, also known as the delta-normal technique. Through this method, the worst 1%
and 5% on the curve can be ascertained easily through the Gaussian normal
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distribution curve, which is expressible in terms of the confidence interval, the
standard deviation, and the mean. A key assumption here is that returns are jointly
normally distributed. Through the following equation, a portfolio’s VaR can be
calculated:
VaRp = -(μp −α σpW)

(4.2)

where W = the initial portfolio value, μp = the average return of the portfolio, and α =
the standard normal deviate (for the 99% confidence level).
It is evident through the above formula for VaR of an asset that a smaller VaR
is implied through lower volatility, which is quite preferred. If the returns of the
constituent assets have small or even negative correlations, a lower volatility is
achieved in a portfolio of assets. Gains through diversification occur through
diversification of a portfolio of assets whose outcomes are not extremely positively
correlated (Cakir & Raei, 2007).
Even though there are certain shortcomings, the VaR calculation is made
suitable through the normality assumption. As opposed to the symmetry represented
in normal distribution, there are two common methods in which asset returns deviate
from symmetry. By using suitable approaches, these sets of asset returns can be
estimated by modeling volatility (this will be discussed later in the thesis). In
calculating asset returns, fat tails are quite usual, indicating that extraordinary losses
could occur more often than the times they have been forecast through normal
distribution. In addition, asset returns are frequently negatively skewed, with more
observations on the left side than the right (Dowd, 1999; Hayat & Kraeussl, 2011).
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The Monte Carlo simulation method, as opposed to the delta-normal approach,
requires less strong assumptions. However, it involves more calculations. At first, for
the price paths, stochastic data-generating procedure is stated, and through the data,
parameters such as correlations and risks are derived. Next, for all variables of interest,
price paths are simulated through computer-generated random numbers. In order to
create a distribution of returns, all these pseudo realizations are utilized. Through this
approach, a VaR figure is calculated. As is the case with all other approximations, the
projected VaR could have faults in approximation. Thus, these shortcomings should
be taken into account before making any significant explanation, comparison, and
implementation of the projected VaR (Linsmeier & Pearson, 1996; Linsmeier &
Pearson, 2000).
In the Monte Carlo simulation approach, the precision of any projected
parameter is proportional to 1/n where n is the total count of iterations. Monte Carlo
simulation approaches rely on computer-generated random numbers. Since these are
not completely random numbers, they result in certain faults that reduce as n increases.
With regard to the estimation faults, there is no closed form representation, so they
will not be discussed further in this study. However, closed-form formulas are
available for the standard errors of estimation using the delta-normal approach. The
numbers for these have already been determined (Cakir & Raei, 2007; Dias, 2013).
4.2.1 Expected Shortfalls
According to Acerbi and Tasche (2002), a risk measure is coherent if and only
if it is monotonous, sub-additive, positively homogeneous, and translation invariant.
Failure to comply with any one of these four requirements invalidates the risk measure.
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From this perspective, VaR is not coherent since it is not sub-additive. Subadditivity implies that a portfolio made of sub-portfolios will have a VaR smaller than
or equal to the sum of the sub-portfolios’ VaR; in other words, diversification will
reduce risk. This axiom is violated by VaR. Chen (2013) illustrates the lack of subadditivity of VaR by considering two stylized, independent, and identical projects with
a 2% probability of a US$10m loss and 98% probability of a US$1m loss. The 97.5%
VaR on each project is assumed to be US$1m. Looking at the combined VaR, the loss
distribution is as follows: a 0.04% (2%*2%) probability of a $20m loss, a 3.92%
(2*2%*98%) probability of a US$11m loss, and a 96.04% (98%*98%) probability of
a US$2m loss. The 97.5% VaR is then US$11m, which is higher than the combined
VaRs of the two projects (US$2m).
The VaR approach also ignores tail risk: The α% VaR tells us that loss is not
expected in more than α% of occurrences but says nothing about the potential loss
should VaR exceeds. This is particularly problematic since our data display much
bigger tails than predicted by the Gaussian distribution. The expected shortfall is an
alternative market risk measure, defined as the average loss beyond VaR. The expected
shortfall is a sub-additive risk measure (it is monotonous, positively homogenous, and
translation invariant) and is thus a coherent measure of risk. We apply expected
shortfall to our data to check whether they validate or invalidate the VaR results
presented earlier.
Following Acerbi and Tasche (2002), let us assume that for day t, Xt represents
the profit and loss of a portfolio, the distribution of which can be forecast by the
predictive distribution Pt. Thus,
VaRα,t = P-1t(α)

(4.3)
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and
1

𝛼

𝐸𝑆𝛼,𝑡 = − 𝛼 ∫0 𝑃𝑡−1 (𝑞)𝑑𝑞

(4.4)

In a (second) consultative paper published in January 2014, the Basel
Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed to move away from 99% VaR
as a measure on which to base banks’ capital requirements and to replace it with 97.5%
expected shortfall. The main rationale for the change is that VaR is not sub-additive
and ignores tail risk. Should returns be Gaussian, the two measures would be
equivalent. However, should returns exhibit fatter tails then 97.5% expected shortfall,
the returns would drive a higher capital charge. When effective, the new regulatory
environment makes expected shortfall the prime market risk measure.
4.2.1.1 Model Set Up
In a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH)(p,q)
model, the volatility regresses on p against past squared returns and q past variances.
Thus, in the GARCH(1,1) version we have
2
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡2 + 𝑐𝜎𝑡−1

(4.5)

where ht is the conditional variance at time t, a is a mean-reversion parameter, and b
and c the lag-one squared returns and variance coefficients respectively.
We implemented GARCH(1,1) with our data. In GARCH(1,1), the
unconditional variance of returns is obtained as follows:
σ2 = a / (1- b –c)

(4.6)

With most of our data, the constraint b+c>1 is not met; thus, the unconditional
variance is undefined. In such cases, exponentially weighted moving average
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(EWMA) models are normally preferred. We chose to focus on the RiskMetrics model
(a EWMA model with lambda=0.94).
EWMA is a special case of GARCH(1,1), where the mean reversion parameter
is omitted and the condition b+c=1 is imposed. With EWMA, past data are given
declining weights: (t-1) data is assigned weight 1, (t-2) data weight (1- 𝜆)𝜆, (t-3) data
weight (1- 𝜆)𝜆)^2, … , (t-i) data weight (1- 𝜆)𝜆) ^(i-1). The entire series conveniently
reduces to the following recursive formula:
2
2
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜆𝜎𝑡−1
+ (1 − 𝜆)𝑟𝑡−1

(4.7)

where λ is the decay parameter (the higher the value of λ, the lower the decay). The
RiskMetrics version of EWMA uses λ=0.94 for daily data. The sample mean of
squared residuals is used to start recursion.
We next implemented and backtested the RiskMetrics model.
4.2.1.2 Backtesting
Backtesting is a statistical procedure that compares actual profit and loss
numbers to VaR estimates with the aim of checking the VaR model’s ability to capture
actual risks. The simplest backtesting approach is to test whether the actual frequency
of exceptions (losses higher than VaR) is statistically different from that suggested by
the VaR confidence interval. Since such tests are called “unconditional coverage”
tests, we will use the Kupiec likelihood ratio (LR) test. A limitation of such a test is
that it ignores the timings of the exceptions. Should exceptions cluster in specific
periods, this would also invalidate the VaR model (since the model would then fail to
capture volatility and/or correlation changes). Backtesting techniques that address this
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shortcoming are called “conditional coverage” tests and include the Christoffersen test
and the dynamic quartile of Engle and Manganelli. We apply the latter.
4.2.1.3 Unconditional Coverage Test
Each trading outcome either produces a violation or does not. The number of
exceptions thus follows a binomial distribution, which for large samples, as in our
case, can be approximated using the normal distribution. For a (1-α)-VaR model, the
Kupiec LR test checks whether the frequency of exceptions is statistically different
from α; namely, the null hypothesis is
𝑥

H0: 𝛼 = 𝛼̂, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛼̂ = 𝑛

(4.8)

where x is the number of exceptions, n is the sample size, and hence 𝛼̂ is the
observed exception frequency.
The test is conducted as a likelihood ratio and the test statistic takes the form
𝛼𝑥 (1−𝛼)𝑛−𝑥

Kupiec 𝐿𝑅 = −2𝑙𝑛 (𝛼̂𝑥 (1−𝛼̂)𝑛−𝑥 )

(4.9)

Under H0, the statistic asymptotically follows a chi-squared distribution with one
degree of freedom.
In order to further test the validity of the foregoing modeling approach, we
computed the test statistic and associated p-values for both long (quantile losses) and
short (quantile profits) positions. Annex 1 presents the results’ tables. They show that
the backtesting results are mixed and that, in a significant proportion of cases, the null
hypothesis that the frequency of exceptions is equal to the VaR confidence level is
rejected. Specifically, we observe that the frequency of exceptions on long positions
(quantile losses) exceeds that expected under a normality assumption, a finding that is
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consistent with our earlier analysis of non-normality of the data. This observation
applies to all considered confidence levels. We also note that results are far more mixed
for short positions (quantile profits), highlighting the asymmetric impact of news.
Negative news (evidenced by price drops) is known to have a greater impact on
volatility than positive news (evidenced by price increases) of a similar magnitude,
which is what we find. This is known as the leverage or asymmetric effect (as an
illustration, the volatility index (VIX) tends to increase in a bearish stock market and
decrease in a bullish one).
4.2.1.4 Conditional Coverage Test
A limitation of unconditional tests such as the Kupiec LR test is that the timing
of exceptions is ignored. Engle and Manganelli (2004) argue that, for a VaR model to
be validated, exceptions must be uncorrelated as well as unbiased and that any noise
introduced into the VaR measure would change the conditional probability of an
exception. Rather than modeling the whole distribution, their approach is to model the
quantile directly. Specifically, they apply a conditional autoregressive quantile
specification (called CAViaR).
Let θ be the probability associated with VaR, let x t be a vector of time t
observable variables (chosen to be lagged returns), and let βθ be a p-vector of unknown
parameters. Finally, let ft(β) ≡ ft(xt−1,βθ ) denote the time t θ -quantile of the distribution
of portfolio returns formed at time t-1, where the θ subscript is suppressed for βθ for
notational convenience. We now have
𝑓𝑡 (𝛽) = 𝛽0 + ∑𝑞𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝑓𝑡−𝑖 (𝛽) + ∑𝑟𝑗=1 𝛽𝑗 𝑙(𝑥𝑡−1𝑡−𝑗 )

(4.10)
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where p=q+r+1 is the dimension of β and l is a function of a finite number of lagged
values of observables. The autoregressive terms βi ft−i(β),i = 1,..., q, ensure that the
quantile changes “smoothly” over time. The role of l(xt−j) is to link ft(β) to observable
variables that belong to the information set. In our analysis, we use p=5.
Under the assumptions of consistency and asymptotic normality, we now
proceed to derive a dynamic quantile test based on a regression of the exceptions on
their lags, which follows a chi-squared distribution.
Annex 2 contains all the results (for both individual companies and the
indices). The results largely conform to the Kupiec LR test results.
4.2.2 EGARCH and the Asymmetric Impact of News
One weakness of GARCH models is that they do not consider the asymmetric
impact of news: Negative news (evidenced by price drops) is known to have a greater
impact on volatility than positive news (evidenced by price increases) of a similar
magnitude. This is known as the leverage or asymmetric effect. As an illustration, the
VIX (an equity volatility index) tends to increase in a bearish stock market and
decrease in a bullish one. One method to address this asymmetric news impact is to
use an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model. The EGARCH model differs from
GARCH in two respects. First, it allows negative unexpected returns to have a greater
impact on volatility than positive unexpected returns. Second, it allows big news (as
evidenced by the absolute size of the unexpected return) to have a greater impact than
in GARCH. EGARCH takes the following form:

log(ℎ𝑡 ) = 𝑎 + 𝑐. log(ℎ𝑡−1 ) + 𝛾.

𝜀𝑡−1
√ℎ𝑡−1

+ 𝑏. [

|𝜀𝑡−1 |

√ℎ𝑡−1

2

− √𝜋]

(4.11)
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where a, b, c, and 𝛾 are constants and 𝛾 is generally negative so that positive return
shocks will have a lower impact on volatility than negative return shocks.
Engle and Ng (1993) derive what they call the “news impact curve” of both
GARCH and EGARCH. This curve measures the way that past returns’ shocks (𝜀𝑡−1 )
are incorporated into current volatility estimates (ht). The news impact curve of the
GARCH model is symmetric (quadratic) and is centered around 𝜀𝑡 =0: Positive and
negative return shocks of the same magnitude generate the same amount of volatility.
In contrast, the news impact curve of EGARCH has a greater impact on volatility for
negative shocks than positive (since γ is typically negative), as expected. Engle and
Ng (1993) also show that EGARCH allows for large shocks, independently of their
sign, to have a greater impact than with GARCH.
Engle and Ng (1993) examine whether some variables observed in the past and
not included in the volatility model can predict the squared normalized residuals.
Should these variables predict the squared normalized residuals, the variance model
would be invalidated. The authors propose four Lagrange multiplier (LM) diagnostic
tests to examine whether we can predict the squared normalized residuals by past
variables not included in the linear volatility model: the sign test, the negative sign
bias test, the positive sign bias test, and a joint test for the three prior effects.
The sign test examines the impact of positive and negative news on the
−
conditional variance not predicted by the linear model. Let 𝑆𝑡−1
and be a dummy

variable that takes the value 1 when 𝜀𝑡−1 is negative and 0 otherwise. The test looks at
−
whether 𝑆𝑡−1
has any predictive power on the standardized squared residuals 𝜀𝑡2 /ℎ0𝑡 ,

where ℎ0𝑡 is the unconditional variance under the null hypothesis. The sign test (as
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well as the three following tests described below) is calculated as a t-ratio using a
regression model.
The negative sign bias test looks at whether the linear model explains the
different effects between small and large negative shocks. This is undertaken by
−
looking at 𝑆𝑡−1
. 𝜀𝑡−1 . Similarly, the positive sign bias test considers whether the linear

model explains the different effects of small and large positive shocks by examining
+
+
𝑆𝑡−1
. 𝜀𝑡−1 , where 𝑆𝑡−1
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when 𝜀𝑡−1 is positive

and 0 otherwise. Finally, the joint test looks at the three prior effects simultaneously.
Annex 3 presents the results of the four tests for our EWMA RiskMetrics
version of GARCH. In all cases, the null hypothesis that the conditional variance
follows an EWMA RiskMetrics process cannot be rejected at the 5% confidence level.
This implies that we have found no evidence that our model failed to account for an
asymmetric news impact fully.

4.3 Hedging Analysis Methodology
In this section, we present our methodology on the time-varying features of
correlation (estimated with a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-GARCH model)
between conventional bond and sukuk indices, both before and after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. Correlations are a key input in both hedging and asset allocation.
Hedges require estimates of the correlation of the assets in the hedged portfolio.
Further, if the correlations are changing, the hedge ratio should be adjusted
accordingly. The construction of an optimal asset allocation relies on the specification
of a variance-covariance matrix.
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The DCC-GARCH model first proposed by Engle in 2002 is based on
assuming a GARCH volatility process of the second moment of returns. This model
allows for measuring the level of linear interdependence between markets over time.
It calculates the time-varying correlations between any two markets. We estimate the
DCC-GARCH model in a two-step process. In the first step, we compute a timevarying conditional variance using a multivariate GARCH(1,1) process. In the second
step, we calculate the time-varying correlation matrix using the standardized residuals
from the first step’s GARCH model.
4.3.1 DCC-GARCH Model
Following Engle (2002), let 𝑦𝑡 = [𝑟𝑖𝑡 , … , 𝑟𝑁𝑡 ]′ be a 𝑁 × 1 vector of log changes
in indices of asset markets. The conditional mean equations can then be written as
𝐴(𝐿)𝑟𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑡 ⃓𝛺𝑡−1 ~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡 ), and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇

(4.12)

where 𝐴 is a matrix, 𝐿 is the lag operator, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of innovations based on
the information set, Ω, that is available at time 𝑡 − 1. The 𝜀𝑡 vector has the following
conditional variance–covariance matrix:
(4.13)

𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 𝑅𝑡 𝐷𝑡
1/2

1/2

where 𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(ℎ𝑖,𝑡 , … , ℎ𝑁,𝑡 ) is a diagonal matrix that contains conditional
volatilities and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 can be estimated by using a univariate GARCH(1,1) model. The R
1

1

matrix is written as 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡 )−2 𝑄𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡 )−2 . The time-varying conditional
correlations between conventional bonds and sukuk are elements in the time varying
R matrix and are computed as

𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ⁄√𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡 𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗

(4.14)
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We focus on these conditional correlations in this analysis. The 𝑄𝑡 ≡ 𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡
matrix is an 𝑁 square symmetric positive-definite matrix that is obtained from the
estimated univariate GARCH models of the variables and given by the following form:
𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑄̅ + 𝛼𝑢𝑡 𝑢́ 𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑄𝑡−1

(4.15)

where 𝑢𝑡 = (𝑢1𝑡 , … , 𝑢𝑁𝑡 )′ is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of the standardized residuals of the firststep estimation, 𝑄 is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 unconditional variance matrix of 𝑢𝑡 , and 𝛼 and 𝛽 are
non-negative scalar parameters with a sum of less than unity that capture the effects of
prior shocks and dynamic conditional correlations on current correlations.
When the restriction 𝑎 = 𝛽 = 0 is imposed, 𝑄 reduces to the constant
conditional correlation (CCC) model. The conditional correlation coefficient
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 can now be expressed as follows:
ij

𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =

qt

jj
√qii
t qt

,∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗

(4.16)

where 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 indicates the direction and strength correlation between asset markets. If
the estimated 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is positive and statistically significant, the correlation between asset
returns is rising and moving in the same direction or vice versa.
Finally, the parameters in the multivariate DCC-GARCH model are estimated
by using the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge
(1992) that takes into account the fact that a joint multivariate normal distribution is
violated often for financial series.2 We employ Ljung–Box (LB) statistics for the

We use the quasi-Newton method of Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, and Shanno’s (BFGS) algorithm
with a convergence criterion of 0.00001. We estimate the multivariate DCC-GARCH model with
WinRats 9.0 software.
2
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squared standardized residuals to determine the adequacy of the estimated model of
the conditional variances.
4.3.2 Hedge Ratios and Optimal Portfolio Weights
The estimated results derived from the multivariate DCC-GARCH model can
be used to construct trading strategies that minimize unwanted risk without reducing
expected returns for holding a two-asset portfolio. This study analyzes two trading
strategies necessary to determine active portfolio risk management of bond stock
prices with sukuk. More specifically, we compute the time-varying optimal hedge
ratios and optimal portfolio weights. Following Kroner and Sultan (1993), we first
consider the hedging problem as determining the rate at which a long position of one
US dollar in one market (say market 𝑖) could be hedged by taking short positions in
the other market (say market 𝑗) that minimize risk while keeping the same expected
returns. Thus, for a holding portfolio of two market returns, the minimizing problem
is given by3
min 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑝𝑡 ) = min {𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝑡2 × 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑗𝑡 ) + 2𝛽𝑡 × 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑗𝑡 )}
𝛽𝑡

𝛽𝑡

(4.17)

By solving the risk-minimizing problem (by the first-order and second-order
∗
derivatives of 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑝𝑡 )), the time-varying optimal hedge ratio (𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑡
) can be derived

as

∗
𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑡
=

3

𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑗𝑡 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑗𝑡 )

=

ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡
ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡

(4.18)

This model specification agrees with most prior studies (Basher & Sadorsky, 2016; Bessler et al.,
2016; Lin et al., 2014; Lin & Li, 2015; Sadorsky, 2012, 2014; among many others) on DCC hedging.
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Alternatively, conditional volatilities from the DCC model can be used to
construct an optimal portfolio that minimizes the portfolio risk without lowering the
portfolio expected returns. Following the methods of Hammoudeh et al. (2014) and
∗
Kroner and Ng (1998), among others, the optimal weight (𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
) for two assets is

∗
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡

0,
ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡 − ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗
∗
=
, with 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = {𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ,
ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 − 2ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡
1,

𝑖𝑓
𝑖𝑓
𝑖𝑓

∗
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
<0
∗
0 ≤ 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 1
∗
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
>1

(4.19)

∗
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
is weight of the asset 𝑖 in a one US dollar portfolio at time 𝑡, ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the

conditional covariance between 𝑖 and 𝑗 at time 𝑡; ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 and ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡 are the conditional
variances of 𝑖 and 𝑗 respectively. The weight of asset 𝑗 in the considered portfolio is
∗
computed by (1 − 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
).
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Chapter 5: Data Description
5.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the data used in this thesis for individual companies
and indices. The chapter first describes the data. With regard to individual companies,
a brief description of each company’s business and industry is followed by explaining
the actual conventional bond and sukuk issues used in the analysis. The daily prices
for conventional bonds and sukuk are obtained from Datastream. With regard to the
indices (the Dow Jones Sukuk Index (DJSI) and the Dow Jones Corporate Bond
Index), we introduce the indices’ composition and the computing methodology.
We then proceed to introduce market risk analytic approaches and qualitatively
describe the data prices and returns.

5.2 The Dow Jones Sukuk Index
Following the growing popularity of sukuk, Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) Dow
Jones, one of the leading global providers of financial information, has developed an
index that focuses only on Shari’ah-compliant bonds. The DJSI helps to measure the
performance of sukuk at the global level. The DJSI is a market-value-weighted index
that comprises US dollar-denominated instruments that have been screened for
Shari’ah compliance in accordance with measures undertaken in the DJIMI.
For a finance instrument to be considered eligible under the DJSI and DJIMI,
it must pass through industry and financial ration screens. Under the industry screen,
the primary business must be halal; thus, companies dealing with alcohol,
entertainment, weapons and defense, tobacco, and conventional financial services are
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considered ineligible. Under the financial ratio screen, the following elements must be
less than 33%.
1. Total debt divided by trailing 24-month average market capitalization.
2. The sum of a company’s cash and interest-bearing securities divided by trailing 24month average market capitalization.
3. Account receivables divided by trailing 24-month average market capitalization.
A unique aspect of the DJSI is that it provides a benchmark for investors
seeking exposure to fixed-income investments that comply with Shari’ah. For bonds
to be considered eligible for inclusion under the DJSI, they must not only be Shari’ah
compliant but must also meet the standards that are issued by the AAOIFI.
The earliest base date for sukuk is September 30, 2005 when the index was
first created. As of 2012, the index contained 39 instruments, with a combined market
value of US$32.6 billion (source: S&P DJ). The stated coupons carry fixed rates and
floating rates with a minimum maturity of one year. In most cases, maturity is much
longer: the MacCaulay duration of the index is 4.12. Other details about the sukuk in
the index are that the minimum size outstanding is US$200 million and the minimum
quality is BBB (the breakdown is as follows: AAA US$2.9 billion; AA US$8.1 billion;
A US$14 billion; and BBB US$7.5 billion). Calculation frequency is daily and
components must be bullet or make-whole structures. We use the total return (exreinvestment) version of the index (Bloomberg ticker DJSUKTXR).
The use of DJSI in this thesis is mainly because of its comprehensive nature.
Sukuk in this index are from diverse countries and exchanges such as London,
Frankfurt, and Dubai. The daily calculation frequency used for DJSI also makes it
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possible to identify subtle changes in prices and returns, and consequently the
associated market risk.
5.2.1 Features of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index
The creation of the DJIMI in 1999 was a major step in the development of
Islamic finance. According to Siddiqui (2007, p. 496), it represents “the first
institutional approach by a Western index provider (the Dow Jones Index) to publish
an index with a methodology that applies Shari’ah screens to define a universe of
Shari’ah-compliant stock in the global marketplace.” In that same year, another major
Western index, the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE), also engaged in creating
a similar index, namely the Global Islamic Index Series (GIIS), reflecting the growing
interest in the emerging world of Islamic finance.
In principle, the purpose of DJIMI was to define the borders of a universe of
Islamic finance in which components meet specific Shari’ah-based laws and to
recognize the growing need for investments that are compliant with these laws.
However, the creators of DJIMI were also aware that, after 400 years in which
conventional finance dominated the world of economics and finance, identifying
systems characterized by pure Islamic finance is almost impossible. Accordingly, the
creation of DJIMI represented a quantum leap toward the globalization of Islamic
finance and was the starting point of a long journey of creating and defining the
universe of Islamic finance.
At the most fundamental level, the DJIMI and other Islamic indices aim to
ensure that the principles of Islamic Shari’ah are recognized and implemented by the
businesses listed in the index. In this regard, El-Khamlichi, Sarkar, Arouri, and Teulon
(2014) identify five major principles. The first is the principle of PLS. In conventional
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finance, investors are interested in sharing profits while avoiding losses. In Islamic
finance, however, the sharing of profit and loss is essential on the basis of the
recognition that nothing can be guaranteed and that risk taking is about the sharing of
both positive and negative outcomes. The second principle is the prohibition of
interest, which is a fundamental principle in Islamic law. The third principle is assetbacking, which essentially means that financing operations must be backed by assets
to reduce risks, maximize trustworthiness, and ensure that business growth is founded
on solid grounds. The fourth principle is the prohibition of excessive uncertainty;
namely, extremely high uncertainty that could be potentially harmful to investors,
regardless of how promising or lucrative the outcomes may be. This principle is also
consistent with Islamic principles and teachings that prohibit Muslims from taking
unnecessary and potentially destructive risks. The last principle is the exclusion of
sectors that are inconsistent with fundamental Islamic teachings and ways of life.
These specific sectors include industries that deal with the production, processing, and
trade in pork, alcohol, tobacco, weapons, and defense, in addition to entertainment
(e.g., casinos and music) and conventional finance; namely, all financial industries or
businesses whose operations are based on interest.
From its inception, DJIMI was intended to maintain the highest and most
stringent standards and quality criteria in management, supervision, and performance,
especially as it was expected to be perceived as the leading authority on the definition
and development of the universe of Islamic finance. This is evident, for example, in
the advanced institutional approach and the level of commitment exhibited by the Dow
Jones management toward the supervision of operations. For example, the GIIS relies
on outsourced supervision from a variety of Islamic supervisory boards and sources;
however, the DJIMI took the unconventional and costly step of creating and
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maintaining its own Shari’ah supervisory board that reflects Shari’ah views drawn
from several major Islamic countries (Siddiqui, 2007). This unusual step by a Western
institution had several purposes. First, it was intended to reflect the high level of
commitment of the Dow Jones to Islamic finance. Second, it sought to highlight the
recognition of Shari’ah supervision as a fundamental and vital aspect of Islamic
financing. Third, the plan was to institutionalize the processes of screening and
compliance and to ensure that high and consistent criteria and standards were
developed and maintained within the index itself to avoid any conflicts that could arise
when relying on several external supervisory boards.
The supervisory board of DJIMI is responsible not only for screening and
selecting the companies represented in the index, but also for ensuring continuous
oversight on a permanent level. However, the screening and component selection
processes are taken to be among the most critical functions of the supervisory board.
The process of screening and selection is conducted at two levels; namely, the primary
business level and the financial ratios level.
According to Siddiqui (2007), the process of screening and selection at the
primary business level is simple and direct, and is mainly intended to confirm that the
businesses that comprise the index satisfy the most fundamental codes of Islamic
Shari’ah in terms of compliance. This implies the exclusion of businesses that operate
or that may be associated with the industries that are either excluded or that Islam
forbids, such as industries that involve pork, alcohol, and un-Islamic entertainment. At
the financial ratio level, the main objective of screening is to ensure compliance with
the financial principles and criteria of Shari’ah, such as the avoidance of excessive
risk, observing the PLS principle, and the prohibition of interest. For example, among
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the criteria that must be observed is that a company’s board of directors must have an
explicitly “judiciary duty of care and loyalty to examine, entertain and implement
decisions in the best interests of the company that will enhance shareholder value”
(Siddiqui, 2007, p. 14).

5.3 The Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index
Our proxy for the performance of conventional bonds is the Dow Jones Equal
Weight US-issued Corporate Bond Index. The index comprises 96 recently issued
investment-grade bonds spanning a variety of maturities.
The market value of the index components is US$209 billion (financials US$96
billion, industrials US$97 billion, and utilities US$16 billion) while the modified
duration of the index is around 7.5 (compared with 4.1 for the DJSI index).

5.4 Companies Included in the Portfolio Market Risk Analysis: Conventional
and Sukuk Bonds
In order to investigate the possible existence of a difference(s) between the
market risk of sukuk and that of conventional bonds, we selected pairs of sukuk and
conventional securities with the same characteristics (same issuer, rating, and
maturity). We also selected only those bonds (Islamic and conventional) that have
complete data for 2008 to 2013. Thus, the final sample included the Bank of London
and the Middle East (BLME), MAF, Petronas, Rasmala, Tamweel, Dubai, and DP
World.
In order to compute and aggregate possible risks in the sukuk market, relevant
data were collected from seven companies. These included Bank of London and the
Middle East (BLME), MAF, Petronas, Rasmala, Tamweel, Dubai, and DP World.
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5.4.1 BLME
BLME is a well-established Shari’ah-compliant bank based in the UK. Since
its inception in 2006, the bank has specialized in offering financial services in three
core areas: corporate, wealth management, and treasury. We use two BLME funds in
our analysis: BLME Asset Management High Yield US and BLME Asset
Management Shari’ah Dollar Income. Note that January 2011 is the start date of the
BLME data.
5.4.2 MAF
MAF Global Securities Limited is a debt-issuing vehicle based in the Cayman
Islands. The parent company is the Majib Al Futtaim Group, an Emirati holding
company that owns and operates shopping malls and leisure centers. The bond used in
the analysis is the 5¼% 2019 bullet issue, while the sukuk is the 5.85% 2017. Both
issues originated in 2012. The exchange markets in consideration are Frankfurt for the
conventional bond and London for the sukuk.
5.4.3 Petronas
Petronas is a state-owned fully integrated energy company that is based in
Malaysia but has a global presence. The company’s conventional bond under
consideration is the 5¼% 2019, issued as a 10-year fixed coupon bond in August 2009
and listed on the Frankfurt exchange. The sukuk is a five-year 4¼% fixed coupon bond
that was also issued in 2009 and matured in Aug 2014.
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5.4.4 Rasmala Investment Bank
Rasmala is an investment management company established in 1999 and based
in the UK. Two funds are used as our proxies for conventional bonds and sukuk:
Rasmala GCC Fixed Income and Rasmala Global Sukuk.
5.4.5 Tamweel Funding
Tamweel Funding Limited, a subsidiary of Tamweel PJSC, was incorporated
in 2009 and is currently based in Saint Helier, the Channel Islands. The conventional
bond under consideration is a convertible five-year fixed coupon bond issued in
January 2008. The Tamweel stock lost 85% of its value in November 2008 and Dubai
Islamic Finance acquired a majority stake in 2010. Thus, the equity option component
of the convertible can largely be ignored and the instrument considered a conventional
bond. The Tamweel sukuk was issued as a floating rate bond in 2008 in the Dubai
Financial Market. This five-year bond matured in 2013.
5.4.6 Dubai Department of Finance
Bonds issued by the Dubai Department of Finance (DOF) were also included
in the portfolio. The conventional bond used in the analysis is a 4.9% fixed coupon
bond that was issued as a five-year bond in 2012 (the maturity date was May 2, 2017).
The sukuk used is a floating rate five-year bond issued in 2009 in the London
Exchange.
5.4.7 DP World
DP World Limited is a company that owns ports and terminals worldwide. In
2007, the company issued a 30-year straight fixed coupon bond (6¼% 2037). A sukuk
in the form of a straight 10-year 6.85% fixed coupon bond was also issued in 2007.
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One should note the significant difference in duration between the conventional bond
and the sukuk under consideration for this company. Other things being equal, one
would expect greater price and returns volatility for the conventional bond.

5.5 Market Risk Analysis
5.5.1 Price and Returns of Conventional Bonds Compared with Sukuk
In quantitatively evaluating the market risk associated with sukuk relative to
conventional bonds, price and return data will be used extensively in further chapters.
The present section qualitatively describes the data and the associated graphs.
5.5.1.1 BLME’s Prices and Returns

Figure 5.1: BLME’s prices and returns
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Figure 5.1 shows BLME’s prices and returns for the conventional bond and the
sukuk first issued in 2011. Notably, prices for the sukuk fund remain relatively stable
through the date of issue to maturity with the increase being gradual. In contrast,
BLME’s bond prices have significant variations through the period to maturity. The
volatility of returns is clearly greater for the conventional bond than for the sukuk.
5.5.1.2 MAF’s Prices and Returns

Figure 5.2: MAF’s prices and returns
The volatility of returns for the conventional bond and for the sukuk exhibit
relatively similar trends, with increases and decreases occurring at almost similar
times. This similarity in returns movement in part suggests that market factors may
have relatively similar impacts on the prices of the two instruments. One important
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comment is that the observed spikes in the sukuk returns are likely to be the result of
illiquidity and/or imperfections in the data as shown in Figure 5.2.
5.5.1.3 Petronas’ Prices and Returns

Figure 5.3: Petronas’ prices and returns
Figure 5.3 shows that over the three-year period ending in 2013, the price for
Petronas’ conventional bond remains consistently above the company’s sukuk price
(from a common base of 100 for both bonds at the start). It is, however, apparent that
the higher bond returns are associated with a greater volatility level.
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5.5.1.4 Rasmala’s Prices and Returns

Figure 5.4: Rasmala’s prices and returns
Based on the two-year data, a relatively similar trend in price movement is
evident, thereby suggesting that the prices of the conventional bond and the sukuk
respond in a similar manner to market conditions. Rasmala’s conventional bond also
yields greater returns compared with the sukuk but is more volatile (Figure 5.4).
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5.5.1.5 Tamweel’s Prices and Returns

Figure 5.5: Tamweel’s prices and returns
During the four-year period ending 2014, the conventional bond and the sukuk
issued by Tamweel exhibit similar price movements over the first one-and-a-half
years. Thereafter, a higher price for the conventional bond is notable while the sukuk
remains stable. It is worth noting the number of “no price movement” days for the
sukuk. These are more likely to be the result of illiquidity (Figure 5.5). This issue will
be explored in the next chapter.
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5.5.1.6 Dubai’s Prices and Returns

Figure 5.6: Dubai’s prices and returns
A cursory look at the price data shown in Figure 5.6 that the performance of
the sukuk far exceeds that of the conventional bond. As such, the sukuk is better at
withstanding market conditions compared with the bond. Further, the sukuk market
for the Dubai Department of Finance is also less volatile compared with the bond
market, which experienced highly positive and negative returns particularly in 2012
and 2013.
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5.5.1.7 DP World’s Prices and Returns

Figure 5.7: DP World’s prices and returns
Figure 5.7 explains the qualitative and graphical analyses of the prices and
returns of DP World’s conventional bond and sukuk are inconclusive because
relatively similar movements are observed during the seven-year period. To some
extent, this is surprising given the significant difference of duration between the
conventional bond (30 years) and the sukuk (five years).
5.5.2 Overall Price and Return Comparison for All Companies
From the graphical analysis of prices and returns for the seven companies under
consideration, high correlations between sukuk and conventional bonds are evident
only for a few companies such as Tamweel and DP World. The lack of perfect
correlations between sukuk and conventional bonds means that a reduction in VaR is
expected. In other words, it is likely that the inclusion of sukuk as part of a portfolio
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could lead to diversification and consequently a reduction in VaR. Another notable
aspect pertaining to conventional bonds and sukuk is that the latter are in most cases
less volatile in terms of significant variations in prices and returns. This finding
indicates that sukuk markets are relatively insulated to changes in interest rates when
compared with conventional bond markets, possibly owing to their specific
characteristics (among others, a greater reliance on the performance of the financed
asset).

5.6 Descriptive Statistics: Minimum, Maximum, Mean, and Standard Deviation
Table 5.1 contains the descriptive statistics for bonds and sukuk over the entire
sample period. DP World has the most volatile returns (with a standard deviation of
0.77%, a lowest return of -11.97%, and a highest return of +8.813%). The sukuk
market was also marked by substantial variations for some of the companies. DP
World records the largest negative return at -10.77% and, at the same time, the highest
return at a maximum of 8.81% (with a standard deviation of 0.68%). Comparatively,
sukuk recorded relatively lower standard deviations than bonds, except for MAF.
Thus, the sukuk market appears to be relatively stable while the bond market has high
levels of market volatility.

Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics bond and sukuk returns (%)
Conventional Bonds
Min.

Mean

Max.

Sukuk
Standard

Min.

Mean

Max.

Deviation

Standard
Deviation

BLME

-0.59

0.01

0.89

0.07

-0.17

0

0.24

0.023

MAF

-1.3

0.01

0.44

0.13

-3.58

0.003

3.44

0.41

Petronas

-4.41

0.004

6.6

0.26

-2.83

0

3.24

0.18

Rasmala

-1.22

0.01

0.61

0.11

-1.27

0.002

0.32

0.06

Tamweel

-10.63

0.01

15.91

1.18

-6.9

0.01

14.31

0.89

Dubai

-4.61

0.01

6.91

0.51

-2.99

0.01

6.22

0.39

DP World

-11.97

0.003

8.813

0.77

-10.77

0.002

9.43

0.68
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has described the data that will be used throughout the rest of this
thesis for sukuk and conventional bonds, and for individual companies and Dow Jones
indices. We have also presented the qualitative prices and returns associated with the
data. The next chapter focuses on a quantitative, comparative assessment of the risk–
return characteristics of sukuk and conventional bonds.
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Chapter 6: Empirical Results
6.1 Introduction
In order to model the returns distribution, the following traditional techniques
are used: (1) stress testing (scenario analysis); (2) the parametric technique (analytic
based); (3) Monte Carlo simulation; and (4) historical simulation (Al-Zoubi &
Maghyereh, 2007).
However, there are certain Islamic finance indices in the capital market that
could be utilized for the calculation and measurement of sukuk risks. The DJCSI is
formulated to evaluate the performance of global Islamic fixed-earnings investments.
The overall approach from the set of Citigroup fixed earnings indices and the DJIMI
approach for inspecting investments for Shari’ah compliance are followed by the
DJCSI. This index could be benchmarked by traders in sukuk. US dollar-denominated
investment-grade sukuk issued within the international market that have been verified
as Shari’ah compliant are also included in the index. In the Islamic indices, the usual
return is an expected 83.94%. However, there is a more sensible 8.45% in the fiveyear return of the Islamic indices (Al-Zoubi & Maghyereh, 2007).
One problem with the variance–covariance (VCV) method is that it assumes
homoskedasticity (constant variance over time). There is ample evidence of volatility
clustering. The GARCH method allows for heteroscedasticity and may yield better
results. We implement GARCH and EWMA RiskMetrics methods.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents and
analyses the results and section 6.3 summarizes the findings.
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6.1 Results
6.2.1 Company-level results
Table 6.1 presents the results for VCV and historical simulation (HS) VaR
calculations at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels for the full sample and the
most recent year of data. It should be noted here that the lack of secondary market
activity for some of the securities poses a significant challenge to computing HS VaR.
As an example, Rasmala’s conventional bond has so few actual price movements (nonzero returns) that, at the 90% level, HS VaR is 0. The sample size is 443 observations,
but there are only 35 strictly negative returns; hence a VaR of 0. Likewise, Tamweel’s
sukuk has too few price movements to make the 90% and 95% HS VaR deviate from
0 while using the full sample. The one-year HS VaR for Tamweel’s conventional bond
and sukuk cannot be computed because of no price movements in the prior year. The
VaR of 0 is not indicative of a lack of risk; it is the consequence of a lack of liquidity
in the secondary market for these securities.

Table 6.1: Bond VaR vs. Sukuk VaR

BLME
DP World
Dubai
MAF
Petronas
Rasmala
Tamweel*
Index
Pre-crisis
Index Post-crisis

Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR
Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR
Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR
Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR
Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR
Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR
Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR
Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR
Bond VaR
Sukuk VaR

Full Sample
90%
95%
99%
0.06% 0.12% 0.42%
0.02% 0.04% 0.15%
0.87% 1.43% 5.51%
0.58% 0.99% 2.29%
0.36% 0.72% 1.28%
0.23% 0.29% 0.56%
0.26% 0.42% 0.79%
0.19% 0.47% 1.98%
0.42% 0.64% 1.23%
0.21% 0.37% 0.77%
0.00% 0.08% 1.14%
0.02% 0.12% 0.42%
0.27% 0.97% 3.32%
0.00% 0.00% 1.73%
0.32% 0.44% 0.73%
0.01% 0.06% 0.43%
0.35% 0.56% 0.98%
0.11% 0.18% 0.50%

Over One Year
90%
95%
99%
0.09% 0.15% 0.29%
0.03% 0.04% 0.12%
0.77% 1.17% 5.33%
0.23% 0.34% 2.15%
0.12% 0.24% 1.59%
0.19% 0.26% 0.53%
0.37% 0.50% 0.84%
0.14% 0.33% 1.30%
0.36% 0.50% 0.81%
0.06% 0.16% 1.13%
0.00% 0.12% 1.02%
0.07% 0.13% 0.80%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.43% 0.70% 0.93%
0.09% 0.19% 0.54%
0.38% 0.51% 0.79%
0.13% 0.18% 0.35%

90%
0.22%
0.07%
2.02%
1.69%
0.53%
0.26%
0.39%
1.20%
0.84%
0.54%
0.35%
0.25%
1.51%
1.14%
0.34%
0.12%
0.46%
0.79%

Full Sample
95%
99%
0.28% 0.39%
0.09% 0.13%
2.59% 3.66%
2.17% 3.07%
0.68% 0.96%
0.34% 0.48%
0.50% 0.70%
1.54% 2.17%
1.08% 1.53%
0.69% 0.97%
0.45% 0.63%
0.32% 0.46%
1.93% 2.73%
1.46% 2.07%
0.43% 0.61%
0.16% 0.22%
0.59% 0.84%
1.02% 1.44%

90%
0.16%
0.05%
1.88%
0.57%
0.47%
0.27%
0.46%
0.63%
0.42%
0.35%
0.39%
0.25%
N/A
N/A
0.45%
0.18%
0.39%
0.19%

Over One Year
95%
99%
0.21%
0.30%
0.06%
0.09%
2.41%
3.41%
0.73%
1.03%
0.60%
0.85%
0.34%
0.48%
0.59%
0.84%
0.81%
1.15%
0.55%
0.77%
0.45%
0.64%
0.50%
0.70%
0.32%
0.45%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.58%
0.82%
0.23%
0.32%
0.50%
0.71%
0.24%
0.34%

*No price movement in the last year
116

117
Table 6.1: The conventional bonds’ VaR compared with the sukuk’s VaRs we
can see in Table 6.1, at the 99% level, HS VaR rises significantly (more than the
normal distribution would suggest). This may be due to data quirks rather than actual
risk: while implementing HS at the 99% level with just 250 observations, the third
biggest loss (if we are conservative) is the VaR, meaning that just a couple of outliers
can make a large difference.
For each issuer’s conventional bond and sukuk, we compare, at the 90%, 95%,
and 99% confidence intervals and for both the whole sample and one year of data, the
results for the VCV and HS VaR. Should the observed returns be normal, the results
should be identical (since the VCV standard deviation is computed historically using
the same returns as used for HS). Indeed, the results are markedly different because of
the non-normality of returns. Table 6.2 presents the ratio of VCV to HS VaR for all
issuers and for both the full sample and the most recent year of data.

Table 6.2: Ratio of VCV to HS VaR: full sample and one year

BLME
DP World
Dubai
MAF
Petronas
Rasmala
Tamweel
Index
Pre-crisis
Index
Post-crisis

Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Bond

90%
3.27
3.71
2.94
2.31
1.18
1.47
6.21
1.51
2.53
2.02
12.61
N/A*
N/A*
5.58
12.56
1.06
7.30
1.33

Full Sample
95%
2.25
2.27
2.20
1.81
1.19
0.93
3.26
1.17
1.86
1.70
2.62
5.80
N/A*
1.99
2.64
0.99
5.57
1.05

99%
0.83
0.93
1.34
0.66
0.87
0.74
1.10
0.89
1.27
1.24
1.09
0.56
1.20
0.82
0.52
0.84
2.89
0.86

90%
1.60
1.91
2.42
2.44
1.42
3.79
4.55
1.25
6.07
1.17
3.62
N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
2.01
1.05
1.43
1.04

One Year
95%
1.40
1.37
2.14
2.05
1.34
2.45
2.49
1.18
2.79
1.10
2.34
4.28
N/A*
N/A*
1.19
0.83
1.35
1.00

99%
0.72
1.03
0.48
0.64
0.91
0.53
0.88
1.00
0.56
0.95
0.56
0.69
N/A*
N/A*
0.60
0.89
0.96
0.90

* HR VaR is 0
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At the 90% confidence level, all the VCV VaRs of the conventional bonds and
sukuk are higher than HS VaR for both the full sample and the one-year sample. The
ratio of VCV to HS VaR ranges between 12.61 (Rasmala’s sukuk, full sample) and
1.17 (Petronas’ conventional bond, one-year sample).
At the 95% confidence level, all the VCV VaRs of the conventional bonds and
sukuk are higher than HS VaR for both the full sample and the one-year sample, except
for one occurrence (Dubai’s conventional bond, full sample, 0.93). The ratio of VCV
to the HS VaR ranges from 0.93 to 5.80 (Rasmala’s conventional bond, full sample).
At the 99% confidence level, 25 out of 34 ratios are smaller than 1. The values range
from 0.48 (DP World’s sukuk, one-year sample) to 1.34 (DP World’s sukuk, full
sample).
The fact that the VCV/HS ratios differ significantly from 1 indicates the nonnormality of returns. The fact that the ratio is higher at the 90% confidence level and
relatively lower at the 99% confidence level points to a distribution that implies that
returns are clustered around the mean and outliers are more numerous than predicted
by the normal distribution. Later on, we provide further evidence of this issue.
One problem in computing VaR for the conventional bonds and sukuk in our
data set is the lack of secondary market trading activity. A simple way to provide
evidence of illiquidity is to consider the number of days with no price change. While
it is of course possible that no price change on a trading day indicates that the perceived
fundamental value has not changed, it is reasonable to assume that a high number of
no price movements is a good indicator of illiquidity. Table 6.3 provides, for each
security, the number of no trading days. The impact of such illiquidity on the results
will be discussed later. Note that in the case of the sukuk indices, the number of no
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trading days may be misleading. Over September 30, 2005 to September 12, 2008, our
data set contains 1080 data points for the conventional bonds and only 759 for the
sukuk. The remaining 321 days can be attributed largely to a lack of secondary activity.
Table 6.3: Evidence of illiquidity: days with no price movements
No Price

Sample

Percentage of No

Movement

Size

Movement

Bond

408

802

50.87%

Sukuk

417

802

52.00%

Bond

57

1797

3.17%

Sukuk

85

1797

4.73%

Bond

168

550

30.55%

Sukuk

49

550

8.91%

Bond

46

505

9.11%

Sukuk

87

505

17.23%

Bond

123

1244

9.89%

Sukuk

189

1244

15.19%

Bond

443

549

80.69%

Sukuk

356

549

64.85%

Bond

606

1144

52.97%

Sukuk

1079

1144

94.32%

Index

Bond

0

1080

0.00%

Pre-crisis

Sukuk

0

769

0.00%

Index

Bond

1

1812

0.06%

Post-crisis

Sukuk

0

1427

0.00%

BLME

DP World

Dubai

MAF

Petronas

Rasmala

Tamweel
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For each issuer, the VaRs of the conventional bond and the sukuk are computed
and compared. Table 6.4 presents the results for each issuer and for both the whole
sample and one year of data. With regard to Tamweel, only the results for the whole
sample are presented because there is no price movement for either the conventional
bond or the sukuk over the prior year. Table 6.4 presents indicators that show, for each
issuer and sample size, whether the VaR of the conventional bond (“B”) or that of the
sukuk (“S”) is the highest. Of the 102 comparisons, the conventional bond has the
highest VaR 83 times, while the sukuk has the highest VaR 19 times. Of these 19
occurrences, nine relate to MAF and four to Rasmala. In the Rasmala case, the
conventional bond’s illiquidity is high (443 out of 549 observations are 0) and also
higher than for the sukuk (356 out of 549). With regard to the conventional bond, only
35 returns are strictly negative, meaning that the 99% confidence level of the HS VaR
is 0 and the 95% confidence level of the VaR is very low (0.077%, compared with a
standard deviation of 0.273%). Similar observations can be made over a one-year
horizon.

Table 6.4: Bond Var vs. Sukuk Var- Bond VaR highest(B)/ Sukuk VaR highest (S)
Historical Simulation
Full Sample

Variance–Covariance

Over One Year

Full Sample

Over One Year

90%

95%

99%

90%

95%

99%

90%

95%

99%

90%

95%

99%

Total B

Total S

BLME

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

12

0

DP World

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

12

0

Dubai

B

B

B

S

S

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

10

2

MAF

B

S

S

B

B

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

3

9

Petronas

B

B

B

B

B

S

B

B

B

B

B

B

11

1

Rasmala

S

S

B

S

S

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

8

4

Tamweel*

B

B

B

N/A

N/A

N/A

B

B

B

N/A

N/A

N/A

6

0

Index Precrisis

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

12

0

Index Postcrisis

B

B

B

B

B

B

S

S

S

B

B

B

9

3

83

19

*No price movement in the last year
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The VCV method uses historical volatility (as opposed to implied volatility)
calculated with the same data used for HS. Should returns be normal (in a statistical
sense), the results would be the same for both the HS and VCV method. This is not
what we observe in Table 6.5, which presents the ratios of HS to VCV VaR. Thus, we
provide evidence of the non-normality of log returns, looking first at the skewness and
kurtosis of the observed distributions, providing histograms as evidence. We then
compare the number of outliers to what we would expect should the returns be normal.
Table 6.5: Logreturns Skewness and Kurtosis – Full Sample

BLME

DP World

Dubai
MAF

Petronas

Rasmala

Tamweel
Index pre-crisis

Index post-crisis

Bond

Sukuk

Skewness

2.02

1.31

Kurtosis

42.87

29.35

Skewness

-1.92

-4.97

Kurtosis

72.41

178.77

Skewness

-0.12

0.37

Kurtosis

7.96

3.61

Skewness

-1.96

-0.11

Kurtosis

20.46

46.21

Skewness

6.86

1.55

Kurtosis

276.34

162.07

Skewness

-3.00

-7.52

Kurtosis

32.29

102.46

Skewness

3.77

6.68

Kurtosis

76.18

112.21

Skewness

-0.12

-3.59

Kurtosis

2.11

40.57

Skewness

-0.48

-9.50

Kurtosis

7.39

321.72
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Table 6.6: The full sample’s log returns for Skewness and Kurtosis

BLME
DP World
Dubai
MAF
Petronas
Rasmala
Tamweel
Index Pre-crisis
Index Post-crisis

Bond

Sukuk

Skewness

2.02

1.31

Kurtosis

42.87

29.35

Skewness

-1.92

-4.97

Kurtosis

72.41

178.77

Skewness

-0.12

0.37

Kurtosis

7.96

3.61

Skewness

-1.96

-0.11

Kurtosis

20.46

46.21

Skewness

6.86

1.55

Kurtosis

276.34

162.07

Skewness

-3.00

-7.52

Kurtosis

32.29

102.46

Skewness

3.77

6.68

Kurtosis

76.18

112.21

Skewness

-0.12

-3.59

Kurtosis

2.11

40.57

Skewness

-0.48

-9.50

Kurtosis

7.39

321.72

Table 6.6 reveals that as further evidence of non-normality we note that, for
each conventional bond and sukuk, the number of (negative) log returns is more than
three standard deviations away from the mean return; thus, we divide the number by
the total number of returns. This frequency of “3σ outliers” is then compared with the
frequency predicted by the normal distribution (0.135%).
Table 6.7 summarizes the results. For all conventional bonds and sukuk, the
number of outliers is higher than predicted by the normal distribution. The ratio of
actual to normal outliers is as high as 12.14 for Rasmala’s conventional bond and has
a minimum value of 1.79 for Petronas’ sukuk.

Table 6.7: Actual compared with normal frequencies of returns less than three standard deviations away from the mean
Bond

Sukuk

Log Returns <-3 σ

Sample Size

Bond
Normal

Sukuk

Ratio Actual/Normal

BLME

802

7

8

1.083

6.465

7.389

DP World

1797

21

10

2.426

8.656

4.122

Dubai

550

6

4

0.743

8.081

5.387

MAF

505

4

5

0.682

5.867

7.334

Petronas

1244

4

3

1.679

2.382

1.786

Rasmala

549

9

5

0.741

12.143

6.746

Tamweel

1144

11

8

1.544

7.123

5.180

Index Pre-crisis

1080/769

8

13

1458/1.025

5.487

12.687

Index Post-crisis

1817/1427

12

6

2.446/1.926

4.906

3.115
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Finally, for each time-series return, we apply the Jarque–Bera (JB) normality
test. The JB test is a goodness-of-fit test with the null hypothesis that the returns have
a skewness and kurtosis matching that of a normal distribution. We find, in all cases,
that the p-value associated with the test is 0 (when rounded to the sixth decimal place),
leading us to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that returns are non-normal. The
results are shown in of annex 4.
While the fact that financial returns exhibit kurtosis is a known phenomenon,
we believe that the illiquidity of the conventional bonds and sukuk under consideration
have contributed to our observations on the distribution of returns (clustering around
the mean and fat tails effect).
Consider the following example. Assume that the “true” (or fundamental)
values of a security in successive days are 100, 100.5, 101, and 103. The “true” log
returns are then 0.50%, 0.99%, and 1.47%. Now assume that because of illiquidity, the
security does not trade between day one and day four. The daily end-of-day prices now
read 100, 100, 100, and 103, and the associated log returns are 0%, 0%, and 2.96%. It
is easy to see how a repeat of this scenario (persistent illiquidity) would lead to a high
number of observed returns clustered around 0 and a fatter tail (or kurtosis). This is
exactly what we observe in our data.
6.2.2 Indices’ Results
Although less directly apparent, the problem of illiquidity also exists for
indices, for which the number of days with no price change is a lesser indicator of
illiquidity (if only one component of the index has a price movement, so will the
index).
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The sukuk index in particular has several features associated with illiquidity: a
smaller number of data points than the bond index over the same period, greater
skewness and kurtosis (40.57 pre-2008 and 321.72 post-2008) and large outliers. The
frequencies of “3σ outliers” are 12.687 times (pre-2008) and 3.115 times (post-2008)
greater than those suggested by the normal distribution and post-crisis. The sukuk
index has five data points with more than six standard deviations from the mean,
including one with 25 standard deviations from the mean.
The bond index displays lower illiquidity than the sukuk, as expected, with
lower skewness (-0.12 pre-crisis and -0.48 post-crisis) and lower kurtosis (2.11 precrisis and 7.39 post-crisis), while still displaying a larger number of “3σ outliers” than
predicted by the normal distribution (by a ratio 5.457 pre-crisis and 4.906 post-crisis).
For both the sukuk and Bond indices, the number of “no price movements” is
close to 0. This is to be expected because it only takes trading in one of the index
components for the index to change. Consequently, this finding cannot be taken as an
indicator of satisfactory liquidity. In addition, the number of data points, over the same
time span, is smaller for the sukuk than for the conventional bond, further pointing to
the illiquidity of the former.
The results of a comparison of VCV and HS VaR for the indices are consistent
with those of individual companies (a higher VCV VaR at the 90% and 95%
confidence levels and a higher HS VaR at the 99% confidence level) with one notable
exception: the pre-crisis VCV VaR for the sukuk is 2.89 times that of the HS VaR. A
closer inspection of the data shows that there are a limited number of extreme outliers
(up to 25 standard deviations from the mean). These impact the standard deviation
calculation (and hence the VCV VaR) while having only a limited impact on the HS
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VaR (because of their low number: whether an outlier is just beyond the VaR level or
many standard deviations away will not impact the HS VaR provided the number of
such extreme outliers is low). Consequently, the observation that the HS VaR is
generally higher at the 99% confidence level while the VCV VaR is higher at the 90%
and 95% confidence levels still stands and is consistent with illiquidity (with returns
clustered around 0 and fatter tails than predicted by the normal distribution).
6.2.3 Expected Shortfall
We implement expected shortfall (ES) for our data, using the HS results, for
the individual companies and the indices. We then discuss the results. ES values are
computed at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels for both the last year of data
and the whole sample. The results are presented in the Table 6.8. Table 6.9 contains
binary indicators that (for each company, sample, and confidence level) take the value
“B” when the conventional bond is riskier and “S” when the sukuk is riskier.

Table 6.8: Expected shortfall

BLME
DP World
Dubai
MAF
Petronas
Rasmala
Tamweel
Index Pre-crisis
Index Post-crisis

99%
0.624%
9.684%
1.883%
2.009%
0.902%
2.214%
0.000%
1.304%
1.109%

BLME
DP World
Dubai
MAF
Petronas
Rasmala
Tamweel
Index Pre-crisis
Index Post-crisis

99%
0.99%
9.57%
1.90%
1.37%
2.44%
1.80%
5.57%
0.88%
1.22%

Bond
One Year
95%
0.297%
3.447%
0.995%
0.903%
0.656%
0.804%
0.000%
0.847%
0.735%
Full Sample
95%
0.46%
3.63%
1.13%
0.76%
1.14%
0.70%
2.41%
0.63%
0.81%

90%
0.206%
2.230%
0.583%
0.661%
0.541%
0.422%
0.000%
0.728%
0.591%

99%
0.173%
2.322%
0.695%
3.140%
1.212%
1.443%
0.000%
0.841%
0.913%

90%
0.30%
2.39%
0.81%
0.56%
0.83%
0.13%
1.47%
0.50%
0.61%

99%
0.37%
7.28%
0.69%
6.17%
1.83%
1.48%
4.18%
0.65%
3.24%

Sukuk
One Year
95%
0.096%
1.030%
0.432%
1.069%
0.837%
0.539%
0.000%
0.467%
0.353%
Full Sample
95%
0.15%
2.54%
0.45%
1.92%
0.78%
0.49%
0.89%
0.27%
0.85%

90%
0.067%
0.659%
0.329%
0.653%
0.466%
0.324%
0.000%
0.304%
0.253%
90%
0.10%
1.66%
0.35%
1.14%
0.53%
0.10%
0.44%
0.15%
0.49%
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Table 6.9: The ES of the conventional bonds compared with the ES of the sukuk
One Year

Full Sample

99%

95%

90%

99%

95%

90%

BLME

B

B

B

B

B

B

DP World

B

B

B

B

B

B

Dubai

B

B

B

B

B

B

MAF

S

S

B

S

S

S

Petronas

S

S

B

B

B

B

Rasmala

B

B

B

B

B

B

Tamweel

S

S

S

B

B

B

Index Precrisis

B

B

B

B

B

B

Index Postcrisis

B

B

B

S

S

B

Total B

42

Total S

12

The results show a similar pattern to the VaR results presented in prior sections;
namely, that conventional bonds are riskier than sukuk in most cases, with the notable
exceptions of Tamweel’s bond (because of poor data) and MAF’s bond (because of
the specific structure of the two securities under consideration). We conclude that the
non-coherence (as defined by Acerbi & Tasche, 2002) of the VaR measure does not
invalidate our results.
6.2.4 EWMA and GARCH
Financial data exhibit volatility spikes (some periods are more volatile than
others) and serial correlation (or autocorrelation, meaning that these volatility spikes
do not occur randomly over time). The combination of these two effects is referred to
as volatility clustering; moreover, the fact that the variance may not be constant
throughout the data sample is called heteroskedasticity. The VCV (and HS) VaR of
prior sections uses simple historical volatility estimates, which give equal weight to all
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the error terms in the sample (the homoskedasticity assumption). In the presence of
heteroskedasticity, these VaR measures would misrepresent risk. In this section, we
implement two alternative volatility measures to compute VaR and analyze the results.
These measures are EWMA (which is a special instance of GARCH(1,1)) and
GARCH(1,1). We find that, in most cases, GARCH(1,1) does not fit the data well
(some constraints are not met); thus, we focus our analysis on EWMA, which yields
better results. The following subsections present tests on autocorrelation applied to our
data

(Ljung–Box

Q-statistics

and

the

Engle

autoregressive

conditional

heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test), specify the model’s setup, and present the fitting
results. Further subsections describe backtesting to check the validity of the results.
6.2.4.1 Evidence of Autocorrelation
We use the Ljung–Box Q-statistics to test for autocorrelation in our returns
data. The test is defined as testing the null hypothesis that the data is independently
distributed compared with the alternative hypothesis that the data is serially correlated
(i.e., we test whether the observed autocorrelation coefficient is statistically different
from 0). The Q(h)-statistic is computed as follows:
𝑝̂ 2

𝑘
𝑄(ℎ) = 𝑛(𝑛 + 2) ∑ℎ𝑘=1 𝑛−𝑘

(6.1)

where n is the sample size, h is the number of lags, and 𝑝̂ 𝑘 is the autocorrelation
at lag k. Q(h) follows a chi-squared distribution with h degrees of freedom. The Ljung–
Box statistic tests the null hypothesis that the residuals are independently distributed
compared with the alternative hypothesis that serial correlation is present. Table 6.10
presents the Q-statistics and the associated p-values for all companies in our data set,
with lags of 5, 10, 20, and 50 observations and for both raw and squared residuals.

Table 6.10: Ljung-Box Q statistics and associated p-values (p-values>0.95 in bold)
Raw Data
BLME
bond

BLME
sukuk

MAF bond

MAF sukuk

Petronas
bond

Petronas
sukuk

Rasmala
bond

Rasmala
sukuk

Q(5)

49.6483
[0.00000]

20.5525
[0.00098]

40.9540
[0.00000]

57.9161
[0.00000]

6.91029
[0.22734]

352.139
[0.00000]

48.3197
[0.00000]

13.7359
[0.01738]

Q(10)

58.4428
[0.00000]

26.0852
[0.00362]

52.3293
[0.00000]

59.9994
[0.00000]

104.861
[0.00000]

353.463
[0.00000]

49.0289
[0.00000]

15.6749
[0.10932]

Q(20)

70.7522
[0.00000]

50.4168
[0.00019]

68.6041
[0.00000]

70.4475
[0.00000]

109.074
[0.00000]

354.896
[0.00000]

50.9469
[0.00000]

19.7247
[0.47527]

Q(50)

155.940
[0.00000]

118.099
[0.00000]

121.353
[0.00000]

74.8026
[0.01310]

140.514
[0.00000]

373.699
[0.00000]

62.0766
[0.00000]

30.8077
[0.98505]

Tamweel
bond

Tamweel
sukuk

Dubai bond

Dubai
sukuk

DP World
bond

DP World
sukuk

Index bond

Index
sukuk

Q(5)

26.9458
[0.00006]

28.4044
[0.00003]

26.9458
[0.00006]

28.4044
[0.00003]

5.58588
[0.34862]

23.4484
[0.00028]

15.3548
[0.00895]

6.57679
[0.25406]

Q(10)

42.7137
[0.00001]

81.1560
[0.00000]

42.7137
[0.00001]

81.1560
[0.00000]

32.7779
[0.00030]

36.2237
[0.00008]

30.2536
[0.00078]

7.34219
[0.69279]

Q(20)

56.4181
[0.00003]

89.0956
[0.00000]

56.4181
[0.00003]

89.0956
[0.00000]

55.2117
[0.00004]

43.9466
[0.00153]

61.4994
[0.00000]

22.0904
[0.33563]

Q(50)

86.6699
[0.00049]

135.991
[0.00000]

89.6699
[0.00049]

135.991
[0.00000]

104.553
[0.00001]

99.4832
[0.00004]

101.645
[0.00002]

163.153
[0.00000]
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Table 6.10: Ljung-Box Q statistics and associated p-values (p-values>0.95 in bold) (Continued)
Squared
Data
BLME
bond

BLME
sukuk

MAF bond

MAF sukuk

Petronas
bond

Petronas
sukuk

Rasmala
bond

Rasmala
sukuk

Q(5)

12.4425
[0.02920]

19.0833
[0.00186]

24.6022
[0.00017]

58.3233
[0.00000]

0.60774
[0.98765]

455.616
[0.00000]

25.3315
[0.00012]

0.58623
[0.98862]

Q(10)

16.2907
[0.09161]

25.5162
[0.00449]

41.3629
[0.00001]

58.9791
[0.00000]

170.507
[0.00000]

455.686
[0.00000]

45.5807
[0.00000]

0.73803
[0.99996]

Q(20)

43.9541
[0.04135]

111.988
[0.00000]

55.5402
[0.00003]

62.5850
[0.00000]

170.560
[0.00000]

455.935
[0.00000]

95.6539
[0.00000]

1.26925
[1.00000]

Q(50)

68.6134
[0.04135]

216.272
[0.00000]

61.5505
[0.12673]

66.8816
[0.05551]

171.595
[0.00000]

456.357
[0.00000]

137.631
[0.00000]

2.32407
[1.00000]

Tamweel
bond

Tamweel
sukuk

Dubai bond

Dubai
sukuk

DP World
bond

DP World
sukuk

Index bond

Index
sukuk

Q(5)

5.68891
[0.33768]

12.8065
[0.02526]

5.68891
[0.33768]

12.8065
[0.02526]

0.25680
[0.99834]

9.64491
[0.08594]

173.070
[0.00000]

0.06365
[0.99995]

Q(10)

18.6455
[0.04500]

31.8341
[0.00043]

18.6455
[0.04500]

31.8341
[0.00043]

4.05972
[0.94461]

42.3191
[0.00007]

419.920
[0.00000]

0.09127
[1.00000]

Q(20)

19.5306
[0.48762]

53.3242
[0.00007]

19.5306
[0.48762]

53.3242
[0.00007]

8.94420
[0.98354]

42.7728
[0.00219]

904.361
[0.00000]

1.36403
[1.00000]

Q(50)

28.6338
[0.99345]

84.1283
[0.00180]

28.6338
[0.99345]

84.1283
[0.00180]

23.7390
[0.99941]

61.9321
[0.11997]

1426.55
[0.00000]

30.3014
[0.98753]
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With regard to testing the raw residuals, a low p-value indicates that positive
(negative) returns tend to be followed by more positive (negative) returns. With regard
to testing squared residuals, a low p-value indicates that large (low) absolute returns
tend to be followed by further large (low) absolute returns; namely, volatility clusters
over time.
Our results show that, using the raw data, the null hypothesis can be rejected
in many cases. We can thus conclude that there is strong evidence of serial correlation
in our data. In order to further test for volatility clustering, we apply Engle’s ARCH
test. An uncorrelated time series may still be serially dependent because of dynamic
conditional variance (or autocorrelation of the squared residual series). Such series
display ARCH effects. Engle’s ARCH test examines such heteroskedasticity. The
alternative hypothesis for Engle's ARCH test is autocorrelation in the squared
residuals, given by the regression
Ha:e2t=α0+α1e2t−1+…+αme2t−m+ut,

(6.2)

where ut is a white noise error process. The null hypothesis is
H0:α0=α1=…=αm=0

(6.3)

The test statistic is the F statistic of the regression of residuals. We apply
Engle’s ARCH test to our residuals for two, five, and 10 lag terms (m). Table 6.11
presents the p-values for all our time series.
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Table 6.11: p-values for Engle's ARCH tests

BLME bond

ARCH 1-2 F test
0.9638

ARCH 1-5 F test
0.0318

ARCH 1-10 F
test
0.1564

BLME Sukuk
MAF bond

0.7608
0.0004

0.0021
0.0021

0.0139
0.0009

MAF Sukuk
Petronas bond

0.0000
0.8203

0.0000
0.9885

0.0000
0.0000

Petronas Sukuk
Rasmala bond

0.0000
0.5980

0.0000
0.0002

0.0000
0.0001

Rasmala Sukuk
Tamweel bond

0.9608
0.0614

0.9895
0.3478

1.0000
0.0491

Tamweel Sukuk
Dubai bond

0.4439
0.0614

0.0295
0.3478

0.0023
0.0491

Dubai Sukuk
DP world bond

0.4439
0.8856

0.0295
0.9984

0.0023
0.9477

DP world Sukuk
Index bond

0.1802
0.0000

0.1242
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

Index Sukuk

0.9772

0.9999

1.0000

Annex 3 contains all the results (for individual companies and the indices). The
results largely conform to the Kupiec LR test results. Annex 4 presents the results of
the four tests for our EWMA RiskMetrics version of GARCH. In all cases, the null
hypothesis that the conditional variance follows an EWMA RiskMetrics process
cannot be rejected at the 5% confidence level; thus, we find no evidence that our model
has failed to adequately take into account asymmetric news impacts.
6.2.4.2 The VaR of Conventional Bonds Compared with the VaR of Sukuk
The VaR of conventional bonds is generally, and significantly, higher than the
VaR of the sukuk from the same issuer (MAF is a notable exception).
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Table 6.4 presents indicators that show, for both the HS and VCV methods and
over the full sample and the last year of data, whether the VaR of conventional bonds
is highest (B) or whether the VaR of sukuk (S) is highest. Of 102 comparisons, the
VaR of conventional bonds was highest 83 times and that of Sukuk was highest 19
times. The results were discussed in more detail in the prior section.
Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) found that, over 1996–2005, VaR for the DJII
is lower than that of the Dow Jones World Index, implying a lower risk. Our results
confirm and expand these findings, using individual companies as well as indices and
over a time frame that spans the 2008 financial crisis.
The PLS mechanism of Islamic finance is based on either the mudarabah or the
musharaka principle. Under the mudarabah principle, lenders share the profits in good
circumstances (the return being higher than interest rates) but bear the losses in bad
circumstances (provided there is no misbehavior on the borrower’s part). Under the
musharaka principle, lenders and borrowers both share profits and losses.
The Islamic finance PLS mechanism affects the payoffs of investors and
lenders in the following way. Shareholders have a lower return in positive
circumstances because some of the profits accrue to the lender; however, shareholders
have a higher return in negative circumstances because the lender takes all
(mudarabah) or part (musharaka) of the losses. Bondholders receive a higher return in
positive circumstances (since profit sharing leads to returns generally higher than
interest rates) and a lower return in negative circumstances because they bear all or
part of the losses. One would therefore expect that (i) the shares of companies that are
compliant with Islamic financial principles are less risky than non-compliant shares
and (ii) sukuk are more risky than non-compliant conventional bonds.
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Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) argue, and empirically prove using VaR, that
the foregoing leads to a situation where the shares of companies that are compliant
with Islamic principles become less risky. Our analysis also shows that sukuk are less
risky than non-compliant conventional bonds.
There are several reasons why the risk of a sukuk differs from that of a
conventional bond. These reasons collectively explain why sukuk risk is lower than
that of non-compliant bonds despite the sharing of profits and losses. First, Islamic
principles that prohibit interest or usury (riba), and place strong emphasis on the
performance of underlying assets in determining the payoff to investors, have led to a
smaller effect of interest rate changes on sukuk values. Further relevant characteristics
of Islamic finance are the prohibition of speculation (gharar); of short selling, betting,
and gambling (qimar); and of arbitrage (Jobst, 2008). Another contributing factor is
that sukuk are illiquid instruments compared with conventional bonds as evidenced by
the lack of secondary market activity.
Second, there are structural differences between Islamic and conventional
assets. Sukuk can be based on various Islamic partnerships and leasing arrangements;
however, all of these are backed by tangible assets. Moreover, most sukuk are
independent of interest rate movements; thus, the profit depends upon the underlying
asset’s performance.
To the extent that the value of the tangible assets backing sukuk is less volatile
than interest rates (or, more precisely, the impact of the value of sukuk on the
movement in interest rates), one would expect the VaR of sukuk to be lower than that
of conventional bonds. This is what we observe in most cases.
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Third, Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) show that the additional benefits
accorded by the PLS arrangements of Islamic finance are that they decrease agency
costs (lenders sharing the cost of failure leads to more conservative lending policies),
decrease the bankruptcy costs of companies, and eliminate conflicts between
bondholders and shareholders.

6.3 Conclusions
We have shown that the observed returns are non-normal. More specifically,
returns are more clustered around the mean and exhibit heavier tails than predicted by
the normal distribution. While financial returns are known to exhibit heavier tails than
the normal distribution, we believe that this phenomenon is exacerbated in our sample
by the illiquidity of the secondary market for the securities of our data set.
Should the number of simulations be increased for the Monte Carlo VaR, the
results would be the same as for the VCV VaR (they both make the same distributional
assumption). Further, using GARCH does not lead to values that differ significantly
from VCV. Thus, having compared the results for different VaR implementations, we
focus on VCV compared with HS.
By comparing the VCV and HS VaR, we find that the impact of the nonnormality of returns is twofold. First, the HS VaR is generally and significantly higher
than the VCV VaR for high confidence intervals (because of the heavy tails of the
observed distribution of returns). Second, the VCV VaR is generally higher than the
HS VaR at the 90% confidence level (because of clustering around the mean).
The “fat tails” phenomenon exhibited by financial returns is well documented
in the literature, starting, among others, with Mandelbrot (1963), who notes that “the
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empirical distributions of price changes are usually too ‘peaked’ relative to the
Gaussian property”. Fama (1965) shows that, for all stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, the frequency of outlier returns far exceeds that predicted by a normal
distribution. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Assaf (2009)
observed tails significantly heavier than predicted by the normal distribution in four
stock markets. Our results concur with these studies and provide evidence of similar
characteristics for conventional bond and sukuk returns, compounded further by sukuk
illiquidity.
Since illiquidity contributes to the heavy tails phenomenon, it is likely that
“true” (unobservable) returns would exhibit lighter tails than observed returns. The
implication is that the HS VaR possibly overstates the risk for high confidence
intervals. This is particularly true for sukuk, for which illiquidity is highest.
The VaR of a conventional bond is generally and significantly higher than that
of a sukuk for a given issuer, indicating a higher level of risk in holding the
conventional bond relative to the sukuk. Our analysis showed that sukuk are less risky
than conventional bonds. Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) demonstrate that shares of
companies that are compliant with Islamic principles are less risky than non-compliant
shares. These results naturally lead to the conclusion that lending compliance with
Islamic finance principles should be encouraged.
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Chapter 7: Hedge Analysis
7.1 Introduction
The present chapter empirically explores the diversification benefits of sukuk
in fixed-income portfolios, both prior to and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
2008. While conventional bond returns are driven solely by changes in interest rates,
sukuk place a greater emphasis on the performance of the underlying asset(s). We
postulate that the lower dependence of sukuk on interest rates should mean that they
are good diversifiers for a bond portfolio. We proceed to test this hypothesis in three
steps.
This chapter first explores the DCC features associated with the Dow Jones
bond and sukuk indices, both before and after Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Next, we
use the DCC results to explore the diversification benefits of introducing a sukuk
allocation (constrained or unconstrained) to a bond portfolio. Finally, we run a hedge
analysis on the optimal DCC bond–sukuk portfolio.
Our main contribution is to show that introducing a sukuk allocation to a fixedincome portfolio improves the risk-return trade-off in all cases considered (pre- and
post-crisis for constrained/unconstrained/fixed allocations).
We use daily data for both the Dow Jones Bond Index and DJSI from October
2005 to February 2014. The eligibility criteria for the DJSI have already been outlined
in Chapter 4. The DJSI construction makes it a good proxy for global sukuk
performance. All analyses are completed over three time-series panels: the whole
sample, pre-crisis (10/3/2005 to 9/15/2008), and post-crisis (9/16/08 to 2/3/2014)
periods.The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 analyses the
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empirical methods that are followed and section 7.3 presents the data used in this
chapter. Section 7.4 then discusses the empirical findings, while section 7.5 concludes
the chapter by summarizing the main results.

7.2 Empirical Results
7.2.1 DCC-GARCH results
Results from the DCC-GARCH model consist of a series of correlations
demonstrating the changes in returns association over the sample period. Table 7.1
contains the estimation results of the DCC model. With regard to the conditional
return-generating processes, one can observe that for the three times-series panels, the
one-period lagged conventional bond and sukuk returns, denoted by AR(1)
coefficients, significantly affect their current values. This finding suggests strong
evidence of short-term predictability in conventional bond and sukuk price changes
over time. It is also worth noting that the relatively small size of ARCH coefficients
suggests that conditional volatility changes more rapidly as a result of the substantial
effects of past volatility rather than past news or shocks.

Table 7.1: Estimation results of the DCC-GARCH model
Pre-crisis Period,
Post-crisis Period,
10/3/2005–9/15/2008
9/16/2008–2/2/2014
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Panel A: Univariate GARCH Estimates and Univariate Diagnostic Tests
Conditional mean equation
-0.003457
0.007002***
0.004984
0.010363***
φ0
(0.3964)
(0.0000)
(0.1984)
(0.0000)
-0.093874***
-0.027118
-0.027065
0.340854***
φ1
(0.0070)
(0.6384)
(0.3662)
(0.0005)
Conditional Variance Equation
0.008954***
0.00336***
0.0002015***
0.00762***
θ0
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0003)
(0.0000)
0.026052***
0.116304**
0.061551***
0.039241**
θ1
(0.0064)
(0.0378)
(0.0000)
(0.0265)
0.975564***
0.941540***
0.941578***
0.969330***
θ2
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
1.00162
1.05784
θ1 + θ2
Univariate Diagnostic
18.3823**
30.8931***
4.76230
22.4365**
Q(10)
(0.0488)
(0.0006)
(0.9064)
(0.0130)
2 (10)
29.0122**
3.43190
15.9099
0.623094
𝑄
(0.0012)
(0.9693)
(0.1022)
(0.9999)

Total Period
10/3/2005–2/2/2014
Bond
Sukuk

0.001807***
(0.0000)
-0.047731**
(0.0307)

0.008902***
(0.0000)
0.290181***
(0.0000)

0.54370**
(0.0437)
0.054302***
(0.0000)
0.949128***
(0.0000)
1.00343

0.32467**
(0.0319)
0.129102**
(0.0393)
0.946501***
(0.0000)
1.07560

10.4596
(0.8631)
31.5032***
(0.0004)

30.3186***
(0.0007)
0.363199
(0.9999)
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Table 7.1: Estimation results of the DCC-GARCH model (Continued)
Pre-crisis Period,
Post-crisis Period,
10/3/2005–9/15/2008
9/16/2008–2/2/2014
Bond
Sukuk
Bond
Sukuk
Panel B: Conditional Correlation Estimates and Multivariate Diagnostic Tests
Multivariate DCC Equation
α
0.00005**
0.032961*
(0.0267)
(0.0639)
β
0.883993***
0.884480***
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Dynamic Conditional Correlations
0.061651**
0.022447
ρBond−Sukuk
(0.0450)
(0.6594)
Multivariate Diagnostic
69.9251*
58.4036**
𝐿𝑖 − 𝑀𝑐𝐿 𝑄(10)
(0.0517)
(0.0235)
54.9710*
39.9745
𝐿𝑖
2 (10)
− 𝑀𝑐𝐿 𝑄
(0.0868)
(0.3824)

Total Period
10/3/2005–2/2/2014
Bond
Sukuk

0.025095***
(0.0020)
0.813277**
(0.0417)
0.026974
(0.3820)
86.4572
(0.1895)
347.803
(0.2315)

Notes: Q(10) and Q2(10) are the univariate Ljung–Box test statistics for serial correlation in standardized and squared residuals respectively.
Li-McL Q(10) and Li-McL Q2 (10) are the multivariate Li and McLeod's (1981) test statistics for serial correlation in standardized and
squared residuals respectively. The values in parentheses are the actual probability values. *, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels respectively.
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The estimates of ARCH (θ1 ) and GARCH (θ2 ) coefficients that capture shock
dependence and volatility persistence in the conditional variance equations are statistically
significant at least at the 5% level for the three times-series panels. This finding provides
evidence of a significant relationship between current volatility and lagged volatility and
lagged residuals for conventional bond and sukuk market returns. The results show that
θ1 + θ2 is close to 1 (in the range 1.00162 to 1.07560), which indicates that volatility is
persistent. The DCC model seems a good fit because both 𝑎 and 𝛽 are significant at the
1% or 5% levels, except for alpha post-crisis, which is significant at the 10% level. In
addition, the sum of 𝑎 and 𝛽 is inferior to 1, indicating that correlation is mean-reverting.
The implication of mean reversion is that sukuk are likely to be good long-term
diversifiers for a bond portfolio.
The pre-crisis conditional correlation between conventional bonds and sukuk is
small (0.0617) and statistically significant at the 5% level. This points to the significant
diversification potential of including sukuk in fixed-income portfolios. Interestingly, the
correlation falls post-crisis (to 0.0224), suggesting that

sukuk have retained their

diversification potential through the crisis despite widespread evidence of increasing
cross-market correlations at the time. Further evidence of the enduring low conditional
correlation through the 2008 crisis is provided in Table 7.1. Care should, however, be
taken because the post-crisis conditional correlation coefficient is not statistically
significant at any reasonable confidence level.
Figure 7.1 shows the evolution of the DCC over time. While there is some
variation in the correlation, it is worth pointing out that only over two brief episodes does
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the DCC exceed 0.2, thereby confirming the diversification potential of sukuk. Note also
that the jump in conditional correlations during the 2008 financial meltdown, which spikes
to approximately 0.4 in early 2009, also falls afterward to a negative figure of 0.2 by the
end of 2009. Indeed, following the outbreak of the global financial crisis, correlations
revert back to their initial levels. The graph reconfirms the foregoing results to the extent
that sukuk are weakly correlated with bonds and that they have great diversification
potential in the context of global portfolios. The only point to note here is that in a crisis,
sukuk do not offer comparable protection because of their association with global
conventional bond increases.

Note: CORR denotes correlation.
Figure 7.1: Estimated time variations of conditional correlations from the DCC-GARCH
model (10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014)
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7.2.2 Implications for Portfolio Diversification Analysis
The foregoing results indicate that diversification benefits in terms of sukuk and
conventional bonds could be achieved because of the lower association between the two
assets. This subsection explores the diversification impact of introducing a sukuk
allocation to a portfolio of conventional bonds. The analysis is conducted over three timeseries panels (the whole sample, pre-crisis, and post-crisis periods) and outlines the impact
of introducing a sukuk allocation (first an arbitrary allocation, followed by an
unconstrained allocation) to the risk–return trade-off of the portfolio. The actual weights
of minimum variance portfolios are then computed using a standard Markowitz (1952)
mean variance procedure. Specifically, let 𝑤 be 𝑛 × 1 vector of portfolio weights, 𝐻 be
the conditional variance–covariance matrix of the DCC-GARCH model, and 𝑛 be the
number of assets (two assets). The optimal weights can then be calculated by solving the
optimization problem in equation 6.6.
The results are reported in Table 7.2. In the first panel (the whole sample period),
if the portfolio consists only of conventional bonds, the return is 0.19%, the standard
deviation is 0.0265 and the Sharpe ratio (return/standard deviation; namely, the return per
unit of risk assumed) is 0.0732. Introducing a 10% sukuk allocation increases the return
(to 0.25%) and reduces the standard deviation (to 0.022); thus, the Sharpe ratio rises to
0.1141. A 20% sukuk allocation leads to a further increase in the Sharpe ratio (to 0.1625).
The optimal sukuk allocation from a risk–return trade-off (i.e., the allocation which
maximizes the Sharpe ratio) is 35.63%. In this case, the Sharpe ratio is 0.2315, which is
more than triple the ratio for the conventional bonds-only portfolio.

Table 7.2: Performance of minimum variance portfolios
Optimal Weights
(%)
Bond

Return

Standard
Deviation

Sharpe
Ratio

VaR%
1%

5%

10%

Sukuk

Panel A: Total Period, 10/3/2005–2/2/2014
Bond only

100

0.00

0.0019

0.0265

0.0732

6.174

4.365

3.401

Sukuk only

0.00

100

0.0076

0.0478

0.1591

11.133

7.871

6.133

Bond with Sukuk
(unrestricted)

64.37

35.63

0.0040

0.0171

0.2315

3.984

2.817

2.195

Bond with Sukuk
(min. 70% in Bond)

70.00

30.00

0.0036

0.0174

0.2100

2.960

4.187

2.306

Bond with Sukuk
(max. 10% Sukuk)

90.00

10.00

0.0025

0.0220

0.1141

5.117

3.618

2.819

Bond with Sukuk
(max. 20% in Sukuk)

80.00

20.00

0.0031

0.0189

0.1625

4.406

3.115

2.427

Panel B: Pre-crisis Period, 10/3/2005–9/15/ 2008
Bond only

100

0.000

-0.004

0.0185

-0.244

4.303

3.042

2.370

Sukuk only

0.00

100

0.006

0.0018

3.379

0.416

0.294

0.229

Bond with Sukuk
(unrestricted)

6.96

93.04

0.005

0.0017

3.132

0.394

0.279

0.217
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Table 7.2: Performance of minimum variance portfolios (Continued)
Optimal Weights
(%)
Bond

Return

Standard
Deviation

Sharpe
Ratio

VaR%
1%

5%

10%

Sukuk

Bond with Sukuk
(min. 70% in Bond)

70.00

30.00

-0.001

0.0094

-0.143

2.189

1.547

1.206

Bond with Sukuk
(max. 10% Sukuk)

90.00

10.00

-0.003

0.0151

-0.229

3.508

2.480

1.932

Bond with Sukuk
(max. 20% in Sukuk)

80.00

20.00

-0.002

0.0120

-0.200

2.803

1.982

1.544

Panel C: Post-crisis Period, 9/16/2008–2/2/2014
Bond only

100

0.00

0.0055

0.0309

0.1765

7.185

5.080

3.958

Sukuk only

0.00

100

0.0084

0.0729

0.1158

16.955

11.988

9.341

Bond with Sukuk
(unrestricted)

0.0063

0.0217

0.2927

5.041

3.564

2.777

70.21

29.79

Bond with Sukuk
(min. 70% in Bond)

0.0063

0.0217

0.2927

5.041

3.564

2.777

70.21

29.79

Bond with Sukuk
(max. 10% Sukuk)

90.00

10.00

0.0058

0.0257

0.2235

5.987

4.233

3.298

Bond with Sukuk
(max. 20% in Sukuk)

80.00

20.00

0.0060

0.0227

0.2669

5.272

3.728

2.904
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In the pre-crisis panel, the optimal sukuk allocation is over 93%, driven mainly
by the fact that a rising interest rate environment in that period means that the total
bond return is negative (the interest received is more than offset by price depreciations
caused by the higher rates). Post-crisis, the optimal sukuk allocation is over 70%;
moreover, the Sharpe ratio rises from 0.1765 in the conventional bonds-only portfolio
to 0.2927 in the optimal portfolio. In all cases, the introduction of sukuk increases
returns and Sharpe ratios. This finding suggests that reallocating an unconstrained
proportion of a conventional bond portfolio to sukuk improves the risk–return tradeoff significantly.
Figure 7.2 shows the optimal portfolio weights over time. Given that the main
driver of returns differs for conventional bonds (interest rates) and sukuk (performance
of underlying assets), it is unsurprising that the optimal weight should vary over time.
Specifically, a strong jump in the optimal sukuk allocation is observed in the period
2009–2010. In 2009–2010, in the volatile markets post-Lehman Brothers, volatility
rose much more sharply for conventional bonds (which were exposed to market
variables only: reference interest rates and credit spreads) than for sukuk (whose
values were linked to underlying real-world assets). While falling central bank rates
over that time should, in isolation, push conventional bond prices up, this effect was
more than offset by the rise in credit spreads, meaning that overall risky conventional
bonds’ rates increased. Most importantly, volatility relating to rates and credit spreads
rose sharply. As a result, the risk-adjusted return of sukuk was more attractive than
that of conventional bonds. This period also coincided with greater variability of the
DCC correlation (as evidenced in Figure 7.1); however, the conditional variance
differential was the dominant factor and explains the high sukuk allocation.
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Figure 7.2: Estimated time variations of optimal weights from the DCC-GARCH
model (10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014)
Figure 7.3 shows the greater variability of the returns of the optimal portfolio
from the Lehman Brothers’ collapse onward. This variability is further evidenced by
Figure 7.4, which shows the standard deviation of the optimal portfolio rise sharply in
the fourth quarter of 2008.
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Figure 7.3: Estimated time variations of returns in an optimal portfolio from the
DCC-GARCH model (10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014)

Figure 7.4: Estimated time variations of standard deviations in an optimal portfolio
from the DCC-GARCH model (10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014)
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One should note that introducing a sukuk allocation of 30% improves the risk–
return trade-off (as measured by the Sharpe ratio) in all cases. Overall, these findings
imply that investors holding assets should have more sukuk than conventional bonds
in their portfolios to minimize risk, while keeping the expected return unchanged.
As aforementioned, conditional volatility estimates are used to construct hedge
ratios. The average optimal hedge ratios are presented in Table 7.3. The table reports
the amount of sukuk/conventional bonds that should be longed/shorted in order to
hedge a US$1 portfolio. As can be seen, on average, a US$1 portfolio of conventional
bonds can be hedged with a short position of 5.725 cents of sukuk. In the pre-crisis
panel, the portfolio can be hedged with a short position of 8.793 cents compared with
4.060 cents in the post-crisis panel. The main finding from the table is that we observe
a drop in the hedge efficiency post-crisis (from 72.8% to 16%). This is unsurprising
since sukuk have already been found to be good diversifiers in a bond portfolio because
of the low correlation between conventional bond and sukuk returns. If conventional
bond and sukuk returns are driven by different factors, we would not expect one to
have a great hedge efficiency with respect to the other (the key to hedge efficiency is
to find a hedge correlated to the position to be hedged).
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Table 7.3: Optimal weights, hedge ratios, returns, standard deviations, and VaR of
the optimal portfolio for a conventional bond–sukuk portfolio from the DCCGARCH model
Total Period,

Optimal weight %
(𝒘𝟏𝟐,𝒕 )
Hedge ratio %
(𝜷𝟏𝟐,𝒕 )
Return %
Standard Deviation
%
VaR
1%
5%
10%
Hedging
Effectiveness (HE)

10/3/2005–
2/02/2014
31.592

Pre-crisis Period

Post-crisis Period

10/3/2005–
15/09/2008

9/16/2008–
2/2/2014

16.684

39.686

5.7250

8.7931

4.0602

0.6336
2.2994

0.4348
0.5031

0.7415
3.2753

5.9336
4.5077
3.7832
19.2135

1.2988
0.9863
0.8278
72.7981

8.4503
6.4196
5.3879
15.997

The dynamic evolution of hedging ratios is presented in Figure 7.5. The figure
shows considerable variability in optimal hedge ratios across the sample period,
implying that hedging positions must be adjusted frequently. Notice that the hedge
ratios of sukuk/conventional bonds experience stability and are close to zero during
the period 2008–2010. This situation is likely due to the world financial crisis.
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Figure 7.5: Estimated time variations of hedge ratios from the DCC-GARCH model
(10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014)
Overall, our findings for optimal hedge ratios suggest that sukuk should be an
integral part of a diversified portfolio of bonds, thereby helping to increase the riskadjusted performance of the hedged portfolio.

7.3 Conclusions
The DCC analysis as applied to bonds and sukuk both before and after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers shows that correlation is very low, making sukuk a great
diversifier in a fixed-income portfolio that hitherto contained only conventional bonds.
Moreover, the diversification potential of sukuk remained intact throughout the
financial crisis (there is evidence that correlation actually went down). In addition, we
have shown that the introduction of a sukuk allocation to a fixed-income portfolio
(unconstrained or specified ex ante) improves risk–return trade-off in all cases, both
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before and after the crisis. We have also looked at the hedging efficiency of sukuk
used in a bond portfolio and found a fall in the hedge efficiency post-crisis, a result
explainable by the low correlation between conventional bond and sukuk returns.
Cakir and Raei (2007) find that including sukuk in a bond portfolio reduces the
portfolio’s VaR significantly because of the low correlation between sukuk and bond
returns. However, in their study the reduced risk is not balanced against the lower
sukuk returns. While confirming the low correlation with DCC-GARCH (and hence
the diversification benefit), we have gone further by showing that introducing a sukuk
allocation improves the risk–return trade-off, as measured by the Sharpe ratio.
Our analysis has important consequences for asset allocation. Most
importantly, conventional bond funds should be encouraged to introduce a sukuk
allocation to their portfolios since doing so would improve the funds’ risk–return
characteristics.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion
8.1 Introduction
The sukuk market has experienced tremendous growth over the last few years.
Transaction volumes increased from US$8 billion in 2003 to US$856 M globally
(IIFM, 2016) because sovereign and corporate issuances aim to access the growing
Islamic liquidity pool. However, despite this growth, relatively few studies have
explored the market risks of sukuk relative to that of conventional bonds.
Islamic law, or Shari’ah, prohibits the payment of interest. Islamic banks
operate an interest-free system guided by the principle that the profits and losses of a
financed asset are shared between fund providers (depositors) and fund users
(entrepreneurs). Sukuk are traded securities consistent with this principle. Unlike
conventional debt instruments, sukuk returns are linked directly to the performance of
a financed asset, rather than the creditworthiness of a borrower. Sukuk holders are thus
exposed to a financed asset’s value rather than interest rates and issuer credit spreads.
This “buyer–seller” arrangement (rather than the “borrower–lender” arrangement of
conventional bonds) leads to different agency characteristics. Further, the specificities
of sukuk pose the question of their riskiness relative to conventional bonds.
The focus of this thesis has been on the relative market risk of sukuk and
conventional bonds. In this regard, market risk is measured by VaR. The thesis has
three objectives. First, we look at whether, for a set of Middle Eastern issuers, sukuk
are riskier than conventional bonds. Second, we investigate whether VaR is an
adequate measure of market risk for sukuk. Third, we look at the risk–return impact of
including a sukuk allocation in a bond portfolio.
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In chapter 5, we considered seven companies that are conventional bond and
sukuk issuers (BLME, MAF, Petronas, Rasmala, Tamweel, Dubai, and DP World).
We examined the relative riskiness, as measured by VaR, of both issues. We also
performed a similar analysis for two indices (the DJSI and the Dow Jones Corporate
Bond Index).
In order to explore the validity of VaR as a measure of market risk, we
conducted unconditional (Kupiec) and conditional (Engle and Manganelli) backtesting
tests. We also computed ES as an alternative market-risk measure for our data to
compare results.
In chapter 6, we considered the diversification impact of including sukuk in a
bond portfolio. Using a DCC-GARCH approach, we first examined the time-varying
features of the correlation between conventional bond and sukuk indices. We then
investigated the impact of introducing sukuk to a conventional bond portfolio on the
risk–return trade-off (as measured by the Sharpe ratio).

8.2 Summary of Results
We have found that, for a given issuer, conventional bond VaR is significantly
higher than sukuk VaR in most cases, indicating that sukuk are less risky. This finding
holds regardless of the time horizon over which VaR is computed, the confidence
interval, and the methodology used (HS and VCV).
We have also found evidence of persistent sukuk illiquidity, a consequence of
which is that sukuk returns are non-normal (in a statistical sense). Specifically, sukuk
returns exhibit heavier tails and are more clustered around the mean than predicted by
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the normal distribution. The main consequence for VaR is that, for high confidence
levels (95% and higher), HS VaR is higher than VCV VaR.
The backtesting results for our data have shown mixed results with conditional
and unconditional tests. It should be noted that this observation applies equally to
conventional bonds and sukuk. In addition, rerunning the analysis using ES (an
alternative, coherent measure of risk) has not altered the results.
Using a DCC-GARCH approach, we have found that sukuk returns have a low
correlation with conventional bond returns, making them a good diversifier. We have
further shown that introducing a sukuk allocation to a conventional bond portfolio
improves the risk–return trade-off, as measured by the Sharpe ratio, in all cases both
before and after the 2008 crisis.
Our results have expanded the literature. Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007)
show that the DJIS has lower VaR than the Dow Jones Bond Index. Cakir and Raei
(2007) find that introducing sukuk to a conventional bond portfolio decreases VaR
because of the low correlation between sukuk and bond returns. Both studies focus on
risk and do not compare the reduction in risk with the lower sukuk returns. We have
confirmed these results but have gone further by showing that the risk–return tradeoff
of sukuk is better than that of bonds and that it is always worthwhile to introduce a
sukuk allocation to a conventional bond portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis.

8.3 Implications
Sukuk issuance should be encouraged by governments in Muslim countries for
at least two reasons.
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First, there is widespread evidence that efficient capital markets foster
economic growth. A well-organized and liquid sukuk market can thus boost economic
growth while being consistent with Shari’ah. Although the link between capital
markets and economic growth can apply to all instruments (sukuk as well as
conventional bonds), sukuk have added features that make them particularly attractive
from a public policy perspective: Shari’ah compliance, economic system stability,
reduced moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and greater conduciveness to
poverty alleviation.
Second, this study has shown that sukuk carry less market risk than
conventional bonds. Thus, international investors who do not specifically pursue
Shari’ah-compliant investment objectives can still benefit from allocating part of their
resources to sukuk. This study has shown that sukuk are proving an excellent
diversifier to a bond portfolio and improve the risk–return trade-off, as measured by
the Sharpe ratio.

8.4 Recommendations
Governments should foster and encourage the growth of the sukuk sector in
primary as well as secondary markets.
Low secondary trading activity can make sukuk less attractive to international
funds because of the lack of a wide spectrum of maturities. Low trading volumes will
lead to investors demanding a liquidity premium, which would be detrimental to
issuers. International bond funds would do well to include a sukuk allocation in their
portfolios.
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8.5 Limitations and Suggestions
We have found that, for indices, the conventional bond VaR is higher than the
sukuk VaR. While this finding could point to differences in the structures and natures
of both instruments (our argument), it should be noted that the modified duration of
the conventional bond index is higher than that of the sukuk index (7.5 compared with
5.1), a situation that may have contributed to explaining our results. However, the
index results were similar to individual companies’ results, for which no significant
duration differences exist. In addition, given the smaller dependence upon interest
rates of sukuk, the very concept of modified duration may be flawed when assessing
sukuk risks.
The superior risk–return trade-off offered by sukuk that we uncovered needs
to be balanced against the persistent illiquidity of the secondary market for sukuk.
Further work could be conducted to assess the extent to which the extra returns of
sukuk can be explained by the “liquidity premium” frequently demanded by investors
as compensation for illiquidity.
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Appendix 1: Kupiec LR Test Results
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0.027371

-0.071423

1.9650

0.012453

6.3259

0.011899

-0.27751

2.0134

0.0050000

0.012453

6.3259

0.011899

-0.084327

2.1107

0.011208

13.082

0.00029811

-0.26887

1.8786

0.0025000

0.0099626

10.181

0.0014191

-0.095344

2.1312
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MAF
Bond

Sukuk

0.95000

Success
rate
0.95050

0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750

0.97426
0.98218
0.98614
0.98812

Quantile

Success
rate
0.047525

Quantile

0.050000

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
0.0026137
0.95923
0.011316
0.91528
2.5323
0.11153
5.3653
0.020541
9.2737
0.0023247
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
0.066182
0.79698

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

0.23488

1.4285

0.95000

Success
rate
0.96436

0.27602
0.26952
0.29462
0.31256

1.5068
1.4707
1.4589
1.4148

0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750

0.96832
0.98218
0.98416
0.98416

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

Success
rate

-0.28603

1.6082

0.050000

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
2.4247
0.11944

ESF1

ESF2

0.91398

-8.5469

0.85430
0.35534
2.5323
0.11153
7.5611
0.0059642
16.157
5.8300e-005
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
3.1902
0.074080

0.99711
1.6310
1.8139
1.8139

3.4383
2.7936
2.3468
1.9673

ESF1

ESF2

-1.0477

2.8473

0.011316

0.91528

-1.2819

2.8082

3.8131

0.050853

-1.5329

2.7880

10.012

0.0015557

-1.6930

2.6896

16.157

5.8300e-005

-1.8812

2.6575

0.033663
0.025000

0.033663

1.4052

0.23586

-0.32833

1.5062

0.025000

0.010000

0.019802

3.8131

0.050853

-0.39492

1.5168

0.010000

0.025743
0.019802
0.0050000
0.0025000

0.011881
0.0099010

3.4603
6.3162

0.062859
0.011964

-0.49011
-0.54663

1.6425
1.6126

0.0050000
0.0025000

0.017822
0.015842
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Petronas

0.050000
0.025000

Success
rate
0.022508
0.012862

Bond
Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
13.182
0.00028271
13.105
0.00029455
8.5314
0.0034907
12.719
0.00036191
9.6176
0.0019272
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
24.684
6.7547e-007
9.1194
0.0025291

0.010000

0.0072347

1.0631

0.0050000

0.0048232

0.0025000

0.0032154

Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile

Success
rate
0.92605
0.95740
0.98071
0.98633
0.99196

Success
rate
0.93167
0.95338
0.96543
0.97347
0.98071

Sukuk
Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
7.9331
0.0048539
19.096
1.2428e-005
46.309
1.0100e-011
57.160
4.0190e-014
56.658
5.1847e-014
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
33.923
5.7351e-009
6.6549
0.0098884

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

ESF1

ESF2

0.36032
0.43569
0.64769
0.80368
1.1133

1.5142
1.4437
1.5128
1.5070
1.6581

0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750

0.25019
0.30004
0.35864
0.34646
0.39248

1.7838
1.6575
1.4154
1.3252
1.2807

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

-0.61372
-0.76354

1.7950
2.0120

0.050000
0.025000

Success
rate
0.018489
0.014469

ESF1

ESF2

-0.53536
-0.62347

1.6558
1.8325

0.30250

-1.0635

2.3736

0.010000

0.0088424

0.17520

0.67553

-0.76075

1.9070

0.0079138

0.92911

-1.3454

2.7833

0.0050000

0.0064309

0.46931

0.49331

-0.93527

2.0481

0.23401

0.62857

-1.8025

3.3830

0.0025000

0.0048232

2.1124

0.14611

-1.1358

2.2337
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Rasmala
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile

Sukuk
Success
rate
0.97450
0.98179
0.98907
0.99089
0.99636
Success
rate

0.050000

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
8.3913
0.0037703
1.1432
0.28498
0.046453
0.82935
1.4959
0.22130
0.25177
0.61583
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
8.3913
0.0037703

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

0.32357
0.36277
0.38393
0.38889
0.50529

1.3028
1.2310
1.1850
1.1223
1.1745

0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

-0.48903

4.9360

0.050000

0.025501
0.025000

0.84154

-0.48846

3.8198

0.025000

0.023679

0.0050000
0.0025000

0.018215

0.11798

ESF2

0.22109
0.25263
0.32216
0.32216
0.32216

1.1859
1.2313
1.3978
1.2966
1.2150

ESF1

ESF2

-0.24008

3.3884

0.73124

-0.30076

3.0601

5.8258

0.015793

-0.35681

2.6852

4.6290

0.031435

-0.46588

3.2913

8.4857

0.0035794

-0.51692

3.2265

0.027322
5.8258

0.021858
0.020036

Success
rate

ESF1

0.038251
0.039971

0.010000

Success
rate
0.98543
0.99454
0.99818
0.99818
0.99818

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
19.890 8.2041e-006
12.540
0.00039837
5.6111
0.017847
1.4760
0.22440
0.11199
0.73789
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
1.7300
0.18841

0.015793

-0.51662

3.0881

0.010000
0.021858

14.154
22.601

0.00016845
1.9942e-006

-0.53585
-0.56701

2.8218
2.6567

0.0050000
0.0025000

0.012750
0.010929
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Tamweel
Bond

Sukuk
Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
2.0332
0.15389

ESF1

ESF2

0.95000

Success
rate
0.95892

1.0240

-1.8426

0.97500

0.97028

0.98704

0.32047

1.3159

-0.37742

0.99000

0.97727

13.759

0.00020783

1.4893

-1.4881

0.99500
0.99750

0.97990
0.98339

1.6036
1.7085

2.5952
2.3276

0.99500
0.99750

0.99126
0.99126

Quantile

Success
rate
0.029720

29.714 5.0076e-008
39.907 2.6637e-010
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
11.519
0.00068903

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

-0.89015

0.98364

Success
rate
0.0096154

1.2041

0.27251

-1.1154

1.1333

0.54015

0.46237

-1.3527

1.2804

0.010000

0.0078671

2.6284
0.10496
10.800
0.0010150
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
58.066
2.5313e014
18.731
1.5050e005
0.56721
0.45137

5.2572

0.021856

-1.5066

1.2323

0.0050000

0.0078671

1.6081

10.800

0.0010150

-1.6440

1.2722

0.0061189

4.2663

Quantile

0.050000
0.025000

0.020105
0.010000

Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000

0.050000
0.025000

Success
rate
0.99126
0.99126
0.99126

0.0078671

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
61.541
4.3299e015
16.492
4.8855e005
0.19121
0.66191

ESF1

ESF2

3.2368

3.4575

3.2368

3.0578

3.2368

2.6963

3.2368
3.2368

2.4957
2.3349

ESF1

ESF2

-1.6189

3.0104

-1.7546

2.6025

-1.7546

2.0465

0.20476

-1.7546

1.7900

0.038876

-1.9770

1.7943

0.012238
0.0050000
0.0025000

0.010490
0.0087413

0.0025000
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Dubai
Bond

Sukuk
Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
2.0332
0.15389

ESF1

ESF2

0.95000

Success
rate
0.95892

1.0240

-1.8426

0.97500

0.97028

0.98704

0.32047

1.3159

-0.37742

0.99000

0.97727

13.759

0.00020783

1.4893

-1.4881

0.99500
0.99750

0.97990
0.98339

1.6036
1.7085

2.5952
2.3276

0.99500
0.99750

0.99126
0.99126

Quantile

Success
rate
0.029720

29.714 5.0076e-008
39.907 2.6637e-010
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
11.519
0.00068903

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

-0.89015

0.98364

Success
rate
0.0096154

1.2041

0.27251

-1.1154

1.1333

0.54015

0.46237

-1.3527

1.2804

0.010000

0.0078671

2.6284
0.10496
10.800
0.0010150
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
58.066
2.5313e014
18.731
1.5050e005
0.56721
0.45137

5.2572

0.021856

-1.5066

1.2323

0.0050000

0.0078671

1.6081

10.800

0.0010150

-1.6440

1.2722

0.0025000

0.0061189

4.2663

Quantile

0.050000
0.025000

0.020105
0.010000

Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000

0.050000
0.025000

Success
rate
0.99126
0.99126
0.99126

0.0078671

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
61.541
4.3299e015
16.492
4.8855e005
0.19121
0.66191

ESF1

ESF2

3.2368

3.4575

3.2368

3.0578

3.2368

2.6963

3.2368
3.2368

2.4957
2.3349

ESF1

ESF2

-1.6189

3.0104

-1.7546

2.6025

-1.7546

2.0465

0.20476

-1.7546

1.7900

0.038876

-1.9770

1.7943

0.012238
0.0050000
0.0025000

0.010490
0.0087413
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DP World
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile

Sukuk
Success
rate
0.95492
0.96828
0.98275
0.98609
0.98998

Success
rate

0.050000

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
0.94762
0.33033
3.0719
0.079657
7.8432
0.0051011
19.280
1.1289e005
23.054
1.5754e006
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
0.40945
0.52225

Success
rate
0.96049
0.97329
0.98219
0.98609

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
4.4718
0.034458
0.21123
0.64580
8.9810
0.0027280
19.280
1.1289e005
28.852
7.8106e008
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
1.7186
0.18988

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

0.70562
0.86896
1.2970
1.3631

2.3251
1.8950
2.1194
1.7013

0.95000
0.97500
0.99000

1.6774

1.6453

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

-0.98078

2.0991

0.050000

Success
rate
0.043406

0.025000

0.032276

3.5799

0.024485

27.125

0.020590

49.148

0.017807

71.062

0.99500
0.99750

0.98887

ESF1

ESF2

1.2509
1.4507
1.7088
1.8684

1.7250
1.6753
1.6306
1.6077

2.1150

1.6019

ESF1

ESF2

-1.6317

2.1001

0.058484

-1.9048

2.0370

1.9067e007
2.3737e012
0.00000

-2.1950

1.9625

-2.4001

1.9258

-2.5959

1.8906

0.046745
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

5.3152

0.021140

-1.2132

2.0432

0.033945
0.022816

21.879

-1.5759

2.0283

0.017251

33.025

-1.8500

2.0895

0.013912

45.044

2.9045e006
9.0987e009
1.9267e011

-2.1138

2.1308

0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000
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Index
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Sukuk
Success
rate
0.94711
0.96647
0.97822
0.98548
0.98894

Success
rate
0.067058
0.039060
0.023159
0.016592
0.011753

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
0.49839
0.48021
7.8135
0.0051858
30.327
3.6499e008
34.733
3.7817e009
45.856
1.2728e011
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
16.085
6.0547e005
20.085
7.4089e006
36.903
1.2414e009
48.471
3.3517e012
51.963
5.6566e013

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

0.29057
0.32136
0.35930

1.4070
1.3437
1.2587

0.95000
0.97500

0.38109

1.2335

0.38915

1.1867

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

-0.27476

1.4138

0.050000

-0.32078

1.3703

0.025000

-0.35117

1.3115

-0.37211

1.2728

-0.40317

1.2502

0.99000
0.99500
0.99750

Success
rate
0.95984
0.96805
0.97764
0.98083
0.98403

Success
rate

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
4.7706
0.028950
3.9954
0.045626
25.038
5.6220e007
51.240
8.1757e013
71.185
0.00000
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
9.8908
0.0016611

ESF1

ESF2

0.22387
0.27239
0.34476

1.4477
1.1934
1.7947

0.38181

1.0950

0.44323

2.0965

ESF1

ESF2

-0.25435

2.7236

0.036057

0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

0.091500

0.76228

-0.33637

2.4939

0.026016
0.020539

18.841

-0.41075

2.1192

0.016431

35.859

-0.49915

2.1955

0.014605

60.244

1.4205e005
2.1214e009
8.3267e015

-0.54745

1.6949
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Index Pre-crisis
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Sukuk
Success
rate
0.94265
0.96207
0.97687
0.98520
0.98705

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
1.1776
0.27785
6.4145
0.011319
13.729 0.00021115
13.643 0.00022104
23.580 1.1980e-006

0.050000

Success
rate
0.029831

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
0.35462
0.55151
1.1035
0.29350
3.0400
0.081238
8.8443
0.0029401
20.279
6.6923e006
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
7.6706
0.0056129

Success
rate
0.073080

Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
10.678
0.0010841

0.049029

20.090

1.2808

0.025000

0.023346

0.088423

0.76619

-0.18799

2.9578

0.024052

-0.28079

1.2467

0.010000

0.022049

8.4172

0.0037169

-0.19774

2.5614

0.00022104

-0.30557

1.2275

0.019455

18.633

-0.21166

2.4833

6.4705e-006

-0.31529

1.1600

0.019455

35.633

1.5845e005
2.3819e009

-0.21166

2.2721

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

0.23329
0.25482
0.29400
0.31538
0.30532

1.4210
1.3391
1.2690
1.2612
1.1870

0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

-0.22775

1.3816

7.3897e-006

-0.25486

15.473

8.3687e-005

0.014801

13.643

0.012026

20.344

0.99750

0.0050000
0.0025000

Success
rate
0.95460
0.96887
0.98314
0.98573
0.98573

ESF1

ESF2

0.063991
0.080205
0.11466
0.12607
0.12607

1.6906
1.6700
1.8409
1.8023
1.6595

ESF1

ESF2

-0.15614

3.0244
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Index Post-crisis
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile

Sukuk
Success
rate
0.94926
0.96691
0.97904
0.98566
0.99117

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
0.021064
0.88460
4.4305
0.035303
16.722
4.3272e005
21.081
4.4036e006
17.500
2.8732e005
Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
5.8739
0.015367

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

0.32665
0.35557
0.39619

1.3984
1.3263
1.2496

0.95000
0.97500

0.42153

1.2143

0.43416

1.2119

ESF1

ESF2

Quantile

-0.31062

1.4406

0.050000

0.99000
0.99500
0.99750

0.050000

Success
rate
0.062879

0.025000

0.035852

7.7385

0.0054055

-0.36807

1.4126

0.025000

0.023718

24.879

-0.38896

1.3317

0.010000

0.016547

30.180

-0.41911

1.3114

0.012135

34.744

6.1058e007
3.9365e008
3.7602e009

-0.44843

1.2882

Success
rate
0.96341
0.97396
0.97959

Short Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
5.9050
0.015098
0.061983
0.80339
11.950
0.00054638

ESF1

ESF2

0.34196
0.46320
0.53012

1.5857
1.2098
1.7142

0.98311

24.841

6.2261e-007

0.60690

2.1086

0.98874

23.373

1.3346e-006

0.89040

1.9447

Success
rate

Long Positions
Kupiec
P-value
LRT
4.1245
0.042267

ESF1

ESF2

-0.34835

1.8821

0.17298

0.67747

-0.42853

2.3967

9.1987

0.0024218

-0.57089

1.3427

13.689

0.00021575

-0.79333

1.7892

14.898

0.00011349

-1.1316

2.5373

0.038705
0.026742
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

0.0050000
0.0025000

0.019001
0.013371
0.009148
5
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Appendix 2: Engle and Manganelli Test Results
BLME
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Sukuk
Short Positions
Statistics
P-value
50.535
3.6715e-009
31.038
2.4925e-005
6.3216
0.38815
16.479
0.011402
1.9648
0.92291
Long Positions
Statistics
P-value
15.962
0.013961
5.5650
0.47364
31.382
2.1431e-005
17.378
0.0079912
14.186
0.027627

Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Short Positions
Statistics
P-value
48.068
1.1451e-008
19.829
0.0029707
29.567
4.7505e-005
10.092
0.12082
13.368
0.037554
Long Positions
Statistics
P-value
24.407
0.00043944
17.448
0.0077703
16.469
0.011446
4.3053
0.63543
4.9610
0.54882

MAF
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Sukuk
Short Positions
Statistics
P-value
3.6375
0.72559
3.8037
0.70321
6.9035
0.32986
12.025
0.061403
4.1733
0.65323
Long Positions
Statistics
P-value
21.871
0.0012777
26.887
0.00015203
25.055
0.00033348
14.982
0.020399
22.378
0.0010338

Short Positions
Quantile
Statistics
0.95000
8.5163
0.97500
3.4156
0.99000
6.9626
0.99500
10.591
0.99750
12.577
Long Positions
Quantile
Statistics
0.050000
9.7315
0.025000
2.8005
0.010000
6.6717
0.0050000
9.9741
0.0025000
12.577

P-value
0.20266
0.75517
0.32432
0.10189
0.050268
P-value
0.13642
0.83343
0.35228
0.12575
0.050268
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Petronas
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Sukuk
Short Positions
Statistics
P-value
14.314
0.026315
13.812
0.031814
8.2690
0.21905
8.2053
0.22345
5.2103
0.51714
Long Positions
Statistics
P-value
58.272
1.0092e-010
15.575
0.016226
1.6674
0.94761
0.15787
0.99992
0.26450
0.99965

Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Short Positions
Statistics
P-value
11.039
0.087174
19.057
0.0040679
34.963
4.3804e-006
26.699
0.00016484
21.326
0.0016029
Long Positions
Statistics
P-value
77.313
1.2768e-014
26.619
0.00017063
9.3317
0.15576
19.046
0.0040865
36.611
2.0962e-006

Rasmala
Bond
Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Sukuk
Short Positions
Statistics
P-value
61.536
2.1924e-011
51.236
2.6554e-009
14.196
0.027524
22.352
0.0010452
0.23514
0.99975
Long Positions
Statistics
P-value
36.276
2.4362e-006
11.044
0.087027
16.884
0.0097199
22.605
0.00094002
27.916
9.7457e-005

Quantile
0.95000
0.97500
0.99000
0.99500
0.99750
Quantile
0.050000
0.025000
0.010000
0.0050000
0.0025000

Short Positions
Statistics
P-value
84.325
4.4409e-016
38.648
8.3903e-007
20.207
0.0025439
3.0601
0.80126
0.14836
0.99994
Long Positions
Statistics
P-value
25.992
0.00022343
25.071
0.00033132
30.879
2.6730e-005
12.627
0.049357
17.833
0.0066622

189
Tamweel
Bond

Sukuk

Short Positions
Short Positions
Quantile Statistics
P-value
Quantile Statistics
P-value
0.95000
294.85
0.00000
0.95000
236.76
0.00000
0.97500
296.53
0.00000
0.97500
45.274 4.1294e-008
0.99000
227.14
0.00000
0.99000
10.289
0.11299
0.99500
245.39
0.00000
0.99500
11.946
0.063178
0.99750
211.45
0.00000
0.99750
15.272
0.018242
Long Positions
Long Positions
Quantile Statistics
P-value
Quantile Statistics
P-value
0.050000
148.68
0.00000
0.050000
205.66
0.00000
0.025000
81.345 1.8874e-015 0.025000
43.415 9.6545e-008
0.010000
178.08
0.00000
0.010000
1.0411
0.98401
0.0050000 152.61
0.00000
0.0050000 1.5781
0.95414
0.0025000 124.49
0.00000
0.0025000 2.6869
0.84699

Dubai
Bond

Sukuk

Short Positions
Short Positions
Quantile Statistics
P-value
Quantile Statistics
P-value
0.95000
294.85
0.00000
0.95000
236.76
0.00000
0.97500
296.53
0.00000
0.97500
45.274 4.1294e-008
0.99000
227.14
0.00000
0.99000
10.289
0.11299
0.99500
245.39
0.00000
0.99500
11.946
0.063178
0.99750
211.45
0.00000
0.99750
15.272
0.018242
Long Positions
Long Positions
Quantile Statistics
P-value
Quantile Statistics
P-value
0.050000
148.68
0.00000
0.050000
205.66
0.00000
0.025000
81.345 1.8874e-015 0.025000
43.415 9.6545e-008
0.010000
178.08
0.00000
0.010000
1.0411
0.98401
0.0050000 152.61
0.00000
0.0050000 1.5781
0.95414
0.0025000 124.49
0.00000
0.0025000 2.6869
0.84699
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DP World
Bond
Short Positions
Quantile
Statistics
0.95000
4.2058
0.97500
6.2379
0.99000
8.2392
0.99500
13.070
0.99750
14.750
Long Positions
Quantile
Statistics
0.050000 12.800
0.025000 21.075
0.010000 29.940
0.0050000 41.874
0.0025000 27.972

Sukuk
Short Positions
P-value
Quantile Statistics
0.64885
0.95000
66.801
0.39708
0.97500
56.724
0.22110
0.99000
42.076
0.041941
0.99500
61.743
0.022296
0.99750
55.185
Long Positions
P-value
Quantile Statistics
0.046318
0.050000 19.126
0.0017785
0.025000 17.917
4.0348e-005 0.010000 29.026
1.9467e-007 0.0050000 24.963
9.5129e-005 0.0025000 26.315

P-value
1.8482e-012
2.0779e-010
1.7763e-007
1.9905e-011
4.2529e-010
P-value
0.0039553
0.0064419
6.0164e-005
0.00034681
0.00019451

Index
Bond
Short Positions
Quantile Statistics
0.95000 6.3967
0.97500 12.227
0.99000 27.046
0.99500 24.117
0.99750 22.047
Long Positions
Quantile Statistics
0.050000 25.863
0.025000 21.718
0.010000 29.627
0.0050000 38.858
0.0025000 30.157

Sukuk
Short Positions
P-value
Quantile
Statistics
0.38025
0.95000
7.8350
0.057087
0.97500
6.6951
0.00014195 0.99000
17.644
0.00049709 0.99500
26.091
0.0011876
0.99750
27.843
Long Positions
P-value
Quantile
Statistics
0.00023612 0.050000 17.960
0.0013619
0.025000 5.5543
4.6279e-005 0.010000 20.786
7.6314e-007 0.0050000 23.603
3.6696e-005 0.0025000 25.111

P-value
0.25044
0.34997
0.0071869
0.00021409
0.00010059
P-value
0.0063327
0.47491
0.0020043
0.00061770
0.00032570
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Index Pre-crisis
Bond

Sukuk
Short Positions

Short Positions

Quantile
0.95000

Statistics
9.0870

P-value
0.16874

Quantile
0.95000

0.97500

12.577

0.050274

0.97500

10.409

0.10846

0.99000

33.561

8.1776e-006

0.99000

3.4184

0.75479

0.99500

10.670

0.099136

0.99500

5.5741

0.47255

0.99750

13.868

0.031149

0.99750

8.4589

0.20637

Long Positions

Statistics
P-value
31.920 1.6903e-005

Long Positions

Quantile

Statistics

P-value

Quantile

Statistics

P-value

0.050000

21.672

0.0013882

0.050000

15.367

0.017584

0.025000

22.314

0.0010622

0.025000

3.1109

0.79480

0.010000

21.679

0.0013841

0.010000

8.6402

0.19485

0.0050000

22.892

0.00083353

0.0050000

13.199

0.039982

0.0025000

33.936

6.9224e-006 0.0025000

16.393

0.011792

Index Post-crisis
Bond

Sukuk
Short Positions

Short Positions

Quantile
0.95000

Statistics
3.4059

P-value
0.75644

Quantile
0.95000

Statistics
14.836

P-value
0.021567

0.97500

9.5238

0.14619

0.97500

4.3153

0.63409

0.99000

12.448

0.052698

0.99000

10.477

0.10596

0.99500

13.820

0.031713

0.99500

14.375

0.025714

0.99750

9.0418

0.17124

0.99750

10.768

0.095827

Long Positions

Long Positions

Quantile

Statistics

P-value

Quantile

Statistics

P-value

0.050000

12.515

0.051426

0.050000

6.3440

0.38577

0.025000

13.685

0.033359

0.025000

3.2348

0.77886

0.010000

18.824

0.0044710

0.010000

12.792

0.046465

0.0050000

17.425

0.0078432

0.0050000

12.528

0.051166

0.0025000

15.469

0.016907

0.0025000

7.5569

0.27239
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Appendix 3: Engle and Ng Sign Test Results and the Associated P-values
BLME
Bond
Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

Sukuk
0.73766
0.07148

P-values
0.46072
0.94302

0.12839

0.89784

1.03824

0.79200

Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for the
Three Effects

1.07273
0.46534

P-values
0.28339
0.64169

0.13215

0.89486

1.87426

0.59891

0.17510
1.87989

P-values
0.86100
0.06012

0.09985

0.92046

4.12143

0.24865

0.29579
0.23982

P-values
0.76739
0.81047

0.31519

0.75262

1.25341

0.96854

MAF
Bond
Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

Sukuk
0.39473
0.1.40423

P-values
0.69304
0.16025

0.31064

0.75607

2.09215

0.55350

Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

Petronas
Bond
Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

Sukuk
0.71826
0.03852

P-values
0.47260
0.96928

0.68315

0.49451

0.85440

0.83642

Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for the
Three Effects
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Rasmala
Bond
Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

Sukuk
0.79899
0.62098

P-values
0.42430
0.53461

0.11803

0.90605

1.69275

0.63855

Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for the
Three Effects

0.46611
0.14457

P-values
0.64114
0.88505

0.05364

0.95722

0.50076

0.91872

0.15921
0.21917

P-values
0.87351
0.82652

0.08420

0.93289

0.06457

0.99572

0.15921
0.21917

P-values
0.87351
0.82652

0.08420

0.93289

0.06457

0.99572

Tamweel
Bond
Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

Sukuk
1.09790
0.81306

P-values
0.27225
0.41618

0.73015

0.46530

2.11775

0.54833

Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for the
Three Effects

Dubai
Bond
Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

Sukuk
1.09790
0.81306

P-values
0.27225
0.41618

0.73015

0.46530

2.11775

0.54833

Sign Bias t-Test
Negative Size
Bias t-Test
Positive Size
Bias t-Test
Joint Test for the
Three Effects
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DP World
Bond

Sukuk
P-values

P-values

Sign Bias t-Test

0.80164

0.42276

Sign Bias t-Test

1.27623

0.20187

Negative Size
Bias t-Test

0.46698

0.64051

Negative Size
Bias t-Test

0.31564

0.75227

Positive Size
Bias t-Test

0.08815

0.92976

Positive Size
Bias t-Test

0.40906

0.68250

Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

1.18057

0.75767

Joint Test for the 2.52539
Three Effects

0.47072

Index
Bond

Sukuk
P-values

P-values

Sign Bias t-Test

1.12720

0.25966

Sign Bias t-Test

1.23420

0.21713

Negative Size
Bias t-Test

1.81182

0.07001

Negative Size
Bias t-Test

0.63397

0.52610

Positive Size
Bias t-Test

0.69036

0.48997

Positive Size
Bias t-Test

0.48784

0.62567

Joint Test for
the Three
Effects

5.17941

0.15912

Joint Test for the 2.19690
Three Effects

0.53256
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Appendix 4: Jarque-Bera Test Results

BLME
DP World
Dubai
MAF
Petronas
Rasmala
Tamweel
Index

Test statistic
p-value
Test statistic
p-value
Test statistic
p-value
Test statistic
p-value
Test statistic
p-value
Test statistic
p-value
Test statistic
p-value
Test statistic
p-value
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Bond
6.1242
0.000000
291510
0.000000
276890
0.000000
8947
0.000000
393590
0.000000
24221
0.000000
>1000000
0.000000
6413
0.000000

Sukuk
2.8685
0.000000
391510
0.000000
603420
0.000000
44031
0.000000
>1000000
0.000000
240890
0.000000
603420
0.000000
14221
0.000000

